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ABSTRACT 
 
Studies in ‘terrorism and the media’ begin with the proposition that terrorists view 
media attention as important and desirable. These studies usually proceed by 
examining the characteristics of this media attention, especially volume. To the 
extent that they touch on terrorist behaviour at all, these studies tend to deal with 
terrorists’ media strategies which are strongly tied to the terrorists’ desire for media 
attention and predominantly assume that terrorists simple choose the action that 
has had the highest media attention accorded to it. This approach is disconnected 
from the study of underlying terrorist behaviour, especially terrorists’ choice of 
action, and obscures the most important elements of this behaviour behind the 
general proposition of the desirability of media attention.  
By contrast, this thesis recognises that terrorist choice is shaped by the media 
attention that is accorded to each type of terrorist action. Viewed in this way, 
terrorism is not simply a generic means by which terrorists obtain media attention. 
This new approach allows us to account for observed terrorist behaviour that cannot 
be incorporated into an analytical framework that simply depicts terrorists as 
choosing the single action that maximises media attention. Among its contributions, 
the analysis presented in this thesis accounts for: (a) choices of actions that are not 
expected to yield maximum media attention, (b) combinations of more than one 
action and (c) situations in which terrorists choose their action with reference to the 
media attention accorded to the actions of rival groups.  
The analytical work is supported by significant independent archival research that 
collected the media coverage accorded to every act of terrorism perpetrated in West-
Germany during the 1970s, a period when groups such as the Red Army Faction, 2nd 
June Movement and the Revolutionary Cells vied for their position in the terrorism 
context and demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the media. By measuring 
the media attention accorded to individual actions, this thesis overcomes certain 
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analytical weaknesses that emerge when broader, more general, data is used. Only 
when the media attention that has been accorded to each type of action is collected 
and measured can a study of terrorist choice of action be effectively undertaken.  
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Chapter 1  - Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
It is the purpose of this thesis to present an analysis of terrorist choice in a context 
where media attention is the desired but risky or uncertain outcome of terrorist 
activity. There can be few more important challenges than the development of a 
more complete understanding of the decision-making processes that shape 
terrorists’ choices. The relevance of media coverage to the choices that terrorists 
make has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest and ‘media and terrorism’ has 
become a popular research program within terrorism studies. The analysis presented 
in this thesis is based on substantial archival research and the measurement of media 
coverage accorded to each act of terrorism perpetrated in the Federal Republic of 
Germany during the 1970s, a terrorism context which has attracted substantial 
scholarly interest in its own right. The thesis documents the nature and extent of 
media coverage attributed to terrorism during this period and explores, from the 
perspectives of orthodox and behavioural models of decision-making under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty, the patterns that terrorist groups’ choices might 
exhibit when media coverage is desired but uncertain.  
1.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 explores the overarching objective 
of the thesis. In Section 1.3 the significance of the thesis as a contribution to the 
terrorism studies literature is discussed. In Section 1.4 an overview of the thesis is 
provided. In Section 1.5 the main patterns of terrorist choices identified by the 
theoretical and empirical analysis are summarised. Section 1.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
1.2 Objective of the Thesis 
The study of media attention accorded to terrorist activity is a longstanding research 
program within terrorism studies. This research program has many different 
dimensions and has been analysed from many different perspectives. Media 
attention is generally considered to be an important objective of terrorism. Media 
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attention, if achieved by an act of terrorism, may play an important part in a terrorist 
group’s communication strategy, facilitate intimidation of a wide audience and 
enhance the identity of the group responsible. Each of these things may have 
important secondary effects, including recruitment of supporters and members.  
The analysis presented in this thesis starts with the generally agreed position that 
terrorist organisations want media attention for their group, their cause and their 
actions for a number of interrelated reasons and develops an analysis of the ways in 
which terrorists’ choices of attack methods and actions may be shaped by their 
consideration of the amount of media attention that a particular action may achieve. 
The context in which the analysis is specifically grounded is the terrorism context 
experienced by the Federal Republic of Germany (West-Germany) during the 1970s. 
During this very active period for terrorism, several prominent groups emerged that 
have remained archetype examples within their relevant categories, defined by 
objectives, scope and strategy. It is of special interest to the analysis presented in this 
thesis that a part of the scholarly interest that has been shown in these groups 
derives from the fact that they are known to have developed relatively sophisticated 
media strategies during their active periods. The analysis applies several 
complementary models of the decision-making process, including both orthodox and 
behavioural models, in order to develop some insights into the terrorist decision-
making process in a context where media attention is a desirable but uncertain or 
risky outcome of an act of terrorism.  
The overarching objective of the thesis is shaped by a consideration of media 
attention as a desired outcome of an act of terrorism but which cannot be directly 
controlled or guaranteed by the terrorist group and is therefore subject to risk and 
uncertainty from their perspective. If a terrorist group could control media attention 
or guarantee a particular amount of attention for an act of terrorism, the decision to 
act would not be subject to uncertainty and the terrorist group would simply choose 
the type of action that would result in the optimum amount of media attention 
consistent with their objectives. The context in which terrorists operate and the 
intersections and interactions with the media are shaped dynamically by a 
complexity of factors that produce substantial divergence in the media attention 
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accorded from attack to attack and from attack type to attack type over time. This 
realisation, which is underrepresented in the literature, provides the foundation for 
the primary objective of this thesis which is to explore the descriptions of the 
decision-making process embedded within complementary orthodox and 
behavioural models and the predictions regarding patterns of terrorist choice that 
derive from their application in an attempt to develop our understanding of terrorist 
choice and the ways in which media attention accorded to acts of terrorism may 
shape those choices.  
1.3 Significance of the Thesis 
The fulfilment of the overarching objective of this thesis encompasses at least several 
preliminary conclusions. Together, these shape the nature and significance of the 
contribution that this thesis makes to the terrorism studies literature. Specific 
aspects of the investigation are highlighted below: 
 The analysis of terrorist choice and the ways in which choices may be shaped 
by the media attention accorded to acts of terrorism is placed within a well-
defined analytical context focused on identifying patterns of terrorist group 
decision-making. The theoretical analysis is supported by examples 
constructed from a unique dataset of terrorist activity and media attention 
gathered during periods of intense archival research.  
 The application of orthodox and behavioural models of the decision-making 
process generates several alternative but complementary perspectives from 
which to observe the development of terrorist groups’ preference for 
particular actions or combinations of actions when media attention is desired 
but uncertain.  
 Terrorist groups make their determination as to which type of action or 
combination of actions to perpetrate within a dynamic context in which the 
aggregate of terrorist activity and the media attention that is accorded to it 
evolves over time. The formation of expectations regarding the outcomes of 
planned action and the media attention it might or might not receive is 
reflected in different ways by each of the analytical models that are applied. 
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 The media attention that can be expected to result from any single terrorist 
action is uncertain and the terrorist group’s preferences reflect a trade-off 
between the expected impact of a planned action and the possibility that the 
actual amount of media attention that it receives will diverge from the 
group’s expectations. 
 Each of the complementary models of decision-making encompasses this 
trade-off between expected outcomes and the possibility of divergence or 
risk. Each model contributes a unique treatment of this factor and other 
relevant aspects of the decision environment. 
The existing literature tends to overemphasise terrorists’ preferences for the attack 
method or type of action that results in the highest amount of media attention. This 
contains within it an implicit basic model of choice where expectations are shaped 
solely by the absolute amount of media attention accorded to terrorist actions in 
some preceding period or periods. This leads more or less directly to the conclusion 
that media attention ‘causes’ terrorist activity. At the very least, this is an incomplete 
picture. Although a terrorist group may always prefer more media attention to less, 
terrorist groups, either individually or in aggregate, are not observed to choose one 
single type of action. Rather, terrorist groups can be observed to combine more than 
one type of action, to choose one type of action in one period and a different action 
in another period and, significantly, to choose one action over another even when 
the rejected action has attracted more intense media attention in previous periods. 
The development of our understanding of terrorist choice requires the broadening 
of our analytical emphasis beyond terrorist preferences for actions that yield the 
highest amount of media attention to incorporate the terrorist group’s assessment 
of both expected outcomes and the uncertainty that characterises those outcomes. 
The ways in which the trade-off between expected outcomes and uncertainty might 
be managed by a terrorist group, the ways in which a group may assess the chances 
that a particular outcome may be achieved, and the influence of rival terrorist groups 
on each other’s choices are important aspects of terrorist decision-making that are 
amenable to deeper analysis once the emphasis on terrorist choice in this context is 
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broadened to encompass both expected outcomes and the uncertainty that 
characterises them.  
Models of the decision-making process have been developed on similar theoretical 
principles but differ substantially in terms of the specific details that are incorporated 
or reflected in their theoretical structure. The application of these models to new 
contexts not only promises to develop additional insights into the nature of decision-
making in these contexts by drawing out hitherto unexplored parallels between 
theory and practice but also develops our understanding of the scope of application 
or the reach of these theoretical models and their limitations. Only application in 
specific contexts such as the one chosen for the purpose of this investigation can 
achieve a duality in terms of advancing existing knowledge of both theory and its 
scope in particular circumstances. The use of several complementary models of the 
decision-making process allows comparison and contrast but, ultimately, highlights 
the value of a multifaceted approach that draws on the strengths of each individual 
theoretical framework.  
The terrorism context in West-Germany during the 1970s, viewed historically and 
narrowly through the lens of the record of attacks, perpetrators, injuries and 
fatalities facilitated by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) reveals only a static 
numerical picture of the events that took place during this tumultuous period. 
Beneath this aggregate of numerical detail, however, lies a set of real experiences 
and real decisions evolving in a dynamic and uncertain environment where a number 
of terrorist groups, some with similar, some with diverse objectives, operated and 
jostled for their place within the terrorism context and were reflected, discussed, 
editorialised, publicised and ostracised in varying degrees by the mainstream press 
which itself was involved in competition for readership share and bound sometimes 
and sometimes not bound by particular competing philosophies, approaches and all 
of the other factors that shape decisions regarding, very broadly speaking, 
‘newsworthiness’. This thesis draws on substantial and unique data, gathered during 
periods of independent archival research, to present an analysis of the choices that 
terrorist groups made during this time and the ways in which those choices might 
have been shaped, not by the static representation of time and place, but by a 
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context that was in the most real sense of these words evolving and dynamic and 
complex.  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis presents an analysis of terrorist choice in a context where media attention 
is the desirable but uncertain outcome of terrorist activity. The analysis helps to 
develop our understanding of terrorist choice and the ways in which it may be shaped 
by the media attention accorded to terrorist activity. Although the analytical 
framework is general and can be applied to any time period and any form of ‘media’, 
in this thesis it is applied specifically to the terrorist activity recorded in West-
Germany during the 1970s and the media attention that was accorded to it by tabloid 
and mainstream broadsheet newspaper publishers. As mentioned previously, the 
particular period and the terrorist groups that were active then are the subject of a 
standalone research program within terrorism studies due to the nature of the 
groups and their behaviour. As such, the analysis is relevant for those scholars who 
are interested in terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion 
or ‘Baader-Meinhof Group’), the 2nd June Movement (Bewegung 2. Juni) and 
Revolutionary Cells (Revolutionäre Zellen), all of whom were active during the period 
under consideration and whose actions are considered by the analysis presented in 
this thesis.  
In Chapter 2 each of these three terrorist groups is profiled and particular emphasis 
is placed on the understanding that each demonstrated of the relevance of the media 
attention accorded to their actions. These groups operated within a distinct historical 
and cultural period, the tumult of which was accentuated by the many acts of 
terrorism that were perpetrated in West-Germany and across Europe during the 
1970s and 1980s. An overview of the nature and frequency of these acts of terrorism, 
both within West-Germany and across Europe, is presented in Chapter 2 along with 
a commentary that explores relevant aspects of the social background against which 
these acts of terrorism were set. The chapter presents an overview of terrorism in 
Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, a statistical summary of the nature and 
frequency of the acts of terrorism that were recorded and their perpetrators, an 
overview of the social context and the emergence of the ‘New Left’ and, finally, a 
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more detailed set of profiles of several of the most prominent terrorist groups of the 
period and their documented understanding of the importance of their interaction 
with the media.  
In Chapter 3 the thesis is set within the existing literature on terrorism studies. A 
survey of the literature is presented. The volume of literature that has been 
published in what has become a very multidisciplinary field of study is beyond the 
scope of any single review. However, it is possible to review the approaches that 
characterise each distinct area of terrorism studies, including psychology, economics, 
political science and criminology and to place the findings that each of these 
disciplines has contributed within a coherent narrative that provides an accurate 
assessment of the nature and scope of terrorism studies and the main themes that 
have been explored. Some of these themes include research into the nature of 
terrorism studies itself and the definitions of terrorism that are applied there, 
research into the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, investigation of the factors that 
extend or shorten the life cycle of terrorist groups, exploration of the underlying 
causes of terrorism and, lately, the criminological turn that terrorism studies has 
taken. 
The focus of this thesis is terrorist choice and the ways in which the media attention 
accorded to acts of terrorism may shape those choices. The analytical perspective 
derives from orthodox and behavioural decision theory, which sees its fullest 
expression in parts of orthodox and behavioural economics. The application of both 
orthodox and behavioural models of the decision-making process under conditions 
of risk and uncertainty provides a different perspective from which to develop our 
understanding of the ways in which the media attention accorded to different acts 
of terrorism may shape a terrorist group’s choice of action. The literature survey 
provides the context for this application and identifies the contribution that the 
thesis makes to the specific research program within terrorism studies that is usually 
referred to as ‘terrorism and the media’. The multidisciplinary nature of terrorism 
studies and each of its individual research programs has supported the development 
of the field since the late 1970s. This thesis contributes an analytical perspective that 
complements the existing literature and identifies further pathways for cooperative 
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cross-disciplinary research directed towards understanding terrorist choice and the 
factors that may shape it, including the media attention accorded to terrorism.  
In Chapter 4 each of the orthodox and behavioural models of the decision-making 
process that forms the basis for the analysis presented in this thesis are explained. 
Each of the analytical models has strengths and limitations both in terms of the 
behavioural and decision-making processes that are embedded within them and 
their relative tractability in application. Three models of decision-making under risk 
and uncertainty are treated in Chapter 4. These are the orthodox or basic expected 
utility model, mean-variance expected utility and (cumulative) prospect theory. Each 
model is designed to produce a ranking or preference ordering across alternatives. 
In this thesis, this application yields preference orderings for terrorist actions or 
attack methods based on expectations regarding the media attention that each 
action will yield and the risk and uncertainty that characterises that payoff. Although 
new insights into patterns of choices are gained by the purely logical application of 
these models, empirical examples enrich these insights and our understanding of 
terrorist decision-making. The empirical examples are facilitated by the unique 
dataset gathered for this thesis by independent archival research. This permits the 
measurement of media attention accorded to each type of action used by terrorist 
groups that were active in West-Germany during the 1970s and provides the 
necessary data for an application of decision-making theory to this particular context.  
Terrorist groups choose from a number of alternative types of actions or attack 
methods, including armed assault, assassination, bombing and hostage-taking. Each 
action has an expected outcome. In this thesis the expected outcome that is of 
interest is the amount of media attention that the action is accorded. Expectations 
may be formed, presumably, by observation. The existing literature tends to 
overemphasise the influence of absolute amounts of media attention on terrorist 
choice, leading to the implication that terrorists choose the action or attack method 
that yields the most media attention. However, terrorists choose different actions in 
different periods and combine or diversify across alternative actions, often ignoring 
the action that has yielded the most media attention in previous periods. To explain 
this type of behaviour and to develop a more complete understanding of terrorist 
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choice in this context requires the extension of the analysis to incorporate the 
uncertainty that characterises the outcomes of each alternative. This approach 
depicts the terrorist group as choosing an action not solely on the basis of the amount 
of media attention it is expected to yield but also considering the possiblity that the 
actual outcome will diverge from the expected outcome.  
Basic expected utility theory, mean-variance expected utility and the behavioural 
model, prospect theory, each embed both expected outcomes and the uncertainty 
of those outcomes into their respective models of the decision-making process. Each 
does so in a different way and each stresses different aspects of the decision-making 
process. Basic expected utility provides a foundational orthodox perspective on the 
terrorist group’s decision-making that stresses a compartmentalised assessment of 
alternative actions and a strictly linear probability weighting of the utility of possible 
outcomes. Mean-variance analysis provides a more realistic, but still relatively 
orthodox, perspective of the decision-making process that simplifies the assessment 
of alternative actions to the consideration of just two factors: average media 
attention and its variability. The framework also facilitates the consideration of 
combinations of different actions, allowing us to develop a better understanding of 
why terrorist groups choose more than one type of action over time. More generally, 
it allows us to understand terrorist choice in cases where terrorists do not ‘put all 
their eggs in a single basket’. Finally, (cumulative) prospect theory provides the most 
complex perspective of the decision-making process, embedding not only the trade-
off between expected outcomes and uncertainty but other aspects of behaviour such 
as loss aversion and reference point dependence. This allows us to understand how 
terrorist choices may be shaped, for example, by the media attention accorded to 
the actions of rival terrorist groups.  
Each of these models develops our understanding of how preference orderings may 
be shaped in particular circumstances. A part of this development in our 
understanding can be achieved purely logically by considering each model in a new 
context. In order to ground these advances in our understanding, this thesis presents 
an application of each model within the context of the terrorism perpetrated in West-
Germany during the 1970s and the media attention accorded to it. As mentioned 
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previously, the data underlying this application was gathered during periods of 
intense independent archival research. In Chapter 5 the archives in Berlin are 
described, the nature of the data collection process is outlined, the challenges that 
were confronted are discussed and a rationale is provided for the various choices 
that culminated in the collection of a unique set of data detailing the terrorist 
incidents in West-Germany during the 1970s and the media attention that was 
accorded to each incident.  
Chapter 6 is divided into two main parts. The first part of the chapter presents a 
summary of the data gathered from the archives in Berlin. This provides the first clear 
picture of the actual amount of media attention, measured in both ‘space’ 
(percentage of page) and column inches, accorded to each terrorist incident 
perpetrated in West-Germany from 1970 to 1979. Much can be learned that is 
relevant to a study of media and terrorism by exploring this data, including the 
relative consistency of volume across both tabloid and broadsheet newspapers and 
the ways in which the media attention accorded to an act of terrorism decays as time 
passes following the action. Most important is the picture that emerges regarding 
the average or typical amount of media attention accorded to each type of terrorist 
action or attack method and the oscillation in this typical amount during the period 
under consideration.  
The second part of Chapter 6 presents the applications of the decision-making 
models to the context as revealed through the collected data. Terrorist groups 
operating within such a dynamic environment may have formed expectations 
regarding the amount of media attention that a typical example of a particular type 
of action may yield and may have recognised the inherent variability. This thesis is 
concerned, in general, with the decisions that are made within such a context and 
the ways in which preference orderings and choices may be shaped by the media 
attention that a prospective action can be expected to yield and the trade-off that 
must be made against the risk that the actual outcome may be quite different to what 
was expected. The analysis applies both orthodox and behavioural models of 
decision-making to develop insights into this particular decision-making context and 
grounds that analysis by showing how terrorist groups whose decision-making 
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processes are described by these complementary models may have arrived at certain 
preference orderings over alternative actions or attack methods by considering the 
media attention typically accorded to those actions and its variability during the 
period. 
Although something can be gained by determining how well the preference orderings 
approximate the actual decisions that terrorist groups took at the time, the analysis 
has both deeper implications and broader relevance. Each part of the analysis 
highlights a different decision-making process and the variables that are salient to it. 
Each represents a different perspective on the ways in which terrorist groups decide 
which action to perpetrate. The operationalisation of each model using data 
concerning the media attention accorded to different types of terrorist activity 
enhances our understanding of the dynamics of the decision-making process and the 
variation in the structure of choice as an empirical context evolves over time. The 
data does not only provide a picture of the terrorism context at the time but a picture 
of a dynamic and evolving decision-making environment shaped by the action of 
terrorist groups, law enforcement, the government, the media and others. The 
analysis is intended to generate insights into the patterns of terrorist decision-making 
that go beyond the specifics of any single place or time.  
1.5 Summary of Main Contributions 
In general terms, as the literature survey presented in Chapter 3 points out, the 
media and terrorism literature has emphasised the absolute amount of media 
attention accorded to different terrorist actions as the primary consideration in 
terrorist decision-making. Technically, with regards to the measurement of media 
attention, existing studies focus on basic ‘word counts’ or ‘word searches’, for 
example, the number of times the word ‘terrorism’ is used in reports during a period. 
This type of data is suitable for studies that are interested in the topicality of 
terrorism or whether terrorism is at the forefront of the public’s mind or how much 
terrorism is being talked about in general rather than studies that aim to determine 
how media attention shapes terrorist choice with regards to particular types of 
actions. This thesis applies a more sophisticated approach to both the decision-
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making process characterising terrorist groups and the data used as the basis for 
examples and discussion of the formal analytical frameworks.  
Orthodox and behavioural models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty 
provide a different perspective on the decision-making process, emphasising the 
impact on terrorist choice of both the amount of media attention expected to be 
accorded to different actions and the possibility that the actual amount may diverge 
from that which was expected. The application of these decision-making models is 
facilitated by data concerning the total number of column inches recorded after each 
terrorist action perpetrated in West-Germany during the period from 1970 to 1980. 
For this study, therefore, the media attention accorded to each specific action and 
each attack method category is determined. This provides a more focused dataset 
than one based on word counts and word searches which risk incorporating media 
attention that, strictly speaking, belongs to ‘other’ actions and, of course, does not 
provide an adequate picture of the actual amount of attention that particular actions 
have received. A dataset that does not delineate the media attention accorded to 
each type of action cannot be used as the basis for a study of terrorist choice.  
The thesis presents, for the first time, a more detailed picture of a terrorism context 
in which the media attention accorded to specific terrorist actions and the choices 
that terrorist groups make are the primary subjects of investigation. This was 
accomplished by identifying each recorded terrorist incident and undertaking 
archival research to obtain the media attention accorded to each action by members 
of the West-German press. Measurements are reported in terms of ‘percentage of 
page’ and column inches (c”). The picture that emerges is one of a dynamic and 
evolving media and terrorism context in which we can see clearly the changes in 
terrorist activity, including the introduction of ‘new’ terrorist actions, and the 
variability in the media attention accorded to actions over time. Complex and 
dynamic though it might be, the picture that emerges is of a context that is consistent 
with operational decision-making, albeit decision-making subject to risk and 
uncertainty.  
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As a description of terrorist choice in this context, it is not completely satisfactory to 
say that terrorist groups will choose the action with the highest amount or highest 
(historical) average amount of media attention. This does not accord with 
observation, which clearly sees terrorist groups choose differently. It is well known, 
that when decision-makers choose from among risky prospects they consider not just 
the expected or average outcomes but the risk or variability of the outcomes. 
Expected utility theory represents an advance on the basic concept of expected value 
because it considers risk and risk preference and avoids some of the serious logical 
shortcomings into which the expected value model may fall (especially the 
St Petersburg Paradox, discussed in Chapter 4). The first small step that is taken in 
this thesis towards a more complete understanding of terrorist choice in this context 
is to apply the basic expected utility theory to the terrorist group’s decisions when 
media attention is desired but uncertain. This allows us to say more about patterns 
of terrorist choice than the paradigms of the existing literature permit: 
 Terrorist groups might, but might not, choose the action with the highest 
expected value (measured in terms of media attention).  
 Terrorist groups consider both the amount of media attention expected to 
derive from an action and the possibility that the actual amount may diverge 
from what was expected. 
 A terrorist group is characterised by some type of risk preference, either risk-
aversion or risk-seeking, that shapes its perspective on prospective outcomes 
and their uncertainty.  
Specifying a particular utility function and operating within the logical-mathematical 
structure of expected utility theory allows the determination of preference orderings 
over the alternative terrorist actions that might be chosen. If the aim of the analysis 
is to predict terrorist choice, these preference orderings represent such predictions 
for terrorist groups described by the specified utility function. This, however, is but a 
small part of the value inherent in this approach. The structure of utility theory and 
its incorporation of at least several concepts that do not find a place within a basic 
‘expected value’ approach provides a richer framework for thinking about terrorist 
behaviour, developing insights into terrorist behaviour and, potentially, generating 
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advice for law enforcement in particular cases. A terrorist group that is observed to 
choose in a particular way may be classified as risk-averse or risk-seeking, which may 
help to narrow the ranges of behaviour that law enforcement can expect going 
forward in an ongoing investigative process.  
Even though the expected utility model provides some additional structure to our 
understanding of terrorist decision-making in this context, there are some observed 
behaviours that lay just beyond the scope of the basic model. Terrorist groups are 
observed to combine actions either within or across periods. That terrorist groups do 
not simply choose a single action is, of course, somewhat inconsistent with the 
conclusion emphasised in the existing literature (that terrorist groups choose the 
action with the highest media attention). Although expected utility theory avoids 
leading us necessarily to this conclusion, it too has trouble offering an explanation 
for the combination of actions. It could be that the setting is so dynamic that terrorist 
groups rapidly adjust at short intervals and continuously alter their selection of action 
to the one with the highest expected utility at that particular moment. There is, 
fortunately, a better explanation.  
The explanation offered in this thesis for terrorist groups’ decisions to combine 
actions is that this behaviour is a response to the risk and uncertainty inherent in 
terrorist actions, something that the existing approaches fail to consider at all. 
Decision theory offers a very suitable model with which to provide the structure to 
this proposition. This model is the Markowitz mean-variance analysis, which is 
especially suited to the analysis of combinations or portfolios of risky prospects. The 
model depicts a very basic decision-making process based simply on the expected 
(average) outcomes and risk (variability). Decision-makers are not presumed to do 
anything other than choose according to what they see as the average outcomes, 
paying due care to their variability. The decision-maker’s risk preference plays the 
primary role in shaping choice.  
15 
 
Underpinning this basic and very plausible decision-making process (which requires 
no further assumptions from the analyst2) is a sophisticated statistical framework 
that, once more, expands the analytical vocabulary of discussion of terrorism and the 
media as well as generating some particularly stark images of the opportunities that 
confront terrorist groups active in such a context. The combination of actions works 
as a risk management device because the media attention accorded to different 
types of terrorist actions is not perfectly positively correlated across different 
actions. The Markowitz approach stresses the importance of considering the 
correlation structure of outcomes. Failure to consider the correlation structure leads 
us to underestimate the outcomes that a terrorist group may expect from its actions 
and, potentially, to misjudge terrorist groups’ best courses of action in particular 
contexts.  
Applied to any given dataset, the Markowitz algorithm allows us to determine the set 
of combinations of actions that generate the highest expected amount of media 
attention (c”) at each level of risk. This efficient or optimal set of combinations 
provides us with a benchmark against which terrorist actions can be assessed as well 
as another innovation on our theoretical frameworks that are used to interpret 
terrorist decisions once they are observed. When the mean-variance technique was 
applied using the data gathered for this thesis to a rolling set of sub-periods from 
1970 to 1979, the following dynamic picture of the efficient set of opportunities 
emerged as shown in Figure 1.1 (more details are provided in Chapter 6).  
In addition to providing a structured picture of the opportunities available to terrorist 
groups to generate (expected, not certain) amounts of media attention from 
combinations of actions, the application of mean-variance analysis or the Markowitz 
algorithm to the analysis of terrorism and media attention highlights another 
important aspect of this context that it would be detrimental to overlook. The 
concavity of the set of opportunities is due to the imperfect correlation that 
characterises the media attention accorded to different types of actions. The 
                                                     
2 For example, assumptions regarding the distribution of outcomes or assumptions regarding the 
specification of the utility function.  
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concavity of the opportunity set implies that terrorist groups can expect more media 
attention at each level of risk than would be the case if the media attention accorded 
to different types of actions was perfectly positively correlated.  
 
Figure 1.1 Efficient Set: Optimal Media Attention at Each Level of Risk, 1970-1979 
 
An analytical approach that delineates a structure to a context that otherwise seems 
unruly represents an important step along the pathway to developing a more 
complete understanding of behaviour exhibited within that context. The opportunity 
sets depicted in Figure 1.1 go hand-in-hand with a model of choice under risk and 
uncertainty that describes decision-makers as choosing on the basis of average 
(expected) media attention and its variability. Risk preference is the primary shaper 
of choice in this model. Once the opportunity sets are delineated, the (optimal) 
choices that would be attractive to terrorist groups with different risk preferences 
can be inferred; for example, it may be inferred that a very risk-averse terrorist group 
would choose from the lower-left segment of the opportunity set while a less risk-
averse terrorist group would choose from the upper-right segment. Because the 
constituent actions and their weights are determined in computing the opportunity 
sets, it is a simple matter to infer the types of actions and their relative importance 
that would constitute an optimal combination of actions chosen by a particular type 
of terrorist group. This generates further insights that it would be easy to overlook 
when applying a different analytical approach, especially the fact that low risk actions 
may enter into high risk combinations and vice versa.  
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Both of these orthodox models can be complemented with behavioural approaches 
developed within economics and psychology. The most prominent of these is 
(cumulative) prospect theory. As explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, terrorist 
groups operating in West-Germany during the period from 1970 were not only 
particularly media savvy but also rivals paying close attention to the actions and 
outcomes, including the media attention garnered, of their competitors. Cumulative 
prospect theory provides a fully developed theoretical framework with which to 
analyse and interpret decision-making in such a context. The model contains a 
number of additional behavioural variables that are not encompassed in the 
orthodox frameworks. One of the most important of these is the concept of a 
reference point which allows us to consider decisions made not on the basis of an 
absolute assessment of outcomes but on the basis of gains and losses relative to 
another value. In the setting under consideration, the reference point may be formed 
on the basis of outcomes observed to result from rivals’ actions. This provides us with 
the mechanism that we use to interpret the actions of terrorist groups when it is clear 
(or a clear possibility) that they have referenced their decisions on the outcomes of 
the actions of others.  
This has at least one very important implication. It is not the case that a group that 
references its actions against the outcomes of the actions of other rival groups will 
necessarily choose to copy the rival’s action precisely. The reference point is an 
outcomes centric concept, not an action centric concept. The terrorist group may 
observe, for example, that a rival has garnered 60 c” of media coverage from a 
bombing and 60 c” may become the group’s reference point. This is now the point 
from which the gains and losses of all of the available alternative actions are 
evaluated. Although bombing might head the list of the preference ordering that 
emerges from this evaluation process, it might be the case that a different action, for 
example armed assault, may be accorded the highest place in the preference 
ordering of a terrorist group with 60 c” as its reference point. This insight avoids 
leading us into the error of equating ‘referencing’ with ‘copying’.  
In fact, several scenarios are possible in which a terrorist group may choose an 
alternative or even a lower risk attack method than that perpetrated by its 
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competitor while still reaching or exceeding the reference point set by the outcome 
of the predecessor’s action. When the chosen reference point is low, the domain of 
gains is large and a terrorist group can select from a range of alternative attack 
method categories in its effort to emulate or to exceed that reference point. 
Conversely, when the reference point is high, the domain of gains is small and the 
domain of losses looms large. In such a scenario, limited options remain for terrorists 
who are considering attack types for deployment that might reach or exceed the 
outcome achieved by their competitor. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The objective of the thesis is to provide a new and nuanced approach to the 
examination of terrorist choice in contexts where media coverage is a desired but 
uncertain outcome of terrorist action. A range of complementary theoretical 
frameworks are applied to the terrorist decision-making process where alternative 
attack methods and combinations of attack types are considered by terrorist groups 
in light of the media coverage that can be expected to result from the attacks to be 
perpetrated. The application of formal economic models of choice to the terrorism 
and media context is supported and illustrated using historical data obtained through 
extensive, independent archival research. Analysis of the archival data-set provides 
a statistical picture of the historical context of terrorism events perpetrated on West-
German soil during the 1970s and the media attention these acts received in the 
German print media. By applying several distinct yet complementary theoretical 
frameworks to a real terrorism context, historical events that occurred in West-
Germany may be described from a new vantage point and it is further possible to 
utilise a data-set from an authentic historical context of turbulent terrorist activity to 
develop new and nuanced insights into the terrorist decision-making process. These 
conclusions provide new perspectives from which to view the terrorism context, new 
vocabularly to describe terrorist behaviour and new ways to interpret terrorist 
choice. Errors that may be made by existing approaches are avoided and 
contributions are made towards a more nuanced framework for law enforcement. 
The first step in developing this new picture of terrorist choice and the media is to 
describe the rich and turbulent terrorism context experienced in Western-Europe, 
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and specifically in West-Germany, during the 1970s. A detailed picture of this context 
with particular emphasis on major terrorist groups and their interaction with each 
other and the media is developed in Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 2  - Terrorism in Western Europe 1970 to 1990 
2.0 Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to summarise the nature and extent of terrorist 
activity in West-Germany during the period from 1970 to 1990. As explained in the 
introduction, this thesis contributes to the research program that is generally 
referred to as ‘terrorism and the media’. The overarching objective of the thesis is to 
develop our understanding of terrorist choice in a context in which media attention 
accorded to acts of terrorism may shape those choices. The analytical approach 
applies both orthodox and behavioural economic models of the decision-making 
process to study the choices that terrorist groups make in a context where media 
coverage is a desirable but uncertain outcome of a terrorist action. Although the 
analysis is general and may be applied in any context, in this thesis it is applied 
specifically to the terrorist activity recorded in West-Germany and the media 
attention that was accorded to it by tabloid and mainstream broadsheet newspaper 
publishers.  
This chapter presents an overview of terrorism in West-Germany during the two 
decades beginning in 1970 and identifies the features that make this time and place 
a particularly useful context in which to situate a formal analysis of terrorist choice 
and the ways in which those choices may be shaped by the media attention accorded 
to them. The overview of terrorism in West-Germany is placed within the broader 
context of terrorism in Western Europe during the period under consideration. The 
discussion is complemented by descriptions of historical, political and social contexts 
in West-Germany as well as profiles of West-Germany’s most prominent terrorist 
groups: the Red Army Faction formed in 1970; the 2nd June Movement formed in 
1972; and the Revolutionary Cells formed in 1973. Each of these terrorist groups, 
especially the Red Army Faction, had developed communication strategies and 
varying degrees of structured interaction with the media. The groups were also quite 
informed and deliberate in their observations of the success or otherwise of the 
actions of the other terrorist groups operating at the time. This provides an important 
opportunity to apply behavioural economic analysis to terrorist choice in a context 
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where the outcomes of actions of one group may form a reference point for the 
actions of another.  
2.1 Overview of the Chapter 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of terrorist 
activity in Western Europe from 1970 to 1990 using data obtained from the GTD.3 
Terrorist events that occurred in West-Germany are examined both in isolation and 
in the wider European context. Section 2.3 briefly highlights some of the political and 
historical events surrounding the emergence of the New Left and the student 
movement of the 1960s, all of which provide the background to the social context of 
the period under investigation. Section 2.4 profiles some of the most prominent 
terrorist groups of the period. In West-Germany, three terrorist groups are of 
particular significance: the Red Army Faction, 2nd June Movement and Revolutionary 
Cells. The complex relationship between terrorist groups and the media is examined 
in Section 2.5. Particular emphasis is placed on the Red Army Faction’s relatively 
advanced understanding of media coverage accorded to the actions and 
announcements of terrorist groups. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Terrorism in Western Europe 1970-1990 
From 1970 Western Europe experienced a steady rise in terrorist activity until 1977, 
followed by a small decline during that year and then a significant peak in 1979. 
Figure 2.1 (showing Western Europe, excluding West-Germany) and Table 2.1 
(showing Western Europe and West-Germany in two distinct columns) summarise 
this data. In comparison, and as shown in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2, terrorist activity 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, also referred to as “West-Germany”, 
experienced a steady amount of terrorist activity until 1977 (the year referred to as 
                                                     
3  In the GTD, the Red Army Faction (RAF) is referred to as the “Baader-Meinhof Group” until 
September 1977. Only attacks for which the perpetrator(s) and the attack type are known are 
included. East-Germany belongs to the region of Eastern-Europe in the GTD. The number of relevant 
attacks in East-Germany for the period 1970-1990 is relatively small. Eleven attacks were committed 
by seven different groups resulting in one injury and one fatality. As the analysis presented in this 
paper focuses on West-German print media, data for East-Germany is not included. 
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the “German Autumn”), followed by some rises and declines until 1983 before a very 
sharp increase to a peak in 1985 and a subsequent slump from 1986. 
 
Figure 2.1 Terrorist Incidents, Western Europe (excl. West-Germany), 1970-1990 
 
 
Table 2.1 Terrorist Incidents, Western Europe and West-Germany, 1970-1990 
 Western-Europe (excl. FRG) West-Germany (FRG) 
Year Nr of ALL attacks Nr of ALL attacks 
1970 24 10 
1971 104 5 
1972 315 14 
1973 223 15 
1974 263 13 
1975 331 15 
1976 343 19 
1977 487 18 
1978 452 17 
1979 763 8 
1980 472 16 
1981 361 14 
1982 305 10 
1983 355 4 
1984 373 11 
1985 309 28 
1986 277 19 
1987 312 7 
1988 405 5 
1989 342 16 
1990 314 6 
Total: 7130 270 
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Figure 2.2 Terrorist Incidents in West-Germany, 1970-1990 
 
 
Table 2.2 Terrorist Incidents, Fatalities, Injured in Western Europe, 1970-1990 
Period 1970-1990 Nr of ALL attacks % Nr of Fatalities % Nr Injured 
Andorra 1 0.01 unknown - unknown 
Austria 25 0.34 16 0.36 65 
Belgium 65 0.88 20 0.46 94 
Corsica 345 4.66 12 0.27 29 
Denmark 11 0.15 1 0.02 17 
France 568 7.68 122 2.78 772 
Gibraltar 1 0.01 3 0.07 0 
Great Britain 280 3.78 131 2.98 1107 
Greece 247 3.34 212 4.82 529 
Ireland 84 1.14 100 2.28 9 
Italy 736 9.95 323 7.35 953 
Luxembourg 2 0.03 0 0.00 5 
Netherlands 39 0.53 22 0.50 24 
Northern Ireland 2623 35.45 2461 56.00 1454 
Norway 2 0.03 0 0.00 0 
Portugal 72 0.97 25 0.57 46 
Spain 1981 26.77 813 18.50 1844 
Sweden 6 0.08 4 0.09 15 
Switzerland 41 0.55 50 1.14 46 
Vatican City 1 0.01 0 0.00 3 
West Germany 270 3.65 80 1.82 719 
Total: 7400 100 4395 100 7731 
 
Of a total of 7,400 terrorist events recorded for the region of Western Europe for the 
period 1970 to 1990, Northern Ireland experienced by far the highest number of 
attacks (2,623 or 35.45% of the total), followed by Spain (1,981 or 26.77%), Italy (736 
or 9.95%), France (568 or 7.68%), Corsica (345 or 4.66%), Great Britain (280 or 3.78%), 
West-Germany (270 or 3.65%), and Greece (247 or 3.34%). Northern Ireland stands 
out even more strikingly with respect to the number of fatalities that occurred as a 
result of terrorist events. Of the total of 4,365 lives lost to terrorism in Western 
Europe between 1970 and 1990, 2,461 (or 56.0%) fatalities occurred in Northern 
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Ireland, 813 (18.5%) in Spain, 323 (7.35%) in Italy, 212 (4.82%) in Greece, and a 
relatively small number of 80 (1.82%) in West-Germany. Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3 
summarise this data. 
 
Figure 2.3 Terrorist Incidents and Fatalities in Western European Countries, 1970-1990 
 
The GTD identifies eight categories of terrorist attack: armed assault, assassination, 
bombing/explosion, facility/infrastructure attack, hijacking, hostage (barricade), 
hostage (kidnapping), and unarmed assault. With 48.12% and 52.22%, respectively, 
bombing/explosions represent the highest proportion of terrorist attacks in both 
Western Europe (excluding West-Germany) and in West-Germany individually. In 
Western Europe (excluding West-Germany), the high proportion of 
bombing/explosions is followed by assassinations (30%), armed assault (10.86%) and 
facility/infrastructure attacks (7.41%), whereas in West-Germany the proportion of 
facility/infrastructure attacks (20.74%) is comparatively high and the proportion of 
assassination attacks (12.59%) comparatively low. With 0.74% and 1.11%, 
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respectively, hijacking events and unarmed assaults occurred more frequently in 
West-Germany than in the whole of Western Europe (0.31% and 0.31%).  
Kidnappings occurred more frequently in the region of Western Europe (2.26%) than 
in West-Germany (1.48%). This information is summarised in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3 Types of Terrorist Incidents, Western Europe and West-Germany, 1970-1990 
Period 1970-1990 Western Europe (excl. FRG) West-Germany (FRG) 
ATTACK TYPE Nr of attacks % Nr of attacks % 
Armed assault 774 10.86 28 10.37 
Assassination 2139 30.00 34 12.59 
Bombing/Explosion 3431 48.12 141 52.22 
Fac/Infra Attack 528 7.41 56 20.74 
Hijacking 22 0.31 2 0.74 
Hostage (Barricade) 53 0.74 2 0.74 
Hostage (Kidnapping) 161 2.26 4 1.48 
Unarmed assault 22 0.31 3 1.11 
Total: 7130 100 270 100 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, 529 unique groups were active in Western Europe (excluding 
West-Germany) during the period from 1970 to 1990. However, 74.7% of all attacks 
(or 5,328 of 7,130) were committed by just 15 of these 529 unique groups. The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) were the most 
active. During the same period, 66 unique groups perpetrated acts of terrorism in 
West-Germany. Of these 66 groups 42 committed just one single attack. Of the 
remaining 24 groups, the Baader-Meinhof Group, later the Red Army Faction, 
accounts for almost 30% of all attacks in West-Germany, followed by the 
Revolutionary Cells (19%), the IRA (10%), and the 2nd June Movement (4%). This data 
is summarised for Western Europe in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.4 and for West-Germany 
in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.5.  
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Figure 2.4 Most Active Groups in Western Europe (excl. West-Germany), 1970-1990 
 
 
Table 2.4 Most Active Groups in Western Europe (excl. West-Germany), 1970-1990 
15 Most Active Groups in Western Europe (excl. FRG), 1970-1990. There were 529 unique groups in total. 
Country most active in: Name of Group: Nr of Attacks per Group 
Northern Ireland Irish Republican Army (IRA) 2019 
Spain Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 1455 
Corsica/France Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) 346 
Northern Ireland Protestant Extremists 256 
Northern Ireland Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 213 
Italy Red Brigades 209 
Spain First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) 175 
Northern Ireland Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 160 
very multi-nationally active Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 111 
Northern Ireland/Ireland Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 84 
Northern Ireland Irish Republican Extremists 71 
Greece Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA) 67 
Corsica  Separatists 57 
Spain Terra Lliure 53 
France Action Directe 52 
  
 Total: 
5328 
of 7130  = 74.7%    
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Figure 2.5 Groups Active in West-Germany, 1970-1990 
 
 
Table 2.5 Groups Active in West-Germany, 1970-1990 
Active Groups in West-Germany, 1970-1990. There were 66 unique groups in total. 
Name of group: Nr of Attacks per group 
Red Army Faction (RAF) 52 
Revolutionary Cells 52 
Baader-Meinhof Group 28 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 27 
2nd June Movement 12 
Croatian Nationalists 8 
Black September 5 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 4 
Left-Wing Guerrillas 4 
Red Cell 4 
Neo-Nazi Group 3 
Anti-Abortion Activists 3 
Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) 3 
Territorial Resistance Army 3 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 2 
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 2 
Separatists 2 
Right-Wing Extremists 2 
Palestinians 2 
New Armenian Resistance 2 
Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK) 2 
Black Cells 2 
Gruppe Hau Weg Den Scheiss 2 
Revolutionary People’s Army 2 
42 groups at n=1 42 
Total: 270 
 
Red Army Faction (RAF)
Revolutionary Cells
Baader-Meinhof Group
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
2nd of June Movement
Croatian Nationalists
Black September
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP)
Left-Wing Guerrillas
Red Cell
Neo-Nazi Group
Anti-Abortion Activists
Extraparliamentary Opposition
(APO)
Territorial Resistance Army
Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia
Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA)
Separatists
Right-Wing Extremists
Palestinians
New Armenian Resistance
28 
 
Figure 2.6 Groups Most Active in and Focused on West-Germany, 1970-1990 
 
 
Of the groups most active in West-Germany during the period from 1970 to 1990, 
the Baader-Meinhof group/Red Army Faction, Revolutionary Cells, and the 2nd June 
Movement were also most focused on West-Germany as their target, while the 
Croatian Nationalists committed just 50% of their attacks in West-Germany. This data 
is summarised in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.6. Combined, these attacks resulted in 47 
fatalities. The Red Army Faction was responsible for twenty of these, while Black 
September caused sixteen, the IRA six fatalities, 2nd June Movement four fatalities 
and the Croatian Nationals one fatality. Before profiling these prominent groups in 
more detail, the wider historical, political and social background of the period is 
described. 
2.3 Historical, Political, and Social Background 
While a large number of groups were engaged in terrorist activities in Western 
Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, the origins of radical activism might be traced 
back to the 68er movement which, according to Kraushaar (2008, pp. 11-12), 
originated in the Bay Area of San Francisco in the United States. Here, the Free 
Speech Movement developed at the University of Berkeley in 1964; the militant 
Black-Power movement formed in the suburb of Oakland; the Hippie movement in 
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Haight-Ashbury; and in San Francisco’s Castro Street the gay community found a 
voice. Reichard (2010), Russell (2008) and Hall (2008) discuss the gay rights 
movement in the United States. Joseph (2009) examines the black power movement. 
The relationship between African American and white student activists is described 
by Slonecker (2008). The relevance of these movements to the broader social and 
political context in America and in Europe at the time is a prominent theme in the 
literature. 
The student movement emerged as university students organised themselves into 
groups such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the United States of 
America and the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) in Germany (Sale, 
1973). Together with literary minds, intellectuals, and critical thinkers, these groups 
formed the “New Left”. Followers of the New Left frequently had educated, middle-
class backgrounds. They rejected mainstream politics, which they viewed as 
dominated by elites who “preferred a docile public to an engaged one” (Varon, 2004, 
p. 21). Theories by Marx, Lenin, and Marcuse and global figures such as Che Guevara 
and Mao Tse-tung informed the philosophical foundations of the New Left.  
Horn (2007) discusses leftist activism not only in the more prominent countries of 
France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, but also in Belgium and Spain; while 
Kolbe (2008) provides a concise account of  student radicalism in Finland with a 
particular focus on the delicate balance between the 1960s youth movement and 
Finish-Soviet relations. In each case, common concerns are mixed with particular 
ones; see Gilcher-Holtey (2008), Hilwig (2001), and Clifford (2012). The same is true 
of East-Germany. Von der Goltz (2013) examines East-Germany’s 1968 in the context 
of the Prague Spring. Different groups within each country also had somewhat 
unique points of view; for example, Efron (2014) presents an account of Germany’s 
1960s from Jewish perspectives. Perhaps some of the most insightful accounts are 
found in (self-) reflections on the German 1960s; for example, Horx (1989); N. 
Thomas (2003); Frese, Paulus, and Teppe (2005); Kraushaar (2008); and P. Schneider 
(2008). 
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There was an interconnectedness between the American and the West-German 
student movements (Klimke, 2010). Gilcher-Holtey (2001) cited in Baader (2012, p. 
493) highlights German-American philosopher Herbert Marcuse as “the intellectual 
who set himself the task of forging links between the American and German New Left 
movements”. Common themes in both countries included opposition against the 
Vietnam War, anti-imperialism, and a strong desire to change “the system”; that is, 
the status quo formed from prevailing political, corporate and social structures, 
against which the New Left would mobilise “the movement” or “revolution”, which 
some individuals and subgroups eventually escalated into an “armed struggle” 
(bewaffneter Kampf).4  
Apart from before-mentioned issues that the New Left in the United States of 
America and in European countries had in common, West-German activism sought 
to address (redress) the legacies of Germany’s Nazi past (for example, see Kraushaar, 
2008, pp. 72-75). In addition, German activists soon found themselves in a divided 
Germany with Berlin at the centre of a cold war. The extra-parliamentary movement 
(außerparlamentarische Opposition or APO) developed in West-Berlin in response to 
the formation of the Grand Coalition5 (Große Koalition) in 1966/67, grew and soon 
spread from West-Berlin to other parts of West-Germany as students and young 
adults vigorously opposed the Emergency Laws 6  (Notstandsgesetzgebung), the 
Vietnam War and what they perceived to be Axel Springer’s domination of West-
German media-politics through his ubiquitous publishing house (Kraushaar, 2006a, 
p. 512).  
                                                     
4 For a detailed treatment of developments in the United States of America, the Weathermen (later 
named the Weather Underground) in particular, and a comprehensive account (in English) on the 
formation and ideologies of the first generation of the German Red Army Faction (RAF) to 1977 see 
Varon (2004). 
5 On 26 November 1966, the SPD declares her willingness to enter into a grand coalition (Große 
Koalition) with CDU/CSU, see Harbecke (1989). 
6 In early 1968, Emergeny Laws (Notstandsgesetze) are considered by the government. Proposed laws 
are to limit restrictions on mail-tempering and phone-tapping, and are to alter conditions regarding 
the deployment of the Bundeswehr (German army) in the event of political unrest (Harbecke, 1989, 
p. 127). 
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A number of New Left groups, sometimes no more than a small collection of like-
minded friends, took the step from peaceful protest to active violence, committing 
bombings, arson and other destructive acts during the 1960s and 1970s. Others 
objected to the use of violent acts as permissible or justifiable means to bring about 
social and political change and were criticised for failing to take the step from theory 
to practice.7 Kailitz (2007) examines the conflicts over the “question of violence” (die 
Gewaltfrage) in considerable detail. Views of the Frankfurter Schule, represented by 
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno 8 , Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas are 
placed in juxtaposition to those of the student movement, represented by Hans-
Jürgen Krahl, Rudi Dutschke9 and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and to those of the Red Army 
Faction, represented by Ulrike Meinhof, Horst Mahler, Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas 
Baader. Kailitz (2007, p. 217) concludes that differences in opinion regarding the 
question of violence (die Gewaltfrage) were at times greater between members 
within one group than they were between members of different groups. Of the 
groups who took protest to violence in Western countries during this period, the U.S. 
Weathermen (also known as The Weather Underground) and the German Red Army 
Faction are two of the most well-known  (Varon, 2004, p. 3). The Weather 
Underground suffered the loss of several key members in 1970 and disbanded 
voluntarily in 1976, while the armed struggle in Germany began in earnest in 1970 
with the formation of the Red Army Faction (Varon, 2004, p. 11). 
2.4 Prominent Groups 
German terrorist groups emerged from radical key-elements of what had remained 
of the German 1960s protest movement. In West-Berlin10, the student movement of 
the 1960s gradually moved from the Freie Universität Berlin (Free University of 
                                                     
7  A lot of research has been published exploring the emergence of violent groups and terrorist 
organisations from peaceful protest movements. Karstedt-Henke (1980, cited in Koopmans, 1993 pp. 
640- 641), for example, describes protest waves as passing through four stages, in which the final 
stage is characterised by spiralling violence and counter violence which produces terrorist 
organizations. More recently, the topic has been re-examined by Sageman (2017). 
8 See also: Freyenhagen (2014) 
9 For more information on Rudi Dutschke, see also: Kraushaar (2005). 
10 Residents of West-Berlin were not conscripted to national service, which enticed even more non-
conformists to move there.  
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Berlin) in the wealthy suburb of Dahlem to other parts of the city. Here, young 
activists formed communes11 and other share-accommodation, they met in “Szene” 
cafés, tea-bars and pubs, and experimented with drugs such as Haschisch, LSD and 
Marihuana, later also Opium, Meskalin and Heroin (Kraushaar, 2006a, p. 515). Some 
earlier activist groups, the APO (außerparlamentarische Opposition) for example, 
dissolved, re-mixed and formed new groups such as Der Blues and the 
Haschrebellen12 of which Georg von Rauch, Thomas Weisbecker, Dieter Kunzelmann, 
and Michael “Bommi” Baumann were prominent figures (König, 2006). Some 
members of the Haschrebellen later formed the Tupamaros West-Berlin 13  to 
distinguish themselves from the Tupamaros in Munich14; both groups were named 
after the Tupamaros, a clandestine guerrilla group in Uruguay. In West-Germany, the 
formation of the Red Army Faction in 1970 was followed by the formation of the 
2nd June Movement in January 1972 and the Revolutionary Cells in 1973 (Kraushaar, 
2006a, p. 512).   
2.4.1 Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction, RAF) 
The German Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion) formed in West-Berlin in 1970, 
but soon moved the bulk of its operations from Berlin to other parts of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, mainly to Frankfurt/Main. Founding members included 
Andreas Baader (born 1943), Ulrike Meinhof (born 1934), Gudrun Ensslin (born 1940) 
and Horst Mahler (born 1936), all of whom were active in the 1960s protest 
movements and three of whom, Horst Mahler excepted, had moved underground by 
the time the group’s formation was publically announced in June 1970. In the 
German media and general public the group was generally referred to as the 
“Baader-Meinhof group” (Gruppe) or the “Baader-Meinhof gang” (Bande); whereby 
the speaker/writer’s choice between the word “gang” and the word “group” would 
                                                     
11 Kommune I and Kommune II are two prominent examples; for details see (Brown, 2013, pp. 819-
821). 
12 Further details about the Haschrebellen are provided by Brown (2013, pp. 822-824).  
13 For details on the Tupamaros West-Berlin see Kraushaar (2006a). 
14 For further details on the Tupamaros München see Sturm (2006). 
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hint at his/her position on the ideological and political spectrum.15 Group members 
themselves never referred to the group as “Baader-Meinhof” (Peters, 2007, p. 144).  
Public announcements by the group were made in the name of the Red Army Faction 
(Rote Armee Fraktion) or the “RAF” for short. The group’s first political statement 
“Die Rote Armee aufbauen” (building the Red Army) was printed in West-Berlin’s 
“anti-authoritarian” magazine Agit 883 on 5 June 1970 (Peters, 2007, p. 193). This 
announcement was most likely authored by Ulrike Meinhof 16  who had already 
established herself as a well-known left-wing journalist and columnist. Just a few 
years earlier, Ulrike Meinhof and her (then) husband Klaus Rainer Röhl had jointly 
run the popular, leftist magazine konkret in Hamburg, where Ulrike Meinhof, 
respected for her intellect and her journalistic work, was a popular guest and speaker 
at functions of Hamburg’s liberal elite (Peters, 2007, pp. 148-150). This role did not 
sit easy with Ulrike Meinhof, who confided to a friend in 1967 that her “acceptance 
into the establishment” (“Aufnahme ins Establishment”) made her feel like a 
“revolutionary puppet” (“Revolutionskasperle”).  
Ulrike Meinhof eventually left her life in Hamburg and her husband and moved with 
their young twin-daughters to West-Berlin. Here, in February 1970, Ulrike Meinhof 
was contacted by Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader, who were hiding from the 
police. Andreas Baader had a long list of criminal offences to his name; he was bold; 
perceived as a rude macho by some and as charming and a competent leader by 
others. Baader sought action over theory or intellectual discussions and was happy 
to attract attention at almost any price. Gudrun Ensslin, on the other hand, was far 
more measured and contemplative. She was brought up in intact family surroundings 
in a pastoral home and enjoyed a classical education. She was a gifted student, 
                                                     
15 The use of the term “gang” (“Bande”) over “group” (“Gruppe”) was aimed at positioning the RAF as 
a criminal, anarchistic and, most importantly, as a non-political organisation. See also Schweizer (2009, 
p. 18). 
16 Much has been written about Ulrike Meinhof, who for many remains an iconic figure of German 
activism and terrorism. For example, Prinz (2003) provides a biographical account, K. Bauer (2008) a 
collection of Meinhof’s journalistic columns from 1960-1968, and Seifert (2006) an academic and 
contemporary witness perspective on Meinhof’s political activism, journalistic work, and finally her 
death in Stuttgart-Stammheim prison. 
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respected for her sharp intellect, and was working on her thesis when she met 
Andreas Baader, whose forthrightness impressed her. They became a couple and 
formed a bond that lasted for ten years until their death in Stammheim prison in 
1977.  
Ulrike Meinhof agreed to let Baader and Ensslin17 stay with her in her apartment, 
where the group was frequently joined by Horst Mahler. Horst Mahler’s father was a 
dentist and both of Mahler’s parents were staunch Nazi supporters. Mahler18 studied 
law at the Freie Universität Berlin and was a self-employed solicitor with a special 
interest in criminal law matters including the defence of Baader in a court case 
surrounding Baader’s and Ensslin’s role in an arson attack on a department store in 
Frankfurt/Main two years earlier (in April 1968) for which both were charged and an 
arrest warrant was pending.  When Baader was arrested by the police, Ulrike 
Meinhof participated in freeing him in a violent siege on 14 May 1970 and 
immediately moved underground as well. A few weeks later the formation of the RAF 
was announced and the armed struggle (“bewaffneter Kampf”) against “the system” 
was taken up in earnest by this first “generation” of the RAF. 
The organisational structure of the RAF resembled that of an “open group” in which 
not only individuals with full-RAF-membership but also sympathisers were allowed 
contact with the RAF leadership directly. Baader and Ensslin believed this open 
structure to be an important catalyst for the learning process within the group 
(Kraushaar, 2006b, p. 594). As we shall see later, this “open structure” conflicted with 
the “cell structure” purported by Carlos Marighella; a model that also leading 
Revolutionary Cell member Wilfried Böse believed to be a superior and a safer 
organisational structure.  
                                                     
17 For further information on Baader’s and Ensslin’s biographies, see Peters (2007, pp. 50-77) and 
Koenen (2003). 
18 Jander (2006) provides details on Horst Mahler’s biography and on Mahler’s pathways as political 
activist, terrorist, and lawyer. For an analysis of Mahler’s move from left-wing terrorism in the 1970 
to a particular branch of far right ideology see Michael (2009).  
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The history of the RAF is often viewed in terms of three “generations” of the group, 
whereby attempting to allocate all group members 19  to exactly one particular 
generation is problematic. An alternative approach, succinctly outlined by Schweizer 
(2009), is to describe the RAF in three broad ideological and strategic phases. Hereby, 
the primary goal of the first generation of the RAF was to “mobilise the masses” and 
to evoke a “revolution” through “escalation” of conflict. Violent actions by the group 
were consequentially justified20 as “counter-attacks” against oppressive forces of 
“the establishment”.  Marxist-Leninist texts served as theoretical background, and 
Mao Tse Tung’s “Primat der Praxis”, and the example of Latin-American urban-
guerrilla groups provided the impetus and the justification for attacks on select 
German media, industry and government bodies, as well as on representatives and 
institutions of “imperialistic” states. 
When all leaders of the first generation of the RAF were arrested and imprisoned in 
1972 (with the exception of Horst Mahler who had split from the RAF), key members 
of the second generation, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Christian Klar, and Peter-Jürgen 
Boock, took charge on the “outside” while maintaining undercover communication 
with first generation group-leaders in incarceration. Imprisoned RAF members 
continued to formulate strategic and ideological texts for circulation and they used a 
series of hunger-strikes in an attempt to harness the support of left-wing groups and 
to cajole supporters into legal as well as illegal anti-government action. Over a period 
of five years the group’s efforts concentrated on forcing the release of RAF members 
from prison. Actions culminated in 1977, a period referred to as the “German 
Autumn” (Deutscher Herbst), and included the assassination of Federal Attorney 
General Siegfried Buback, the failed kidnapping and subsequent shooting of 
Dresdner Bank speaker Jürgen Ponto, a failed rocket launcher attack on the building 
of the Federal Attorney's office in Karlsruhe, and the kidnapping and subsequent 
murder of Employer Association President (Arbeitgeberpräsident) Hanns Martin 
                                                     
19 (Auto)-biographical accounts of several, some less prominent, members of the RAF have been 
published. For example: Dellwo (2007), Mayer (2007), Folkerts (2007), M. Schiller (1999) and P. Schiller 
(2008), and Wisniewski (1997). 
20 For an examination of the RAF’s justifications for violence from an applied ethics angle see O'Boyle 
(2002). 
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Schleyer. However, all attempts to force the release of RAF members failed. By 
October 1977, all leading members of the group’s first generation had died in prison, 
either as a result of extended hunger-strikes (Holger Meins) or suicide (Ulrike 
Meinhof, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe).  
With the death of leading first-generation RAF members, the group appeared to lose 
what was left of discernible ideological and strategic direction. Apart from a number 
of bank robberies, only isolated terrorist attacks on military officials or targets were 
staged; for example, bombing attacks on NATO General Alexander Haig in Belgium in 
June 1979, on the European headquarters of US Airforce in Ramstein/Pfalz in August 
1981, and on US General Frederick Kroesen in Heidelberg in September 1981 (Peters, 
2007, pp. 838-839). The group viewed these attacks as resistance against US-military 
imperialism world-wide. When leading figures of the second generation, Brigitte 
Mohnhaupt, Adelheid Schulz and Christian Klar were arrested in November 1982 and 
another six arrests followed in July 1984, it seemed again that the RAF had been 
defeated.  
However, the group’s third generation led by Birgit Hogefeld, Wolfgang Grams and 
others continued to operate for almost another seven years. Bomb attacks and 
shootings were perpetrated on representatives of business and the military and 
resulted in the deaths of Ernst Zimmermann (Head of the Engines and Turbines 
Unions), Siemens manager Karl Heinz Beckurts and his driver, Gerold von Braunmühl 
(leading official in Germany’s Foreign Ministry), Deutsche Bank chairman Alfred 
Herrhausen and Detlev Karsten Rohwedder (leader of Germany’s Treuhand 
organisation responsible for the privatisation of state-owned assets in the former 
East-Germany). Much less is known about members of this third generation of the 
RAF, some of whom avoided arrest by living in East-Germany after having been issued 
with new identities by the Stasi, East-Germany’s security and intelligence 
organisation. It has also been suggested that later generations of the RAF learned 
from the mistakes of earlier generations and developed a more sophisticated version 
of terrorism (Schweizer, 2009, p. 48) and underground operations. On 20 April 1998 
an eight-paged letter sent from Chemnitz (in the former East-Germany) arrived at 
the Cologne office of the Reuter news agency signed with the RAF initials and 
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announcing that “the urban guerrilla in the form of the raf is now history…” (Aust, 
2009, pp. 436-437). 
2.4.2 Bewegung 2. Juni (2nd June Movement) 
The 2nd June Movement grew out of the Kommune I and other youth protest groups 
in West-Berlin and derives its name from the date on which German university 
student Benno Ohnesorg21 was shot dead by an undercover police officer during a 
demonstration in West-Berlin in 1967 (Gutmann, 2008, p. 372). The group formed in 
January 1972 and operated for eight years almost exclusively in West-Berlin with an 
anarchist, populist and somewhat anti-intellectual affect. One of the group’s leaders, 
Fritz Teufel, reflects in hindsight that the group’s “cause” was based on “[theory] that 
we had only half-read, but supposedly fully understood.” Other members agreed and 
pointed out that they had experienced difficulty following Marx-seminars and 
preferred practical actions over theories (Wunschik, 2006, p. 538). 
The ideology of the 2nd June Movement has been described as “vague” and as 
essentially anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-fascist (Wunschik, 2006, pp. 537-
538). Members felt compelled to act rather than to allow themselves to be tied up in 
theory. Their motto: “Kriterium einer Theorie ist ihre Praxis. Ohne revolutionäre 
Praxis keine revolutionäre Theorie” (The criterion for theory is praxis. Without 
revolutionary praxis, there is no revolutionary theory). 22  Members of the RAF 
criticised the 2nd June Movement as “hedonistic” (Wunschik, 2006, p. 540) and as 
fun-guerrilla (Spaß-Guerilla) not to be taken seriously. Regardless, the 2nd June 
Movement made its presence felt with numerous bombings and bank robberies in 
Germany and is perhaps best known for having extracted significant concessions 
from the German government in exchange for kidnapped West-Berlin Mayoral 
candidate, Peter Lorenz, in 1975; a success which earned the 2nd June Movement 
lasting admiration from members of the RAF, who later failed to extract government 
concessions through the kidnapping of Hanns Martin Schleyer in 1977. 
                                                     
21 For details surrounding Benno Ohnesorg’s shooting see also Peters (2007, pp. 90-93). 
22 Peter-Paul Zahl, Massenkampf und Guerilla – Rede vor Gericht, printed in: Bewegung 2. Juni, Der 
Blues Bd. 1, p210-226, p213; cited in (Wunschik, 2006, p. 538). 
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Members of the 2nd June Movement included Michael “Bommi” Baumann, Dieter 
Kunzelmann, Georg von Rauch and Fritz Teufel,23 as well as Ronald Fritsch, Till Meyer, 
Inge Viett, Verena Becker, Ella Rollnik, Gabriele Rollnik and others. Some 2nd June 
Movement members, like Inge Viett, later joined the RAF and several eventually 
published (auto-) biographical accounts of their experiences. 24  The relationship 
between the 2nd June Movement and the RAF is complex and changeable. It includes 
collaboration, the sharing of resources and allies, but also inter-group rivalries, 
competition over limited resources, personal frictions, and animosities; all of which 
hindered each group from achieving their goals at times. Kraushaar (2006a, p. 512) 
summarises this important point: while formally, prominent German terrorist groups 
may have started at distinct times, the RAF in 1970, 2nd June Movement in 1972, and 
the Revolutionary Cells in 1973,  their Konstitutionsprozess (the process of 
forming/being constituted) was, in reality, intertwined on many levels. It was 
complex, and included overlaps of personnel, logistics, and group operations.  
2.4.3 Revolutionäre Zellen (Revolutionary Cells) 
Although not considered a terrorist, Karl Dietrich Wolff (born 1943) was no stranger 
to activism. He was known for his exceptional self-confidence and organisational 
skills and played a leading role in the formation of several protest groups during the 
1960s. Wolff had contacts with militant members of the Black Panther Party such as 
Bobby Seale, Tom Hayden and Bernadine Dohrn and also to Gudrun Ensslin and 
Andreas Baader, who later became leading members of the RAF (Kraushaar, 2006b, 
pp. 584-588). In 1970, Wolff, together with Wilfried Böse (born 1949), Michael 
Schwarz (born 1949) and Johannes Weinrich (born 1947) formed a registered 
publishing company named Roter Stern K.D. Wolff KG25  in Frankfurt/Main. Roter 
Stern’s publications included the magazines entitled Erziehung und Klassenkampf 
(education and class war) as well as Antiimperialistischer Kampf (anti-imperialistic 
                                                     
23 For more information about Georg von Rauch see König (2006). 
24  For example, (auto-)biographical accounts were published by: Baumann (1977), Reinders and 
Fritzsch (1995), Roth (1980), G. Rollnik and Dubbe (2004), E. Rollnik (2007), Viett (2005). 
25 Wolff later changed the name from Verlag Roter Stern to Stroemfeld Verlag (publishers). It still exists 
today: details (in German) can be found at www.stroemfeld.de . 
39 
 
struggle). Topics covered included the Black Panther Party and problems faced by 
black militants in America, information about the Palestinian terrorist organisation 
Schwarzer September (Black September), the Japanese Guerrilla organisation Rote 
Armee  (Red Army), the Tupamaros in Uruguay, as well as the situation of Palestinian 
refugees and that of the Palestinian resistance (Kraushaar, 2006b, p. 590). 
Two of Wolff’s colleagues, Wilfried Böse and Johannes Weinrich became key-figures 
in Germany’s third most prominent terrorist group, the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). 
Other RZ members, who are also known to have been associated with Wolff, include 
Weinrich’s long-time girlfriend Magdalena Kopp, who later married international 
top-terrorist Carlos the Jackal (alias Illich Ramírez Sánchez from Venezuela), Böse’s 
girlfriend Brigitte Kuhlmann, and also Hans-Joachim Klein (born 1947). The RZ are 
considered to have officially formed on 16 Nov 1973, the day on which the group first 
claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack: the bombing of premises of US-American 
multi-national concern ITT in West-Berlin and in Nuremberg (Skelton-Robinson, 
2006, p. 869). The RZ were initially underestimated by German authorities as they 
existed, for quite some time, in the media- and public-awareness-shadows of the RAF 
(Kraushaar, 2006b). Wilfried Böse, who is also known as “Boni” because of his second 
given name Bonifatius, is believed to have played a central role26 in the formation of 
the RZ, a group that Böse envisaged as a new type of “Stadtguerilla” (urban guerrilla) 
with a broader, more populist, focus than that of the RAF.  
Before the formation of the RZ, approximately from December 1971 onwards, 
Wilfried Böse was involved with the RAF, who assigned him their own specific cover-
name of “der kleine Dicke” (the little fat-man). Böse was able to obtain batteries 
needed to detonate RAF bombs, he sourced American armoury such as rapid-fire 
weapons of type AR 16 or M 16, acted as courier between branches of the RAF 
throughout West-Germany, and printed and distributed RAF texts (Kraushaar, 2006b, 
p. 592). Böse’s undercover experience, skills and relevant connections later assisted 
                                                     
26 See for example: Pfahl-Traughbar (2014, p. 174) and Kraushaar (2006b, p. 592). 
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operations of the newly formed RZ. Attempts by Böse to convince RAF members to 
switch to the RZ have also been reported (Kraushaar, 2006b, p. 593).  
Central to the organisational structure of the RZ were at least two ideas. First, RZ 
members were advised or directed to avoid going underground and to remain “legal” 
for as long as possible by continuing their regular life, maintaining their normal social 
networks, working regular jobs, and importantly, by taking part in mainstream 
political processes and organisations. RAF members openly criticised the RZ and 
looked down upon RZ members, whom they described as “Feierabend-Guerilla”27 
(after-hours guerrilla) rather than fully engaged and committed revolutionaries. 
Second, as the RZ’s name suggests, the organisational model resembled a cell 
structure rather than an open or linear organisational structure with a centre of 
command. Operation under a cellular model was expected to make it more difficult 
for the German Fahndungsapparat (police and criminal investigations) to capture RZ 
members in quick succession. 
It appears that the RZ quickly learned from the experience of the RAF just a short 
time earlier, in 1972, when founding members Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, 
Ulrike Meinhof, Holger Meins, and Jan-Carl Raspe, plus three additional RAF 
members were arrested by authorities within just a few weeks of each other. In 
contrast to the RAF’s model, individual group members of the RZ would know as little 
as possible about other members and would be unable to provide information to 
authorities if captured. This approach appears to have served the RZ well. When one 
of their members, Hermann Feiling, sustained life-threatening injuries during a failed 
bombing attack in the summer of 1978, he was captured by criminal investigators 
and interrogated in hospital over a period of several weeks. Despite intense 
interrogations of a heavily injured and weakened RZ member, investigators merely 
extracted information about Feiling’s local cell of five members in Heidelberg, but 
nothing of significance about the group’s founding cell in Frankfurt nor about the 
                                                     
27 As reported by former RAF member Margit Schiller in (M. Schiller, 1999) 
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group’s international connections, such as to the before-mentioned Carlos nor to 
Palestinian terrorists groups (Kraushaar, 2006b, p. 598).  
Little was known about the internal structure of the RZ for a long time. It was not 
until the arrest of leading RZ member Hans-Joachim Klein in 1998 that more 
information was obtained. It is now believed that approximately ten RZ cells 
operated in the Federal Republic of Germany; four in Frankfurt/Main, and several 
others in West-Berlin as well as in the Ruhrgebiet (Pfahl-Traughbar, 2014, p. 174). At 
least one international cell of the RZ participated in attacks outside Germany and 
collaborated with terrorists from other countries; such as in the attack on an OPEC 
conference in Vienna in 1975 under Carlos (in which RZ member Hans-Joachim Klein 
took part); and the hijacking of an Air-France aircraft on route from Israel to France 
in the European summer of 1976. After a stop-over in Athens, the aircraft was 
hijacked by members of the PFLP-SC as well as German RZ members Wilfried Böse 
and Brigitte Kuhlmann. The terrorists redirected the aircraft to Entebbe in Uganda, 
where Israeli forces killed all terrorists and freed remaining hostages in a special 
military operation. The hijacking/hostage-taking event, which lasted several days, at 
some stage included the segregation of hostages into two groups—Jewish and non-
Jewish. This selection process is believed to have been carried out by Böse and 
Kuhlmann and resulted in much debate amongst members of the RZ and other 
German terrorist groups, of which conflicting accounts exist. However, it appears to 
be agreed that the ill-fated Entebbe attack caused major rifts within the RZ and that 
it effectively ended the group’s international operations  (Skelton-Robinson, 2006, 
pp. 880-881). 
The hijacking of the Air-France aircraft with the ensuing hostage-situation in Entebbe 
probably constitutes the most publicised attack perpetrated by the RZ. Other RZ 
attacks were of a smaller scale and more populist in nature, with the intention that 
the design of attacks might be easily replicated (by other established and by newly 
formed cells) and attack targets selected in such a way that the selection of a target 
would represent a political message in itself. Pfahl-Traughbar (2014, p. 174) 
illustrates this point and lists RZ targets between 1973 and 1974 that demonstrate 
opposition to American foreign policy, targets between 1975 and 1977 that appear 
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to support the feminist-movement and pro-abortion groups, while several RZ attacks 
between 1977 and 1978 targeted firms and research institutions involved with the 
construction of nuclear power-stations. From approximately 1980 onwards, the RZ 
also conducted several so-called “Knieschussattentate” (knee-cap attacks) in which 
several government officials were wounded or killed. Like the RAF and the 2nd June 
Movement, the RZ lost support and impact after the reunification of Germany in 
1989. The group’s last actions are believed to have been small scale bombing attacks 
in 1993 and 1995.  In 2001 former members of the RZ published a paper entitled 
“Rauchzeichen” (smoke-signal) in which the following observation is made: “Bis 
heute gibt es keinen authentischen Rückblick über die frühen Jahre der RZ. Selbst 
nicht in der individualisierten Form einer Autobiographie. Diejenigen, die etwas dazu 
sagen können, sind entweder tot oder schweigen.” (Until today there are no 
authentic reviews of the RZ’s early years. Not even in the individual form of an auto-
biography. Those, who are in a position to comment, are either dead or remain silent; 
as outlined in “Geschichten des Zorns”, jungle world vom 21. Juni 2001 (cited in 
Kraushaar, 2006b, p. 590). 
2.5 Terrorism and the Media 
In their article “Theatre of Terror”, published more than 30 years ago, Rubin and 
Friedland (1986) use vivid descriptors to suggest metaphorical parallels between a 
highly dramatic theatre performance and that of a carefully staged act of political 
terrorism. Like theatre actors, terrorists must first capture the attention of their 
target audience and then hold and sustain audience interest for as long as possible. 
A dramatic target for an execution of a terrorist attack combined with a message of 
symbolic significance and political justification can assist terrorists to amplify 
attention and sympathetic potential from their audience under at least two 
conditions: first, that resulting media coverage is sufficiently extensive and/or 
sustained and, second, that media reports are suitably slanted in order to promote 
the communicative goals of the terrorists.  
Of course, media outlets have their own agendas to follow when deciding on the 
content and extent of their coverage. Elter (2006, p. 1067) and Glück (2007, p. 24), 
for example, list several criteria that are important for an issue or an event to be 
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considered newsworthy, including: timing and timeliness, emotionality, curiosity, 
involvement of persons with elite or celebrity status, degree of violence or negative 
impact, vicinity to the reader or viewer, continuity, and clarity. If several of these 
criteria are met and, especially, if the level of continuity is high, then a great headline 
or a hot-story may become a media-event that lasts for several days, weeks or even 
months, as was the case for the media attention accorded to several hostage-taking 
and kidnapping events in Europe throughout the 1970s. Terrorist groups for whom 
media coverage is a desired payoff will therefore pay close attention to the 
development of an effective media strategy.  
The interplay between terrorism and the media has been the topic of many 
publications over recent decades28 and it continues to be the subject of much debate. 
If we narrow our focus on Western Europe, however, the volume of published works 
is considerably smaller; for example, Kingston (1995) examines terrorism and the 
media in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict; Glück (2007) focuses on ETA; 
and Martens (2008) on representations of the German Red Army Faction (RAF) in the 
Dutch media. In the context of the Federal Republic of Germany, Balz (2006) writes 
on the discourse about terrorist “sympathisers” in the West-German print media; 
Musolff (2006) on terrorism represented as “Kriegsgeschehen” (event/s of war) in 
the West-German public discourse; Steinseifer (2006) on terrorism as media-event/s 
in the German autumn of 1977 with particular reference to the kidnapping of Hanns 
Martin Schleyer; and Buck (2007) on media, hostage-taking and kidnapping of 
German citizens.  
Few authors have analysed terrorist acts in Germany specifically from the perspective 
of a deliberate communication strategy; they include: Elter (2006, 2008) on the RAF 
and the media; Kraushaar (2006c) on a “Kleinkrieg” (small scale war) by groups 
including the RAF against Axel-Springer publishers;  Gätje (2006) on the RAF’s  “info-
system” and the group’s internal communication strategy; Glaab (2007) on the RAF 
                                                     
28 Works consulted for this study include: Alexander (1980); L. J. Martin (1986); Carpini and Williams 
(1987); Wilkinson (1990); Crelinsten (1997); Nacos (1994); Weimann and Winn (1994); Nacos (2003); 
Schbley (2004); Abrahms (2005); Weimann (2005); Ross (2007); Surette, Hansen, and Noble (2009). A 
more comprehensive discussion of the literature is presented in Chapter III.  
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and the media during the 1970s; Balz (2008) on the media strategies of the RAF (pp. 
52-76) and news management during the “escalations” of 1977 (pp. 255-320). It is 
significant to note that the RAF has been the subject of almost all of these analyses. 
It is also timely to reiterate a point frequently made in the literature; see for example 
Elter (2006, p. 1068) and Glaab (2007, p. 31): Terrorists can influence to a 
considerable degree if media coverage is likely to occur in response to an act of 
terrorism that has been carefully staged according to the before-mentioned criteria 
of a newsworthy story.29 Influence, however, on how and how much the media will 
report is much more difficult to achieve and is subject to the uncertainty that 
characterises terrorist activity. Regardless, terrorist groups seek media attention for 
their actions even if resulting media coverage is negative and does not support the 
terrorists’ stated political or ideological message. It seems that the nature of the 
coverage is far less important than the fact that coverage occurs at all.  
The analysis of the RAF’s interaction with the media has many dimensions (Elter, 
2006, p. 1068) and the group’s first generation is regarded as particularly concerned 
with the way in which the group was represented in the media. The RAF’s declaration 
of formation (Gründungserklärung) entitled “Die Rote Armee aufbauen” (to build the 
Red Army) was printed under the logo of the Black Panther Party in Agit 883; the text 
ends with the rallying cry: “Die Klassenkämpfe entfalten /Das Proletariat organisieren 
/Mit dem bewaffneten Widerstand beginnen /Die Rote Armee aufbauen!” (To start 
class conflicts  /To organise the proletariat /To begin with armed resistance /To build 
the Red Army); German text cited in Peters (2007, p. 193). Agit 883 carried the 
subtitle Zeitschrift für Agitation and sozialistische Praxis (magazine for agitation and 
socialist praxis); it was a broadsheet “Szene”-newspaper, offered fortnightly by 
street-vendors in pubs and cafés. With a circulation ranging between 4,000 and 
10,000 copies - more than any other underground paper of this genre in Germany 
                                                     
29 No terrorist group can, however, guarantee that a particular planned operation will result in a 
certain amount of media coverage. Recognising the variability or risk inherent in the outcomes of 
terrorist actions, including the media coverage generated by them, is a key feature of the analysis 
presented in this thesis. 
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(Kraushaar, 2006a, p. 516) - Agit 883 provided a public forum for the documentation 
and exchange of radical left positions and opinions.  
By the time Agit 883 printed the RAF’s appeal “Die Rote Armee aufbauen”, a text 
widely assumed to have been authored by Ulrike Meinhof (Kraushaar, 2006a, p. 517), 
Meinhof herself had gone underground leaving her career as a well-known and 
respected journalist, publicist and writer behind. She brought to the RAF a sharp 
intellect and significant media-related experience. Before going underground, Ulrike 
Meinhof wrote regular columns30 , some of which were published in the far-left 
magazine Konkret (Peters, 2007, p. 148). Konkret magazine was founded by Klaus 
Rainer Röhl in 1957 and received, for some time, significant financial support from 
communist East-Germany. Klaus Rainer Röhl and Ulrike Meinhof married in 1961 but 
separated before the RAF was formed in 1970. Interestingly, Konkret was renamed 
konkret in 1973 thus adopting the RAF’s distinctive style of replacing uppercase 
letters in standard German spelling with lowercase letters. Even in prison Ulrike 
Meinhof continued her study of media-related theories and media systems and 
ordered relevant books via solicitor Dr Klaus Croissant (Elter, 2006, p. 1069).  
The first generation of the RAF held an immense mistrust of the media and viewed 
mainstream media outlets as a tool of the West-German government to indoctrinate 
the public in line with imperialist intentions expressed through both foreign and 
internal West-German politics (Glaab, 2007, p. 37).  Even leftist-liberal media outlets, 
if mainstream, were suspected to be part of “the system”. Media coverage 
concerning the RAF and the political left was followed and examined closely and the 
publication of untruths and propaganda expected as a given; for example, the RAF’s 
first strategic publication Konzept Stadtguerilla 31  from April 1971 includes the 
following statement: “daß fast alles, was die Zeitungen über uns schreiben – und wie 
sie es schreiben: alles - gelogen ist, ist klar” (that almost everything that the 
newspapers write about us – and how they write it: everything - are lies, that’s a 
                                                     
30 See K. Bauer (2008) for a selection of Ulrike Meinhof’s columns from 1960-1969 translated to 
English. 
31 For a more comprehensive account of the Konzept Stadtguerilla and other RAF publications see ID-
Verlag (1997), for example pp. 27-28. 
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given). The publication also states that an interview by French journalist Michèle Ray 
with the RAF in June 1970 was exploited both by her and by the Spiegel magazine for 
financial and editorial gain. 
The first generation of the RAF, like other activist groups at the time, sought out 
smaller publishers such as Karl Dietrich Wolff’s Roter Stern, as well as non-
mainstream newspapers and magazines like konkret, Agit 883, and Kursbuch, 
Germany’s most important magazine of the New Left (Kraushaar, 2006a, p. 517).  The 
readership of smaller, underground media outlets constituted members of the 
revolutionary left, marginalised groups and disenfranchised youths who were 
expected to be more receptive to revolutionary views and actions proposed under 
calls for a “fight against the system”. In addition, it was assumed32 that the RAF’s 
political messages, even if published in mainstream media, would not be printed in 
full and would be distorted through editorial commentary.  
Despite a strong dislike for mainstream media, the RAF did not ignore the popular 
and mainstream press. Ulrike Meinhof, together with most early members of the 
RAF, regularly and systematically analysed media coverage in newspapers and 
magazines in the German, wider European and American press, not only to survey 
media reports about the RAF and other terrorist groups, but also to collect 
information about relevant police and criminal investigations 
(Fahndungsmaßnahmen), as well as reactions and public debates surrounding the 
issue of terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. A number of RAF members 
were even assigned the task of reading and analysing media reports not only in 
German, but also in French and English (Elter, 2006, p. 1074).   
Even after the arrest and imprisonment of leading first generation RAF members the 
group continued, and possibly intensified, their media-related work as well as efforts 
towards constructing the RAF’s own historiography.33 An important aspect in this 
                                                     
32 See views expressed by RAF founding member Gudrun Ensslin, quoted in Glaab (2007, p. 39). 
33 Elter (2008, p. 233) points out that the RAF is one of the few, possibly the only, terrorist organisation 
whose “historiography in the present” (Historisierung in der Gegenwart) began while the group was 
still active.  
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regard is undoubtedly the interest shown by German and European intellectuals, 
authors and artists,34  and prominent public figures in the escalation of debates 
surrounding the RAF, the conditions under which RAF members were held in prison 
and the response of the German government and the mainstream-media to terrorist 
activity in the country.  The following is an extract of a request written by Ulrike 
Meinhof to French philosopher and writer Jean-Paul Satre in October 1974. Satre is 
asked to visit Andreas Baader in prison, where Baader, together with 31 other 
members of the RAF, participated in the group’s third collective hunger-strike: 
“Satre, … Um das Interview zu machen, ist es nicht notwendig, daß Du uns in 
allem zustimmst, was wir von Dir wollen ist, daß Du uns den Schutz deines 
Namens gibst und Deine Fähigkeit als Marxist, Philosoph, Journalist, Moralist 
für das Interview einsetzt, um uns die Möglichkeit zu geben, dadurch 
bestimmte politische Inhalte für die Praxis des antiimperialistischen Kampfes 
zu transportieren …“, cited in Aust (2008, p. 431). „Satre, ... To conduct the 
interview, it is not necessary that you agree with us on all points, what we 
want of you is that you give us the protection of your name and that you use 
your abilities as a Marxist, philosopher, journalist, moralist, to provide us with 
the opportunity to convey certain political messages for the praxis of the anti-
imperialist struggle … “(translation to English by the author). 
On 9 November 1974, imprisoned RAF member Holger Meins died after many weeks 
of starving himself as part of the group’s well publicised third hunger-strike.35 Holger 
Meins’ death resulted not only in the retaliatory shooting murder of Günter von 
Drenckman, president of Germany’s Superior Court of Justice, but also in 
demonstrations throughout Germany and an increase in the debate surrounding the 
conditions under which “political prisoners” or “terrorists”, depending on the view 
of the speaker/writer, were held in German prisons. Jean-Paul Satre did visit Andreas 
                                                     
34 Tremel (2006) coins the term “Literrorisierung” (loosely translated as “terror in literature”) and 
highlights, among other works, Nobel Prize Laureate Heinrich Böll’s 1974 novel “Die verlorene Ehre 
der Katharina Blum oder: Wie Gewalt entstehen und wohin sie führen kann” (The Lost Honour of 
Katharina Blum or: how violence develops and where it can lead). The novel’s central theme is the 
effect of sensationalist journalistic practices on the life of a law-abiding woman who yields to despair 
and shoots a tabloid press journalist. 
35 For details on the events surrounding Holger Meins’ death see for example Peters (2007, pp. 317-
323). 
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Baader in Stammheim prison in December 1974. Satre’s meeting with Baader was 
covered widely in the German press and in the “whole of the international press” 
(Aust, 2008, p. 423) and has been described as a most successful coup for the external 
communication of the RAF (Elter, 2006, p. 1073). When the second generation of the 
RAF emerged fully as a terrorist group and their Commando Holger Meins staged the 
violent siege of the German Embassy in Stockholm in April 1975 with the explicit goal 
of freeing leading first-generation RAF members from prison, the group did so with 
a relatively advanced understanding of the ways in which the group’s actions would 
be treated by the German and international media.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the historical context from which the leftist movement emerged in 
the Unites States and in Western Europe was described. The discussion tracked 
significant events as the 1970s progressed culminating in the violent expression of 
leftist political ideology and the rise to prominence of a number of terrorist groups 
in West-Germany. The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the research 
program called ‘terrorism and the media’ by exploring terrorist choices of actions in 
a context where media coverage is the desirable but risky or uncertain outcome of 
terrorism. The particular context that has been chosen for this study is the terrorism 
experienced in West-Germany beginning in 1970. The terrorist groups that were 
active in this time and place have attracted a great deal of interest from terrorism 
studies researchers. Many of these groups, especially the RAF, were conscious of the 
role and the importance of the media, paying close attention to media reports 
regarding their own attacks and the actions perpetrated by other groups. Various 
other aspects of this context, including the dominance of print media at the time, will 
be introduced in later chapters. This chapter has provided a contextual background 
that begins to explain how this investigation of terrorism choice contributes to our 
understanding of the behaviour of terrorists and terrorist groups who desire media 
coverage but who recognise that no terrorist action can guarantee it because of the 
uncertainty inherent in terrorist activity and its outcomes.  
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Chapter 3  - Literature Survey 
3.0 Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to survey the terrorism studies literature. This 
includes contributions from economics, criminology, political science, sociology, 
psychology and critical studies. Over time, researchers have placed significant 
emphasis on media attention as an important operational objective or ‘payoff’ to 
terrorist activity, and emphasise the need to understand the interaction between 
terrorist groups, terrorism, the media and media attention. Studies of ‘terrorism and 
the media’ exhibit some limitations. When these studies are quantitative, they tend 
to rely on word-counts and word-searches to measure the attention accorded to 
terrorism in the media; for example, by counting the number of times the term 
‘terrorism’ appears in a given period. Although this approach is appropriate for 
studying the topicality of terrorism, without media attention data by attack type, 
these studies can never satisfactorily explore terrorist choice and strategy.  
In studies that attempt to explore terrorist strategy as it pertains to the media and 
especially those studies that extend their analysis to the choices that terrorists make 
in terms of actions and targets, there is another less noticeable but no less significant 
shortcoming. This is the implication that terrorists will choose the action that yields 
the greatest amount of attention. At best, this approach can be interpreted as naïvely 
embedding a basic expected value type model of choice. It is well known from studies 
in decision theory and decision-making under risk and uncertainty that this type of 
approach yields incomplete and, potentially, logically inconsistent conclusions. This 
chapter places the ‘terrorism and media’ literature into its broader scholarly context 
and highlights the value of the steps taken in this thesis to overcome some of the 
weaknesses inherent in existing analytical approaches. It is concluded that the 
problem addressed by this thesis is important and that an opportunity exists to 
develop our understanding of terrorist attack method choice in a context where 
media attention is the desired but uncertain outcome of terrorist activity.  
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3.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 the ways in which terrorism is 
defined and analysed by each of the major fields that contributes to terrorism studies 
is discussed. This provides an introduction, not only to the multidisciplinary nature of 
terrorism studies, but also to each of the major research programs that are ongoing 
within each of the participating disciplines. In Section 3.3 the scope and structure of 
terrorism studies over the past four decades is explored in more detail with an 
emphasis on the main areas of study, the major problems which have drawn 
contributions from researchers representing each of the participating disciplines, and 
the recognisable trends or turns that terrorism studies has taken during this time. 
Because the thesis applies both orthodox and behavioural models of decision-making 
developed within economics, the study of terrorism from an economics perspective 
is singled out for more extended treatment in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, attention is 
focussed on the area of study to which this thesis aims to contribute directly. The 
study of terrorism and its interaction with the media is a foundational research 
program within terrorism studies and each of the major disciplines has contributed 
something towards it. Our attention is drawn finally in Section 3.6 to those studies 
that have directed the theoretical and analytical frameworks of economics towards 
the study of terrorism and the media. The literature survey concludes that the 
problem addressed by this thesis is significant within contemporary terrorism studies 
and that the approach taken herein represents a worthwhile contribution to the 
literature. This conclusion is stated in Sections 3.7 and 3.8.  
3.2 Defining Terrorism 
Definitions of ‘terrorism’ are numerous and even after decades of meticulous efforts 
by Schmid (1984, 2004b, 2012) and Schmid and Jongman (1988) an all-encompassing 
and unanimously accepted definition has not been found. Despairing of the task, 
Walter Laqueur (cited in: B. Hoffman, 2006, p. 33) concluded in the late 1970s that 
finding a definition was neither possible nor was it worthwhile to continue such 
attempts. In 1988, he responded to a survey conducted by Schmid with the following 
observation: “Ten years of debates on typologies and definitions have not enhanced 
our knowledge of the subject to a significant degree”. Nonetheless, the debate 
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continues (e.g. Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). A survey of the 
contemporary literature suggests that the task of defining terrorism has developed 
into an almost independent program much of which is based in the field of critical 
studies; for example: Shanahan (2010), Jackson (2011), Jarvis and Lister (2014), and 
Ramsay (2015). 
Before exploring some aspects of the debate in more detail, the definition adopted 
throughout this thesis can be stated. On the one hand, the definition used in the GTD 
is important because that is where part of the data for this thesis is sourced from. 
The GTD defines terrorism as any action by a non-state actor (usually, a terrorist 
organisation) outside the context of legitimate warfare with the intention to 
communicate (through the use of violence) with, coerce, or intimidate an audience 
larger than the immediate victims of a terrorist act, where this act is associated with 
achieving political, economic, religious  or other social objectives. The GTD definition 
would guide this study well, however, because the thesis uses economic analysis, it 
is appropriate to augment the GTD definition with a definition used within the 
economics of terrorism. Such a definition was contributed by F. Schneider and 
Meierrieks (2014, p. 1). This is very similar to the GTD definition: 
Terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence 
by non-state actors outside the context of legitimate warfare with the 
intention to coerce and intimidate an audience larger than the immediate 
victims in order to obtain political, economic, religious, or other social 
objectives through intimidation or fear.  
The term ‘terrorism’ is not a new one. B. Hoffman (2006, pp. 1-41) provides an 
overview of how the meaning and associated connotations of the term have varied 
since the French Revolution to the early 21st century. He points out how terrorism 
was historically understood as neither random nor indiscriminate and how terrorism 
is viewed as “violence committed by non-state entities” whereas the term ‘terror’ 
describes “violence and intimidation by those already in power against their own 
citizenry” (pp. 15-16). B. Hoffman (2006) devotes an entire chapter to defining 
terrorism, and Hoffman’s conclusion is largely consistent with the definition 
contributed by F. Schneider and Meierrieks (2014). However, such agreement is not 
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always characteristic of this literature. Terrorism has been studied by scholars from 
various fields including criminology, political science, sociology, critical studies, 
psychology, and economics. While some general consensus is evident, researchers in 
different fields view terrorism from different perspectives and emphasise different 
aspects in arriving at a definition for terrorism.  
3.2.1 The Perspective of Criminology 
Criminologists define terrorism as political violence “from below” (Hamm, 2005, p. 
239). Hamm attributes the foundational work on terrorism from a criminological 
perspective to Austin Turk (1982). According to Hamm (2005, p. 238), Turk was the 
first criminologist to suggest that the terrorism label should be reserved only for 
subordinate groups that challenge the state through intimidation or violence and 
that crimes by the state should not be identified as political [terrorism]. Bassiouni 
(1981) proposes that terrorist acts are ideologically and politically motivated and are 
designed to achieve power. Crelinsten (1989, 1997) describes terrorism first and 
foremost as a phenomenon of communication designed to send a message to specific 
target audiences. This is a theme also followed by Surette et al. (2009), who examine 
media-oriented terrorism and cite the work of Schmid and de Graaf (1982), who also 
view terrorist violence from the perspective of a communication strategy. 
In the modern vernacular the term terrorism is a pejorative term (B. Hoffman, 2006, 
p. 23). It is therefore common for terrorists to describe themselves as ‘freedom 
fighters’, as ‘(urban) guerrillas’, as members of a ‘resistance movement’ or as 
‘soldiers’. Even substitutions for the term terrorist are shown in inverted commas 
here, as they too are not objective facts, but are concepts for which it may not be 
possible to find an all-encompassing definition, or at least not one that everyone 
might agree with. Attempts have been made to circumvent such impasses. Jenkins 
(1986, pp. 279-280), for example, suggests that terrorism may be objectively defined 
“by the quality of the act, but not by the identity of the perpetrators or by the nature 
of their cause”, where the quality of an act is judged in accordance with national 
and/or international legal frameworks. The criminological perspective is important, 
as we shall see in the next section, because terrorism researchers have begun to 
incorporate a distinctive criminological perspective into their research programs.  
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3.2.2 The Political Science Perspective 
Political scientists have described terrorism essentially as ‘political’ and aimed at the 
pursuit of ‘power’. Abrahms (2008, p. 79), for example, poses the question of 
whether the solution to terrorism might not reside “in diminishing its political utility”, 
while B. Hoffman (2006, p. 2) contributes the following definition: “Terrorism, in the 
most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and 
inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the 
acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change”. While some 
analysts such as B. Hoffman (2006, p. 41) view terrorism as acts perpetrated by 
subnational groups or non-state entities only, others (e.g. Blakeley, 2007, p. 234) 
maintain that the label ‘terrorist’ can and probably should be used to denounce 
publically actions by states that are “morally no different from (non-state) terrorism” 
(Finlay, 2009, p. 773). A survey conducted by Young and Findley (2011) found that 
the terrorism studies literature from 1980 to 2008 has been dominated by qualitative 
and case-study work. As the number of observations in case studies are generally 
very small, researchers have been careful to define terrorism in a way that fits their 
particular case under study; thus contributing to the continuous proliferation of 
definitions. Young and Findley (2011, pp. 416-417) argue that better integration of 
knowledge might be achieved through quantitative research where (a) scholars begin 
with “a firm minimal definition based on points of agreement about what terrorism 
is (and is not)”, and (b) use additional empirical analysis on key points of contention 
to investigate how much the contention matters when it is applied to a large number 
of cases.  
3.2.3 The Social Science Perspective 
Social scientists have highlighted the psychological impact of terrorist acts.  Hudson 
(2010, p. 10) describes the primary goal of terrorist action as “the psychological 
purpose of publicising a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a 
government or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause”. 
The element of public fear generated via terrorist action and the role of the media in 
this process is highlighted by Braithwaite (2013, pp. 95-96) who suggests that “public 
perceptions […] are the real target of terrorist attacks. Terrorists prioritise 
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communication of an exaggerated sense of their ability to do harm. They do this by 
attempting to convince the population that their government is unable to protect 
them”. Primoratz (cited in Richards, 2014, p. 230) also highlights the psychological 
dimension of terrorist acts and contends that “all uses of political violence effect 
some degree of fear, but in terrorism proper, the causing of fear and coercion 
through fear is the objective”. Richards’ own definition concurs: “terrorism is the use 
of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a 
psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political 
motive.” In Richards’ view such elements are common to all acts of terrorism. He 
concludes that if the primary aim of a violent act is not to generate a wider 
psychological impact, then the act is not terrorism. Richards concedes that ‘knowing’ 
or ‘deciding’ if an act of political violence is primarily designed to generate a 
psychological impact beyond the physical effect is a subjective process. Still, it is a 
question which in Richards’ view points to the heart of the subjectivity problem that 
is so inherent to the task of finding a definition for terrorism. That terrorism is not a 
given ‘truth’ in the real world but is instead a biased interpretation of events and 
their presumed causes, at times used consciously to manipulate perceptions to 
promote certain interests has also been suggested by Turk (2004, pp. 271-272). While 
social science researchers have tended to focus on the psychological impact of 
terrorist acts on society at large, consideration of the terrorist as an individual person 
or as part of a specific terrorist group are the concern of psychologists. 
3.2.4 The Psychologists’ Perspective 
The psychological approach to terrorism “is concerned with the study of terrorists 
per se, their recruitment and induction into terrorist groups, their personalities, 
beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers as terrorists” (Hudson, 2010, p. 16). 
Attempts at uncovering the ‘terrorist mind’ or a ‘terrorist profile’ have spanned 
several decades of investigations. Victoroff (2005) offers a review of published 
theories of the psychological bases of terrorism as well as published psychosocial 
data describing terrorists. He defines terrorism as “atypical human behaviour” (p. 4), 
points to the heterogeneity of terrorist roles and responsibilities within terrorist 
organisations (pp. 5-6), as well as to divergent temperaments, ideologies, thought 
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processes, and cognitive capacities of individual terrorists, and acknowledges that 
any efforts to uncover the ‘terrorist mind’ will more likely result in uncovering a 
“spectrum of terrorist minds” (p. 7). 
Over several decades, insanity, psychopathy, and sociopathy36 are cited as possible 
reasons which might push individuals towards terrorism. Concerns about the 
scientific validity of such assertions are raised by Corrado (1981, cited in Victoroff 
2005 p. 31) who suggests that “a terrorist personality probably does not exist and 
that efforts to psycho-pathologise this type of aggression are rooted in biased theory, 
not in unbiased data”. Reich (1998, p. 262) concurs, warning that “psychological 
accounts of terrorism are replete with explanations that ignore or blur variety and 
complexity”. More recent reviews of the literature (e.g. Victoroff, 2005; Silke, 2003a, 
p. 33; Horgan, 2008, p. 80) also conclude that many attempts at identifying terrorist 
‘traits’ have lacked scientific rigour and have largely been unsuccessful. While some 
specific psychological characterisations of the terrorist tend to persist, for example 
hypotheses about Frustration-Aggression 37 , Narcissistic Rage 38 , and Negative 
Identity39, contemporary psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists appear 
now largely to agree that a single ‘terrorist personality’ does not exist (Hudson, 2010, 
p. 51). It is important to note at this point that absence of conclusive evidence in 
support of pathological traits common to all terrorists does not suggest that 
“mentally unbalanced or pathological personalities are never present in terrorist 
organisations” (Silke, 2003a, p. 32). Similarly, suggested ‘root causes’ of terrorism40 
such as poverty, demographic factors, social inequality, dispossession, and political 
grievances have “garnered little empirical support or conceptual grounding” 
                                                     
36 For a discussion of terrorist behaviour as both prosocial and antisocial see Victoroff (2005, pp. 13-
14).  
37  The Frustration-aggression hypothesis views aggressive behaviour as a result of unresolved 
frustration. For a description see also, for example, Friedland (1992) cited in Horgan (2003, p. 10), and 
Hudson (2010, p. 17). 
38  Narcissistic rage is defined as rage against the ‘self’ arising from complex psychological and 
environmental factors exacted upon an external target (Victoroff, 2005, p. 23); see also Pearlstein 
(1991) cited in Horgan (2008, p. 12) and Hudson (2010, p. 18). 
39  Negative identity is the resolution of an identity crisis that involves the adoption of socially 
undesirable behaviours or ideologies. For details see Erikson’s (1968) theory of identity formation and 
Knutson (1981), both cited in Hudson (2010, p. 18). 
40 For a discussion on the ‘root causes of terrorism’ argument see Newman (2006). 
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(Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006, p. 196). And again, while such factors are not irrelevant 
to terrorism, they have not been proven to be reliable determinants of terrorism, as 
the majority of individuals facing conditions of disadvantage do not become 
terrorists. 
Given the difficulty of profiling terrorists as individuals, some researchers have 
shifted their attention to examining the various pathways that some people take 
toward, into, and even out of terrorism. Taylor and Horgan (2006, pp. 590-591) 
clearly depict terrorism as a socialisation process and Horgan (2008) reemphasises 
the point that more value may be gained from examining individuals’ “pathways” and 
“routes” toward and through terrorism rather than to remain focused on terrorist 
profiles and possible root causes or so-called “push”-factors which are often so broad 
that little can be done in a practical sense to change them. According to Horgan, more 
may be gained for counterterrorism initiatives if researchers were to increase their 
focus on narrower and more easily identifiable “pull”-factors, i.e. lures and real or 
imagined rewards throughout a person’s radicalisation process that elevate and 
maintain his or her positive expectation of terrorist group involvement. Mitigating 
action toward challenging the myths and lures of terrorism, for example through the 
use of targeted counterpropaganda, may serve as effective counterterrorism 
strategies.  
Another interesting development is the juncture where the psychological approach 
to terrorism meets with the field of criminology and the overarching question is 
posed of whether or not insights gained in one field may inform the other. Fussey 
and Richards (2008) provide a useful overview of the debate and after discussing 
several differences between terrorists and other criminal behaviour conclude in 
support of interdisciplinary enquiry, albeit with some reservation. At the level of the 
individual offender, for example, Fussey (2013, p. 104) restates the point that many 
terrorists do not “experience their violence first hand” and may be emotionally 
equipped differently to ‘ordinary’ criminals, who come in close physical contact with 
victims of their attacks. Related findings are presented by Taylor and Horgan (2006, 
p. 596) who highlight the divergent characteristics of terrorist activities and illustrate 
how various types of terrorist roles differ in their relative proximity/distance to 
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violence perpetrated. While differences can be found in the motivations, processes 
of involvement, and actions that terrorists and other criminal offenders might 
display, some researchers in the area of psychology have pointed to interesting 
parallels in the behaviour of both.  
Stedmon and Lawson (2013, p. 91) argue that “terrorism shares attributes with many 
lower and more common forms of crime” and suggest that terrorists conduct hostile 
reconnaissance in the planning of an attack in a public space in a very similar manner 
to the way a petty criminal may survey a public space for security measures and 
vulnerable targets. With regard to attack prevention, Vrij, Mann, and Leal (2013) 
point out that results from physiological and neurological deception research as well 
as insights gained about the differential mental processes of truth tellers and liars 
might be beneficially deployed when approaching persons suspected of planning a 
terrorist attack. Specifically, Vrij et al. (2013, pp. 115, 124) point out, first, that even 
truth tellers may display cues of deception such as stronger emotions, gaze aversion, 
when under pressure in an interview situation. Therefore, more reliable results may 
be obtained by (a) examining potential suspects when they are secretly observed. 
Furthermore, the authors propose that cognitive load and therefore observable cues 
to deception may be increased by (b) asking suspects about intentions (rather than 
past actions or events) and by (c) interviewing suspects together whenever possible, 
as it is much more difficult for a group of people to construct a cohesive and 
consistent lie than it is for an individual. 
3.2.5 The Economics Perspective 
The economics approach to the study of terrorism has a relatively short history, so 
definitions for terrorism from this perspective are relatively easier to determine. A 
definition for the term ‘terrorism’ from the economics approach, provided by F. 
Schneider and Meierrieks (2014), was cited at the start of this chapter. This recent 
definition contains many elements which are congruent with definitions that have 
been provided by other economists who study terrorism. Enders and Sandler (2002, 
pp. 145-146), for example, capture essential features of definitions provided in the 
literature and state:  
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Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or 
brutality by subnational groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological 
objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly 
involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence. Key 
ingredients of the definition include the underlying political motive, the 
general atmosphere of intimidation, and the targeting of those outside of the 
decision-making process. Terrorists choose their targets to appear to be 
random, so everyone feels at risk […]. Businesspeople, military personnel, 
tourists, and everyday citizens, rather than politicians, are generally the 
targets of terrorist attacks.  
An important element in the examination of terrorism from an economics 
perspective is the concept of rational choice. The rational choice model implies that 
terrorists have an objective and choose from among their scarce means to reach that 
objective. This thesis takes an economic perspective to the study of terrorism and 
the media. The scope of the economic analysis of terrorism and some important 
contributions to the literature are surveyed later in this chapter.  
3.3 Scope and Structure of the Terrorism Research Program 
The study of terrorism is an evolving research program that can be traced, in its 
contemporary-modern form, to the late 1960s and by now spans a period of more 
than five decades. A general survey of terrorism studies is not attempted here, 
primarily because the investigation is mainly concerned with the analysis of terrorism 
and the media and the choices that terrorists make in such a context. Although the 
terrorism studies literature is voluminous, some attempts at reviewing it have been 
contributed and can be read to gain an appreciation of the scope and nature of work 
that has been done in this field (e.g. Reid, 1997; Silke, 2001; Shughart, 2006; Reid & 
Chen, 2007; Schmid, 2011; Sageman, 2014). In this section an overview of the 
terrorism studies literature is provided that places the thesis within the broader 
context of the terrorism studies literature.   
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In order to accomplish this, a complete survey of two major multi-disciplinary and 
inter-disciplinary academic journals41 concerned with the study of conflict, terrorism, 
and political violence was conducted. All volumes and issues in both Terrorism and 
Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism were examined and a list of 
special-issue titles compiled. Then, the “most-read”42  and “most-cited”43  articles 
from both journals were collected and catalogued by year of original publication and 
topic. Approaching the task of outlining the scope and structure of the terrorism 
studies literature by focussing on the most-read and most-cited journal articles is an 
approach that has some precedence in terrorism studies (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 
2015). The two journals, to which most of our attention is directed, have previously 
formed the foundation for literature reviews in this field of study (Silke, 2008). The 
list of topics, special issues, readership and citations is compiled and summarised in 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. 
It quickly becomes apparent that very few special-issue topics are represented 
amongst most-read or most-cited articles. The few exceptions include: (1) Sandler 
(1995) whose article on the relationship between democracy and terrorism fits 
within the theme of the year 2000 special-issue of the journal of Terrorism and 
Political Violence; (2) Dishman (2005) whose article on the convergence of crime and 
terror relates to the 2012 special-issue in that journal; and (3) Spaaij (2010) whose 
article on lone wolf terrorism corresponds to the topic chosen for a special-issue of 
the journal of Terrorism and Political Violence in 2014.  Special-issue topics in neither 
the journal of Terrorism and Political Violence nor the journal of Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism have thus attracted the readership or citations of other topics 
considered in these two journals. 
 
                                                     
41 Terrorism and Political Violence (Taylor and Francis): 1989 (Vol 1/Issue 1) to 2015 (Vol 27/Issue 4); 
and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Taylor and Francis): 1977 (Vol 1/Issue 1) to 2015 (Vol 38/Issue 
10) 
42 Measured by downloads. See Taylor and Francis, Routledge. 
43 Measured by Scopus and Web of Science. See Taylor and Francis, Routledge.  
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Table 3.1 Terrorism Studies Research – Topics, Readership and Citations 
Topic Special Issue most read most cited 
Media, Police and Terrorism 1979 S   
Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World 1991 T   
Terrorism Research and Public Policy 1991 T   
Western Responses to Terrorism 1992 T   
Political Parties and Terrorist Groups 1992 T   
Technology and Terrorism 1993 T   
Northern Ireland: Prospects for Peace 1995 S   
Millennialism and Violence 1995 T   
Violence in Southern Africa 1996 T   
Water Conflict: The Middle East 1997 S   
Water Conflict: Southern Asia and the US 1997 S   
Prospects for Peace in the New Millennium? 1998 S   
Aviation Terrorism and Security 1998 T   
The Future of Terrorism 1999 T   
Democratic Experience and Political Violence 2000 T  1995 T 
Contemporary Global Maritime Piracy 2012 S   
Intersections of Crime and Terror 2012 T  2005 S 
Progress in Research on Political Violence 2012 T   
The Intellectuals and Terror: A Fatal Attraction 2013 T   
Northern Ireland: 20 Years After the Cease-Fires 2014 S   
Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism 2014 T 2010 S 2010 S 
Criminological Theory and Terrorism 2015 T   
Al-Qaeda's 20 year strategic plan, global terror  2013 S  
Al-Qaeda's uncertain future  2013 S  
Al-Qaeda, 9/11 attacks, (counter)-intelligence  2009 S  
Al-Qaeda  2004 T, 2010 S  
Al-Qaeda, breaking their cells   2003 S 
CIA drone war in Pakistan  2010 S  
London Bombers, case study   2007 S 
Salafi movement anatomy of   2006 S 
Sierra Leone boy soldiers   2006 T 
Kurdish Workers Party, Funding Terrorism   2007 S 
Tourism in Spain and terrorism   1991 S 
Nationalist terrorism, ETA and IRA  2007 T  
Causes, motivations of terrorists  2011 S  
Pathways to terrorism  2008 T 2008 T 
Causes, poverty and terrorism  2006 T, 2006 S 2006 T 
Pathways to terrorism, Psychology  2006 T  
Europe, Radicalisation in  2010 S 2010 S 
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Table 3.2 Terrorism Studies Research – Topics, Readership and Citations (cont.) 
Topic Special Issue most read most cited 
State failure and terrorism  2007 T  
De-radicalisation of terrorists  2010 T 2010 T 
Counterterrorism since 9/11  2002 S 2002 S 
EU Europol counterterrorism  2010 S 2011 T, 2010 S 
Crime, terrorism, and transformation   2001 S 
Radicalisation, violent vs non-violent  2012 T  
New Terrorism and its Critics  2011 S  
Radicalisation, concept  2010 T 2010 T 
Conceptualising terrorism  2004 T 2004 T 
Conceptualising terrorism, challenges  2004 T 2004 T 
New Terrorism. How new?  2004 S 2004 S 
Radicalisation vs Activism   2009 T 
Democracy and terrorism   2001 T 
Electoral violence in conflict-ridden societies   2009 T 
Financing of terrorism and the internet  2010 S  
Costs: raising the cost of rebel violence   2007 T 
Funding terrorism, Kurdish Workers Party   2007 S 
Insurgency, future of  2013 S  
Social Media and Jihad  2015 S  
Media and female terrorists  2005 S  
Media and terrorism  1997 T  
Cyberterrorism   2005 S 
Social Network analysis Jemaah Islamiyah   2006 S 
Networks connecting terrorist   2008 S 
Support of terrorism, Muslim countries   2006 S 
Psychology, Pathways to Terrorism  2006 T  
Psychological profiles, suicide bombers   2004 S 
Psychology and terrorism   2006 T 
Jihadists' Radicalisation  2011 T  
Jihadist Threat to US  2011 S 2011 S 
Religion and Terrorism  2010 T  
Islamist  2009 T 2009 T 
Ideology and terrorism   1998 T 
Problems/Stagnation of terrorism research  2014 T 2001 T 
CBRN Weapons and Terrorist Organizations  2012 S  
Suicide bombing Hamas, Islamic Jihad  2006 S 2005 T 
Suicide attack, signalling and terrorism   2004 S 
Suicide bombers, psychological profiles   2004 S 
Suicide bombing, Palestinian-Israeli conflict   2008 S 
 
Whilst special issues reflect important topics within a field, the identification of the 
major research themes for any considerable period of time cannot rely upon special 
issue topics. Therefore, published articles which on 4 September 2015 were listed on 
the two surveyed journals’ websites as either most-read and/or most-cited were 
catalogued to identify major research themes. Case-studies, a recurrent contribution 
to the literature in most periods, were removed. The results are summarised in Table 
3.3. The contributions to terrorism studies can be seen to encompass a diverse range 
of themes covering many different topics. Most themes have enjoyed a reasonable 
lifespan in the literature, with many of them attracting research over a number of 
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years. It is also easy to discern the emergence of themes at times when law 
enforcement agencies faced particular challenges.  
Table 3.3 Terrorism Studies Research – Main Themes (Case-studies removed) 
Theme Topic 
Special 
Issue 
most read most cited 
Al-Qaeda 
Al-Qaeda's 20 year strategic plan, global 
terror  2013 S  
Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda's uncertain future  2013 S  
Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda, 9/11 attacks, (counter)-intelligence  2009 S  
Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda  2004 T, 2010 S  
Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda, breaking their cells   2003 S 
Causes of T. Causes, motivations of terrorists  2011 S  
Causes of T. Pathways to terrorism  2008 T 2008 T 
Causes of T. Causes, poverty and terrorism  2006 T, 2006 S 2006 T 
Causes of T. Pathways to terrorism, Psychology  2006 T  
Causes of T. Europe, Radicalisation in  2010 S 2010 S 
Causes of T. State failure and terrorism  2007 T  
Counterterrorism De-radicalisation of terrorists  2010 T 2010 T 
Counterterrorism Counterterrorism since 9/11  2002 S 2002 S 
Counterterrorism EU Europol counterterrorism  2010 S 2011 T, 2010 S 
Criminology and T. Intersections of Crime and Terror 2012 T  2005 S 
Criminology and T. Criminological Theory and Terrorism 2015 T   
Criminology and T. Crime, terrorism, and transformation   2001 S 
Defining T. Radicalisation, violent vs non-violent  2012 T  
Defining T. New Terrorism and its Critics  2011 S  
Defining T. Radicalisation, concept  2010 T 2010 T 
Defining T. Conceptualising terrorism  2004 T 2004 T 
Defining T. Conceptualising terrorism, challenges  2004 T 2004 T 
Defining T. New Terrorism. How new?  2004 S 2004 S 
Defining T. Radicalisation vs Activism   2009 T 
Democracy and T. Democratic Experience and Political Violence 2000 T  1995 T 
Democracy and T. Democracy and terrorism   2001 T 
Democracy and T. Electoral violence in conflict-ridden societies   2009 T 
Financing T. Financing of terrorism and the internet  2010 S  
Financing T. Costs: raising the cost of rebel violence   2007 T 
Financing T. Funding terrorism, Kurdish Workers Party   2007 S 
Insurgency Insurgency, future of  2013 S  
Lone Wolf T. Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism 2014 T 2010 S 2010 S 
Media and T. Social Media and Jihad  2015 S  
Media and T. Media and female terrorists  2005 S  
Media and T. Media and terrorism  1997 T  
Media and T. Cyberterrorism   2005 S 
Media and T. Social Network analysis Jemaah Islamiyah   2006 S 
Networks Networks connecting terrorist   2008 S 
Networks Support of terrorism, Muslim countries   2006 S 
Psychology Psychology, Pathways to Terrorism  2006 T  
Psychology Psychological profiles, suicide bombers   2004 S 
Psychology Psychology and terrorism   2006 T 
Religion/Ideology Jihadists' Radicalisation  2011 T  
Religion/Ideology Jihadist Threat to US  2011 S 2011 S 
Religion/Ideology Religion and Terrorism  2010 T  
Religion/Ideology Islamist  2009 T 2009 T 
Religion/Ideology Ideology and terrorism   1998 T 
Research on T. Problems/Stagnation of terrorism research  2014 T 2001 T 
Special types of T. CBRN Weapons and Terrorist Organisations  2012 S  
Suicide T. Suicide bombing Hamas, Islamic Jihad  2006 S 2005 T 
Suicide T. Suicide attack, signalling and terrorism   2004 S 
Suicide T. Suicide bombers, psychological profiles   2004 S 
Suicide T. Suicide bombing, Palestinian-Israeli conflict   2008 S 
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3.3.1 Research on Terrorism Research 
It becomes apparent that considerable effort has been expended within the 
terrorism studies research program grappling with itself (e.g. Silke & Schmidt-
Petersen, 2015; Taylor, 2014; Schmid, 2014; Sageman, 2014; Reid & Chen, 2007; 
Shughart, 2006; Silke, 2001; Reid, 1997). In particular, definitions of terrorism and 
the scope and methods of studying terrorism have been the subject of much debate. 
Challenges in developing a definition of terrorism were introduced earlier in this 
chapter where the contributions by Schmid (1984, 2004a, 2004b, 2012), Schmid and 
Jongman (1988), Weinberg et al. (2004), and researchers from the field of critical 
studies (e.g. Jarvis & Lister, 2014) were acknowledged. Since the early 2000s, 
discussions in the literature have begun to include and to critique the concept of ‘new 
terrorism’ (e.g. Duyvesteyn, 2004; Kurtulus, 2011). More recently, the concept of 
‘radicalisation’ was introduced which has led to discussions regarding different 
interpretations of the term (Sedgwick, 2010), investigations of various types of 
radicalisation (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), psychological ‘mechanisms’ in the 
process of political  radicalisation that might lead to terrorist action (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008), as well as studies examining the relative effectiveness of several 
‘de-radicalisation’ programs (Horgan & Braddock, 2010).  
3.3.2 A Criminological Turn 
The constantly evolving nature of terrorism studies is evident from the various 
directions that this field has taken, not only with regard to the concepts it includes 
but also with regard to the practical application and integration of multidisciplinary 
research findings. In recent years, for example, there has been a clear emergence of 
a criminological turn in terrorism studies. As discussed above, Hamm (2005, p. 238) 
attributes the foundational work on studying terrorism from a criminological 
perspective to early contributions by Turk (1982). The broader terrorism studies 
research program, however, has noted these developments only more recently 
(Dishman, 2001, 2005) and is currently responding to the implications that such an 
approach to terrorism may have for the general research program. The journal of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, for example, devoted a special issue to the 
“Intersections of Crime and Terror” in 2012. The importance of criminological studies 
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of terrorism are highlighted again in 2015 with a special issue on “Criminological 
Theory and Terrorism”.  
3.3.3 Islamic Terrorism and Al-Qaeda 
Of course, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks a great deal of attention has been devoted 
to Al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism. Many new researchers have emerged with many 
different perspectives, resulting in a very rapid growth in the number of studies of 
terrorism being published; the nature, scope and quality of this newly contributed 
work and its implications for the existing literature have been the subject of ongoing 
debate. In addition to prompting this ‘new’ work, scholars were also prompted to 
consider terrorism in a world re-shaped by 9/11. Since 2001, topics studied by new 
and established researchers range from outlining initial implications for 
counterterrorism (B. Hoffman, 2002) to the specific application of mathematical 
modelling toward the destruction of Al-Qaeda cells (Farley, 2003). Other papers 
discuss broad links between religious terrorism and political objectives (e.g. 
Sedgwick, 2004), the failure of Al-Qaeda’s communication strategy (Abrahms, 2005), 
and Al-Qaeda’s inevitable demise (Cronin, 2006). Most recently, researchers have 
focused on Al-Qaeda’s specific use of intelligence and counter-intelligence (Ilardi, 
2009), the group’s formal organisational structure (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010), the 
future of its brand or ‘Al Qaeda-ism’ (B. Hoffman, 2013), and the group’s twenty-year 
strategic plan (Rudner, 2013).   
3.3.4 Suicide Terrorism 
The willingness of the 9/11 perpetrators to die during the attacks focussed the 
attention of some researchers on suicide attacks. The logic of suicide terrorism has 
been debated  (Pape, 2003) and the psychological, religious, and group-factors 
related to suicidal terrorism have been explored (Silke, 2003b). Other researchers 
have taken a case-study approach. B. Hoffman and McCormick (2004), for example, 
examine the evolutionary use of suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorist organisations 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and describe suicide attacks as “signalling 
tactics’” in terrorism operations which they broadly define as a “signalling game”. 
Others concentrate their investigations on suicide bombing as a particular type of 
suicide attack: Lester, Yang, and Lindsay (2004) conclude that psychological profiling 
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of suicide bombers may indeed be plausible; Gupta and Mundra (2005) examine 
suicide bombing by Hamas and Islamic Jihad within Israel and the Palestinian 
territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1991 and 2003; and Araj 
(2008) cites extreme state repression as one of three predominant organisational 
rationales that may lead to the deployment of suicide bombers. Interest in the topic 
lead to a large volume of publications written for both an academic and a general 
audience. Crenshaw (2007) reviews thirteen books published on the subject between 
2003 and 2006. Horowitz (2010) discusses suicide bombing with reference to 
adoption capacity theory and points to the significance of inter-group linkages in 
determining a group’s capacity to adopt additional or new attack methods. 
Horowitz’s research of group connections and diffusion patterns relates to an earlier 
observation offered by Moghadam (2006), which clearly distinguishes between 
“traditional (localised)” and “contemporary (globalised)” patterns of suicide attacks. 
The reach of terrorist groups, particularly Al-Qaeda’s demonstrated capacity to strike 
a long way from its base of operations facilitated by international movements of 
resources, manpower, and finance, generated interest in the financing of terrorism. 
3.3.5 Terrorist Financing 
Since 9/11, much has been learned about the sources of funds and the ways in which 
those funds are transferred across international borders. Freeman (2011, p. 462), for 
example, identifies four sources of terrorist financing: state sponsorship, illegal 
activities, legal activities, and popular support; as well as several methods for moving 
money, including: formal banking, informal banking (e.g. hawala, money transfer 
without money movement), trade-based money laundering, charities, and cash-
smuggling. Bures (2012, 2014) outlines the burden carried by private sector financial 
institutions in combatting terrorist financing (CFT) with regards to necessary 
monitoring tasks and effort involved in uncovering and reporting suspicious 
transactions. The challenge of uncovering pathways of terrorist financing is also 
highlighted by Freeman (2011, pp. 471-472), who notes the capacity of many 
terrorist groups to respond swiftly to changing circumstances by altering or adapting 
their financing strategies. This point is illustrated by Buesa and Baumert (2012) who 
report on the changing nature of sources of finance and their relative proportions for 
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the group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) during the periods 1993-2002 and 2003-2010. 
Terrorists’ use of the internet to facilitate the raising and the transfer of funds has 
also attracted research interest.  M. Jacobson (2010), for example, investigates how 
Al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups such as Hamas, Lashkar e-Taiba, and 
Hizballah have used the internet to conduct financing transactions quickly, 
internationally and with relative security and anonymity for both donors and 
recipient.  
3.3.6 Lone Wolf Terrorism 
Although the attacks by Al-Qaeda both in the United States and in other countries 
rightly focussed much attention on the contemporary actions, motivations and 
objectives of modern terrorist groups, the actions of individuals not formally 
associated with any groups and, indeed, not formally associated with accomplices, 
led to a growing concern among governments and law enforcement agencies about 
the rise of the lone wolf terrorist. However, lone wolf terrorism is not a phenomenon 
new to the 21st century. This has been noted as a number of published chronologies 
of lone wolf attacks demonstrate (e.g. Instituut voor Veiligheids en 
Crisismanagement, 2007; M. Becker, 2014; B. J. Phillips, 2015). Part of the research 
conducted on lone wolf terrorism explores concepts very similar to those which have 
also been applied to group-based terrorism, such as defining ‘lone wolf terrorism’ 
(Spaaij, 2012), describing the social and psychological circumstances of individual 
lone wolf terrorists (Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement, 2007; Spaaij, 
2010), examining social movement theories, radicalisation patterns, and ideological 
factors (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014), as well as providing an overview of the 
literature on lone wolf terrorism (Marlatt, 2015). It is generally recognised that 
terrorism studies has recently taken a decidedly criminological turn. This turn is 
reflected in recent studies of lone wolf terrorism. Prominent examples are: P. J. 
Phillips (2011b, 2013),  P. J. Phillips and Pohl (2012), and Meyer (2013). Phillips’ 
approach is based on an economic model of choice under risk and uncertainty which 
is used to explore the possibility of drawing inferences about the unknown lone wolf 
offender from evidence relating to the crime scene, especially the choice of attack 
method. The inferences include the proximity of future attacks to the most recent 
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attacks, the proximity of the attacks to the offender’s possible place of residence, 
and the patterns of engagement that may be expected over time as the offender’s 
payoffs accumulate. Meyer explores the application of detailed crime scripts and 
thus the identification of possible crime intervention/prevention points using the 
case of Anders Behring Breivik’s lone wolf attacks in Norway in 2011 as an example 
for illustration. This work draws terrorism studies closer to practitioners managing 
real investigative processes and is quite distinct from the more traditional 
approaches and historical analysis which touch law enforcement and security 
agencies only in so far as their recommendations influence broader policy initiatives. 
This being said, those studies that are at the forefront of the criminological turn in 
terrorism studies and those that are more traditional in their focus are both equally 
interested in identifying the underlying causes of terrorism.   
3.3.7 Causes of Terrorism 
In pursuing this research program, early investigations tended to focus on the 
identification of possible ‘root causes’ of terrorism at the national level (e.g. P. R. 
Ehrlich & Liu, 2002; Newman, 2006) seeking to uncover causal relationships between 
social, economic, political and demographic conditions on the one hand and terrorist 
activity on the other. Results of such studies are not unanimous and some findings 
do not confirm the hypotheses that poverty, inequality, and poor economic 
development are root causes of terrorism (Piazza, 2006; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). 
More recently, emphasis appears to have shifted from seeking to uncover causes for 
terrorism grounded in socio-economic conditions to examining the various 
‘pathways’ that individual persons may follow as they become terrorists or 
radicalised. Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) highlight the distinction between 
activism as legal and non-violent political action on the one hand and radicalism as 
non-legal and violent political action on the other and conclude that individuals’ 
readiness to participate in activism does not necessarily lead them also to participate 
in radicalism. From a review of books, articles and studies published between 2001 
and 2008 on militant Islamism in Europe,  Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) extracts several 
explanations for radicalisation, including: (1) sociological background factors: 
radicalisation occurs as individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity in a perceived 
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hostile environment where traditional communities and identities have dissolved; 
and (2) social movement or network theory (e.g. Sageman, 2004) which states that 
radical ideas are transmitted via social networks and within smaller groups, where 
bonding, peer pressure, and indoctrination are common features. Other researchers 
have named group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality 
characteristics as contributing factors in radicalisation (King & Taylor, 2011) or have 
described terrorism as an outlet for existential desires (Cottee & Hayward, 2011) or 
a means to alleviate existential anxiety (McBride, 2011) where such needs cannot be 
met through legitimate action.  
3.3.8 Psychology and Terrorism 
It is quite clearly the case that these aspects of terrorist behaviour might be 
approached from the perspective of psychological theory, which is seemingly well 
positioned to explain various aspects of terrorist decision-making, both as individuals 
and as part of a group. Psychology is one of the long-standing research programs 
within terrorism studies. Early contributions from the field of psychology and 
psychiatry to the study of terrorism were made during the 1970s and 1980s and 
focused on identifying personality factors to explain terrorist behaviour (e.g. Cooper, 
1977; Pearce, 1977). A particular interest in studying the psychology of female 
terrorists emerged in the 1990s. Examples include: Pearlstein (1991), who studies the 
case of Ulrike Meinhof, founding member of the German Red Army Faction, as well 
as two female members of the Weathermen; Steinhoff (1996), who focuses on 
radical women leaders in the Japanese Red Army movement; and de Cataldo 
Neuberger and Valentini (1996) who study female terrorists in Italy. Despite “[…] 
some policymakers’ insistence on the possibility of a fixed and unambiguous terrorist 
profile, a list of characteristics that permit identification of actual or potential 
terrorists” (Crenshaw, 2000, p. 407), a significant number of researchers have 
ultimately rejected generalised descriptors for terrorists from the perspective of 
psychopathology, socio-pathology, or other mental disorders (e.g. Rasch, 1979; 
Corrado, 1981; Ferracuti, 1982; Silke, 1998; Horgan, 2003).  
The link between societal causes and individual circumstances or pathology has been 
taken up by a number of researchers. An example is the Frustration-Aggression 
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Hypothesis, which was first proposed by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears 
(1939) and which was developed further by social psychologists such as Berkowitz 
(1969). The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis was later applied to the study of 
terrorism by Friedland (1992). Limitations of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis 
and other psychological models for explaining terrorism, such as Relative-
Deprivation Theory, have been identified by Friedland (1992) and others (e.g. 
Horgan, 2003). Victoroff (2005) offers a comprehensive review of the diverse 
opinions that have been offered by researchers from the fields of political science, 
sociology, psychology, and psychiatry. He divides the most cited psychological 
theories into: (1) sociological theories; (2) psychoanalytic approaches to individual 
psychology; (3) non-psychoanalytic psychological approaches to individual 
psychology; and (4) theories of group process. However, Victoroff (2005, p. 34) notes 
that the total number of published theories exceeds the number of empirical studies 
and, furthermore, that conclusions drawn from studies investigating terrorist 
psychology may not be reliable foundations for policy, because psychological 
research frequently fails to apply proper scientific methods.  
As an alternative to approaches that emphasise individual psychology, some 
researchers have sought to integrate aspects of individual psychology with the need-
satisfaction which some individuals may gain from joining an underground 
organisation or terrorist group (e.g. Rabbie, 1991; Ross, 1994; Gupta, 2005; Post, 
2005; McBride, 2011). Gupta (2005, p. 25), for example, describes terrorism as a 
complex social process resulting from underlying motivations and collective actions 
which cannot be reduced to attempts of selfish need-maximisation of an individual, 
but which must be viewed in conjunction with “the other primordial human need: 
the need to belong to a group”. Conversely, Taylor (2010, pp. 121-122) asserts that 
while group phenomena provide a contextual factor to terrorist behaviour, “the 
issues of primary concern in terrorism research relate to violent acts, not 
propensities to commit violence or their presumed social contexts”. Taylor underpins 
his analysis with two detailed case studies; first, of terrorist events surrounding the 
publication of the novel, The Jewel of Medina, in London in 2008 and, second, of 
terrorist action undertaken by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in 1996. 
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The author argues that while collective activity undertaken by a terrorist group is of 
contextual significance, it does not fully explain the causal qualities underlying the 
behaviour of individual terrorists. 
Taylor and Horgan (2006) offer a comprehensive conceptual framework addressing 
the psychological processes which can underlie a person’s involvement with terrorist 
groups. The authors draw on insights from forensic psychology as well as findings 
from analyses of crime by Clarke and Felson (1993) who distinguish between 
“criminal involvement” and “criminal events”.  Individual criminals (or terrorists) 
typically make a whole series of involvement decisions over substantial periods of 
time (Taylor & Horgan, 2006, p. 592), some of which may lead a person to take on a 
specific role or incrementally a number of different roles within a terrorist 
organisation. Activities of involvement may comprise legal action such as political 
activism or community engagement, but may also escalate to participation in a 
“criminal event”, that is a terrorist attack. Whatever quality of involvement the 
individual chooses to have with terrorism, including the possibility of disengaging 
from it, each decision along the way is a distinct decision which in turn is related to a 
variety of psychological and environmental context factors that the (would-be) 
terrorist is experiencing. Taylor and Horgan (2006, p. 598) propose that interception 
at critical decision points, for example, before an individual proceeds to potential 
terrorist action, may be a more effective counterterrorism strategy than seeking to 
change broader societal factors or an individual’s presumed characteristics. Taylor 
and Horgan belong to a group of researchers who have moved the psychological 
perspective on terrorism toward a practical criminological approach; focusing on the 
prevention and investigation of violent acts (see also: Zhang, Frumkin, Stedmon, & 
Lawson, 2013; Vrij et al., 2013), rather than examining broader societal, political, or 
economic factors as potential underlying causes.  
3.3.9 The Life-cycle of Terrorist Organisations 
Regardless of whether a terrorist acts alone or as part of a group, terrorist action 
waxes and wanes. The coming and going of terrorist groups has led some researchers 
to examine the life-cycle of terrorist organisations. The respective length of time a 
group is active varies, of course, and several researchers (e.g. Crenshaw, 1991; 
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Blomberg, Engel, & Sawyer, 2010) have utilised ‘International Terrorism: Attributes 
of Terrorist Events’ (ITERATE) 44  or other datasets to document the number and 
chronologies of terrorist attacks perpetrated by different groups over several 
decades. Cronin (2006, pp. 17-18) lists several factors that might contribute to a 
group’s speedy demise or alternatively ensure its relative longevity. Among others, 
such factors include the capture or death of the leader, failure of the group to 
transition to the next generation, and the undermining or loss of popular support. 
More importantly, terrorist groups are defined by the perpetration of terrorist acts 
and they are not viewed as ‘terrorists’ until such action is taken. Unfortunately, it can 
be impossible to interpret accurately a group’s rhetoric and to distinguish between 
potentially violent and nonviolent opposition until the first act of terrorism occurs 
(Crenshaw, 1991, p. 86). Therefore, the question of whether or not and, if so, how 
the terrorist group or lone wolf will reoffend is more crucial than the terrorists’ or 
group’s organisational survival per se. In addition, it has been suggested that higher 
levels of violence increase a group’s chance of survival (Blomberg et al., 2010, p. 318) 
and, furthermore, that terrorist groups behave as if they were in a tournament with 
other groups: “In short, they observe the results of past attacks and maximise their 
efforts in order to make [their own] attacks at least equally destructive as the 
foregoing attacks” (Caruso & Schneider, 2010, p. 19).  
3.3.10 Concluding Remarks 
Recognising the turn of the terrorism research program towards forging closer 
collaboration and integration of findings with criminologists and crime prevention 
researchers, more recent attention has shifted from explaining the organisational life 
cycle of terrorist groups towards a more complex approach in which the oscillations 
of a group’s terrorist actions are examined (e.g. M. Becker, 2015). P. J. Phillips (2011a) 
applies economic analysis to the competition that terrorist organisations and 
governments enter into over grassroots or popular support. Phillips’ analysis finds 
competition for grassroots support to be cyclical and particularly fierce in a terrorist 
group’s early years, a time during which a group’s terrorist activity is also likely to be 
                                                     
44 The ITERATE dataset is maintained by Duke University in North Carolina.  
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highest as it seeks to recruit members and popular support. This focus on actions and 
the investigative processes that may be directed towards their pre-emption or the 
pursuit of offenders is characteristic of efforts, not only to forge closer links between 
criminology and terrorism studies, but closer collaboration links between academic 
research and law enforcement practitioners. This is, perhaps, demonstrated most 
clearly of all in recent applications of offender profiling or investigative psychology 
to terrorism with the aim of identifying characteristics of an unknown terrorist 
offender on the basis of evidence relating to the nature of the terrorist act (Canter, 
2004; P. J. Phillips & Pohl, 2012).  
The foregoing discussion provides an indication of the scope and structure of 
terrorism studies. More than four decades of research have combined to provide a 
deep, multifaceted, multidisciplinary perspective of terrorism and the very many 
aspects of the terrorism context. Some research programs within terrorism studies 
have come and gone as terrorism studies and, of course, the nature of terrorism has 
evolved over time. A number of research programs have retained their active status 
throughout the modern history of terrorism and terrorism studies. One of the most 
prominent of these is a research program that has, like the others that have been 
discussed in this section, attracted contributions from at least several of the 
disciplines that contribute to terrorism studies. This research program is the study of 
the role of the media in the terrorism context. The nature of terrorism in a context 
where terrorist actions are accorded varying degrees of attention by the popular and 
mainstream press has garnered attention from researchers since the very inception 
of terrorism studies. The literature that has been produced by these researchers is 
explored in detail in Section 3.5. Before turning our attention in that direction, an 
overview of the economic analysis of terrorism is provided. 
3.4 Defence and Peace Economics 
The economic analysis of terrorism is a distinct research program within defence and 
peace economics. Defence economics emerged during the 1960s as part of efforts to 
apply political science and social science to the study of war. The distinguishing 
feature of defence economics was its use of economic method. The foundations of 
defence economics were put in place by Schelling (1960), Boulding (1962, 1978), and 
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Tullock (1974). Peace economics, like defence economics, applies economic methods 
to the study of conflict. The perspective, however, is different. According to Anderton 
and Carter (2007, p. 1214): “The primary focus of early pioneers of defence 
economics was the efficiency of the military sector. This included identification and 
implementation of efficiency conditions for military spending, weapons contracting, 
recruitment of military labour, allocation of resources to war and the like. Peace 
economists, on the other hand, tend to be committed to reductions in defence 
spending, a lessening of war as an option in international affairs and the application 
of economic methods to promote peace, not military efficiency”. As both research 
programs emerged and expanded, the foundations laid by Schelling, Boulding, and 
Tullock were augmented by Grossman45, Isard46 and Hirshleifer47 and, of course, by 
the combined efforts of a great many other contributors.  
The economic analysis of defence, peace and, more specifically, terrorism is 
distinguished from other approaches by the application of economic method. In 
trying to define the scope and method of economics there is the risk that such a 
definition may merely present a caricature. The literature dealing with economic 
method is itself considerable (Robbins, 1935; Hollis & Nell, 1975; Latsis, 1976; 
Rosenberg, 1976; Blaug, 1980; Hausman, 1981, 1989; Boland, 1982; Caldwell, 1982; 
Mäki, 1988). Although it oversimplifies the matter somewhat, it is true to say that 
the defining characteristics of the economic method have come to be encompassed 
by the rational choice approach. There are at least several different interpretations 
of this approach extant in the literature but the depiction of decision-makers as 
maximising or optimising, subject to some constraints, encompasses the essential 
features of what is meant by rational choice. This depiction is represented within two 
main overarching categories or contexts: (1) those characterised by certainty; and (2) 
those characterised by the presence of risk and uncertainty.  
                                                     
45 See Grossman (1991, 1992, 1995, 2003), Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996, 2002). 
46 See Isard and Smith (1982), Isard (1992, 1994). 
47 See Hirshleifer (1988, 2001). 
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Sen (1998) surveys the literature and delineates the main points in the debate 
regarding what constitutes rational behaviour in economics. In a context 
characterised by certainty, economic theory developed by depicting decision-makers 
as rational on the basis of two criteria: (1) internal consistency; and (2) the 
maximisation of self-interest. According to Sen (1998, p. 69) this approach has 
considerable analytical advantages by structuring individual behaviour in such a way 
as to make its analysis tractable. Over time, in response to various debates, criticism 
and the emergence of new theoretical and empirical work, the concept of rational 
behaviour has been reshaped and different interpretations have emerged; for 
example, Sen (1998, p. 70) discusses the contribution of Herbert Simon, whose work 
on behavioural economics preceded by decades the work that later came to define 
the field. Simon (1955, 1979) argued that decision-makers might not maximise but 
satisfice. This is a more generalised version of optimising behaviour that considers 
factors such as cost of information, decision time, constraints and cognitive effort 
(Schoemaker, 1982, p. 539). Decision-makers exhibit bounded rationality because of 
limited information processing capacity and time. As such, decision-makers 
terminate their search or assessment of alternatives once some pre-set constraints 
have been met (Schoemaker, 1982, p. 548). Counter-arguments that seek to defend 
the underlying principles of optimising vis-à-vis bounded rationality include attempts 
to place optimising behaviour upon the foundation of natural selection (Sen, 1998, 
p. 71). Even in contexts where decision-makers face no uncertainty there remains 
considerable debate about how to represent rational behaviour and to what purpose 
models of rational behaviour should be put. A not inconsiderable part of the debate 
stems from these different purposes. Schoemaker (1982) outlines four: (1) 
descriptive; (2) predictive; (3) prescriptive; and (4) post-dictive. Even highly formal 
models of rational behaviour may be entirely acceptable as predictive or prescriptive 
models. Models that seek to be descriptions of actual decision-making processes face 
the challenge of incorporating potentially very many subtle and important factors.  
The treatment of choice under conditions of certainty may be described as a logical 
model, despite the highly formalised mathematical treatments that characterise 
parts of the literature (especially Samuelson, 1947). The standard approach to the 
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analysis of decision-making under conditions of risk and uncertainty is, by contrast, a 
mathematical model. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) expected utility 
theory is a model of decision-making under risk and uncertainty. Within the specific 
theoretical framework of expected utility theory, rational behaviour has come to be 
defined as behaviour consistent with the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms: (1) 
completeness; (2) transitivity; (3) continuity; (4) independence. These axioms form 
the cornerstone of the mathematical theory of expected utility which aims to 
delineate a class of functions (utility functions) that can generate orderings over 
alternative risky gambles that mirror the decision-maker’s actual preferences for 
those gambles. The theory is summarised in a simple equation:  
𝐸𝑈 =∑𝑢(𝑥𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Together with the particular definition of rational behaviour embedded within the 
axioms on which expected utility theory is based, it is also important to recognise 
that any theory of decision-making under uncertainty must incorporate a particular 
view on the nature of risk, uncertainty and probability. As both Sen (1998) and 
Schoemaker (1982) point out, probability is a much contested and debated concept 
within philosophy and mathematics as well as within economics. Different 
interpretations of probability like the different purposes to which models of decision-
making may be put (descriptive, predictive, etc.) may lead to substantially different 
conclusions regarding the applicability, suitability or validity of different models of 
rational behaviour in different contexts. These philosophical or methodological 
concerns are ever present, even as work has progressed on identifying the 
shortcomings of expected utility theory, generalising it in ways that overcome certain 
criticisms and the development of alternative behavioural models of decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Machina, 1982; Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
In the introduction to the second volume of the Handbook of Defence Economics, 
published in 2007, the editors (Sandler & Hartley, 2007, p. 615) list the economic 
analysis of terrorism as one of the areas within defence economics that had 
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undergone significant advancement in knowledge and an explosion in literature since 
the publication of the first volume in 1995. It is true that even the literature within 
defence and peace economics that focuses specifically on the economic analysis of 
terrorism is itself now too large to be reviewed in detail. Intriligator (2010, p. 1), in 
an overarching review of the field, concentrates on the essential points of the 
economic approach and identifies the main ways in which economic analysis has 
been applied: (1) the study of strategic interaction; (2) the application of rational 
choice models, with special emphasis on substitution and deterrence effects; (3) the 
econometric or statistical analysis of terrorism incidents, with special emphasis on 
cycles; (4) the implications for the likely efficiency of policy and counter-terrorism. In 
general, this type of taxonomy frames surveys of the literature in this field, including 
those by Sandler and Enders (2004), Llussá and Tavares (2011), and F. Schneider, 
Brück, and Meierrieks (2015).   
The analytical decision to cast an analysis in a context characterised by either 
certainty or uncertainty depends in each case on the nature of the analytical 
objectives and the precise problem under consideration. Although it is obviously the 
case that terrorist decision-makers confront a great deal of risk and uncertainty, 
interesting results can be obtained without introducing this added complexity. A lot 
has been learned about substitution effects by applying simple models of rational 
behaviour drawn from consumer theory to the analysis of the terrorist’s choice 
between terrorism and legitimate behaviour. Frey and Luechinger’s (2003) analysis 
is an example of how this approach depicts the terrorist’s decision calculus and the 
analytical conclusions that might be reached. Frey and Luechinger cast the terrorist’s 
choice in the formal language of consumer choice and consumer preference. They 
depict two catchall categories of goods: (1) terrorism; and (2) other activities. The 
terrorist’s objective is to maximise utility by choosing amounts of terrorism and other 
activities. In the formal representations drawn from neoclassical consumer theory 
the choice problem can be represented by a budget constraint and indifference map. 
The optimal choice is at the tangent of the highest indifference curve and the budget 
constraint. This is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 Terrorist Preferences for Terrorist and Other Activities 
 
Frey and Luechinger (2003) assume that the terrorist’s objective or end can be 
achieved either through terrorism or some other activity, such as legitimate political 
engagement. This provides the logical foundation for the analysis of the terrorist’s 
choice between these two goods. Different outcomes might be achieved by 
government policy initiatives: (1) terrorists may be deterred from engaging in 
terrorism by government policies designed to increase its cost; (2) terrorists may be 
discouraged from engaging in terrorism by government policies designed to decrease 
the benefits or advantages of terrorism; or (3) terrorists may be encouraged to 
participate in other activities rather than terrorism by reducing the costs of these 
alternatives. In the cases of (1) and (3), the government policy shifts the terrorist’s 
budget constraint. This might be accomplished, for example, by military deterrents 
(1) or opening up the political process (3). In the case of (2), government policy 
changes the terrorist’s preferences and alters the position of the terrorist’s 
indifference curves such that less terrorism and more other activities are desired. 
This might be accomplished, for example, by a never-negotiate strategy which 
reduces the payoffs to terrorist actions. Frey and Luechinger (2003) list a number of 
different policy options and analyse their effects. Each of the cases (1), (2) and (3) is 
depicted in Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.2 Terrorist Choice When Terrorism Becomes More ‘Expensive’ 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Terrorist Choice When the ‘Advantages’ of Terrorism Diminish 
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Figure 3.4 Terrorist Choice When Other Activities Are ‘Cheaper’ 
 
This type of analysis has also been undertaken in a very formal way by applying the 
Slutsky equation. This is a widely used analytical tool in microeconomics which allows 
changes in demand following changes in incomes and prices to be analysed and 
partitioned into different effects: (1) substitution effects; and (2) income effects. 
Formally, the Slutsky equation may be written as (Nicholson, 1992, p. 150): 
𝜕𝐷𝑋
𝜕𝑃𝑋
= substitution effect + income effect 
=
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑃𝑋
|
𝑈 = constant
− 𝑋
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝐼
 
The formal analysis undertaken using this technique can serve as a useful 
complement to Frey and Luechinger’s (2003) geometry-based analysis. The Slutsky 
equation is used to analyse the changes that might be expected in the terrorist’s 
demand for terrorism when the price of terrorism increases or decreases. The change 
in demand due to a change in price may be partitioned into income effects and 
substitution effects. When the price of terrorism increases, terrorists may substitute 
other activities in place of terrorism (and vice versa). This change, due to a change in 
the price ratio of the two goods is called the substitution effect. When the price of 
terrorism changes, the terrorist’s purchasing power also changes. If the price of 
terrorism increases (decreases), the terrorist has a lower (higher) purchasing power. 
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This is analogous to a change in the terrorist’s income or resources and is called the 
income effect. The Slutsky equation is one method that may be used to decompose 
into these two effects the total change in the terrorist’s demand for terrorism 
following a change in its price. Anderton and Carter (2005) focus most of their 
discussion of the rational choice of terrorists on the application of the Slutsky 
equation. This very demand-side oriented analysis is complemented by Sandler’s 
(2013) supply-side analysis, which treats terrorist groups more as producers of 
terrorism than as demanders of terrorism. In both cases, orthodox microeconomics 
and standard treatments of rational behaviour under conditions of certainty 
characterise the analysis.  
In the presence of risk and uncertainty, rational behaviour can be modelled as 
behaviour that maximises expected utility. In defence economics, one of the earliest 
applications of this type of model is Landes’ (1978) study of hijacking in the United 
States. The study draws much of its inspiration from the theoretical analysis of crime 
and illegitimate behaviour pioneered by G. S. Becker (1968) and I. Ehrlich (1973). At 
the time, hijackings represented a significant problem. There were 124 hijackings in 
the United States between 1968 and 1972. Hijacking is a risky activity and the 
outcomes are far from certain. There is a high probability that the outcome may 
diverge from that which was expected. Landes (1978, p. 5) depicts the hijacker’s 
choice problem as one involving the maximisation of expected utility subject to 
constraints. Utility depends positively on the hijacker’s wealth and negatively on 
factors such as the length of a prison term if the hijacker is apprehended. Formally, 
Landes’ (1978, p. 5)  model is expressed as 
𝐸(𝑈) = (1 − 𝑃𝑎)𝑈(𝑊𝑗) + 𝑃𝑎𝑃𝑐𝑈(𝑊𝑖 − 𝑆) + 𝑃𝑎(1 − 𝑃𝑐)𝑈(𝑊𝑗 − 𝐶) 
 where 𝑃𝑎 is the hijacker’s estimate of the probability of apprehension in location 𝑖, 
𝑃𝑐  is the conditional probability of conviction if apprehended, 𝑊𝑗  and 𝑊𝑖  are the 
hijacker’s wealth in locations 𝑖  and 𝑗 , 𝑆  is the monetary equivalent of the prison 
sentence in 𝑖 , and 𝐶  is the monetary equivalent of costs associated with 
apprehension without conviction (Landes, 1978, pp. 5-6). The choice that the hijacker 
confronts is the choice between (1) hijacking, and (2) not hijacking. Purely logically 
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or theoretically, the model allows Landes to determine the likely impact upon the 
potential hijacker’s choice of changes in the variables that have been included in the 
analysis. In the first instance, the potential hijacker will choose hijacking if the 
expected utility of doing so exceeds the expected utility of the alternative (not 
hijacking). If 𝑃𝑎, 𝑃𝑐, 𝑆, or 𝐶 increase or the differential between 𝑊𝑗 and 𝑊𝑖 declines, 
the expected utility of hijacking declines and vice versa. Government policy options, 
such as increasing prison sentences, placing more security at airports to increase the 
probability of apprehension, or agreements between countries to deport hijackers 
back home may all be analysed within this framework. Models such as this also form 
the foundation for empirical analysis. Landes (1978) undertakes an empirical 
investigation of the policy initiatives that were put in place by the U.S. government 
during this period when hijackings were very common and finds that they were 
significant factors in reducing instances of hijacking in subsequent years, not simply 
because more hijackers were caught but because less hijackings were attempted. The 
preference of potential hijackers shifted from hijacking to not hijacking.  
It is clear that much of this analytical work is focussed on the terrorist’s choice 
without explicit consideration of what the government may do in response. The 
strategic interaction between terrorists and governments has long been treated by 
applying game theory to the problem. Game theoretical analysis represents a 
significant part of the literature dealing with the economic analysis of terrorism. A 
number of review articles have been published that provide an overview of the 
method and the main applications. According to Arce and Sandler (2005, p. 184) “… 
game theory is an appropriate tool for investigating counterterrorism because it 
captures the strategic interactions between terrorists and targeted governments 
whose choices are interdependent”. Studies that explore the application of game 
theory to the analysis of terrorism and terrorist behaviour include: Wilson (2000), 
Powell (2002), Sandler and Arce (2003), Sandler and Enders (2004), Levine and Levine 
(2006), Siqueira and Sandler (2006, 2008), and D. Jacobson and Kaplan (2007). These 
studies operate under the assumption that the players in the games are rational. The 
rationality in game theoretical contexts extends to inferring optimal actions for other 
players as they depend upon one’s own actions. Many of the prominent game 
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theoretical structures, including prisoner’s dilemma and ‘chicken’, can be used to 
structure problems that emerge within the terrorism context. Arce and Sandler 
(2005, p. 198) provide an overview of the policy choices that may confront a 
government and the underlying games that characterise those choices. 
Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983, p. 38) built upon this work and provide an 
analysis that contains a number of the most important results in the economic 
analysis of terrorism. The authors apply what they refer to as rational-actor models. 
Actors are said to be rational when “…they efficiently utilize scarce resources to 
achieve their respective goals and effectively respond to changes in their 
constraints”.  Sandler et al. simultaneously depict rational-actor models for both the 
government and the terrorist group in the negotiation process which might occur as 
a result of transnational terrorism. Their analysis is built upon expected utility theory 
but introduces various aspects of game theory into the economic analysis of 
terrorism in order to analyse not only terrorist choice but terrorist choice in a 
strategic context. One of their contributions is depicted in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5 Game Theoretical Analysis: Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983) 
 
In Figure 3.5, the horizontal axis depicts terrorists’ demands and the vertical axis 
government concessions. Along the 45 degree line government concessions and 
terrorist demands are equal throughout. The two solid curves 0A and 0B illustrate 
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the terrorists’ and the government’s respective initial negotiation positions: the 
government is willing to meet terrorist demands up to point g.  Beyond point g 
government concessions flatten off resulting in a lowering rate of concession 
increase per increase in terrorist demands. The government’s curve is concave in 
shape whereas the terrorist’s demand curve is convex indicating that terrorists’ 
demands increase at a lower rate beyond a certain level of demands. Stalemate 
equilibrium is reached where the two curves intersect at point S. Beyond point S the 
discrepancy between terrorist demands and any concessions the government is 
willing to make can only widen. Curves 0A and 0B represent optimal reaction paths. 
Actual reaction paths can be inferred once negotiations have commenced. If the 
government is successful in reducing terrorists’ resources, for example, by 
successfully extending negotiations over a long period of time, then the terrorists’ 
reaction path may shift to the left as illustrated by curve 0A1. In this event, terrorists 
will have reduced their demands relative to their earlier position on curve 0A and a 
resolution may be found at equilibrium E. Sandler et al. (1983, p. 48) offer two 
observations. First, both the terrorists’ and the government’s reaction paths may 
shift not only during execution but also during the planning stage of a terrorist event.  
Second, if one of the pay-offs terrorists are seeking is media attention then an 
adequate level of media coverage of the incident may entice terrorists to reduce their 
other demands.  
Findings by Sandler et al. (1983) include: (a) concessions granted by the government 
in the past limit the credibility of a government’s pledge never to grant concessions 
during current or future terrorist events; (b) models are dynamic, that is, terrorists 
may shift their reaction path in both the planning and in the execution phase of a 
terrorist event; (c) factors other than expressed demands or concessions form part 
of the negotiation process, for example, drawn-out negotiations can both support 
the terrorists’ goal of increased media coverage, while also supporting the 
government’s goal of reducing terrorist resources; and (d) stalemate equilibriums 
occur when concessions do not meet demands. Such instances can only be peacefully 
resolved by either the government or the terrorist group, or indeed, both parties 
shifting their respective reaction paths to a point where concessions equal demands.  
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In this type of economic analysis of terrorism some type of payoff, positive and 
negative, must be delineated. In context-specific analysis this might be a relatively 
straightforward task; for example, Landes (1978) examined hijacking where the 
positive payoff was a monetary or wealth equivalent of the well-being and so forth 
obtained from a successful hijacking, and the negative payoffs are the monetary or 
wealth equivalents of the prison sentence and legal defence associated with an 
unsuccessful hijacking. Within analysis that deals with hostage-taking scenarios, the 
ransoms or other concessions, such as prisoner releases, demanded by terrorists will 
be the relevant positive payoffs, and the various consequences and punishments 
associated with failure and capture will be the relevant negative payoffs. When 
examining terrorism in general, however, the payoffs may not be so easily delineated 
and may only be captured by broad categories or labels or objectives such as ‘political 
influence’ or ‘overthrow of the existing government’.  
The formal models of rational behaviour, including expected utility theory and the 
rational behaviour embedded within game theory, also form the foundation for 
econometric or time series analysis of terrorist incidents; for example, Enders and 
Sandler (2002) use a model very similar to Landes’ (1978) model to provide the 
theoretical foundation for their statistical or econometric analysis:   
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝜋𝑈(𝑊𝑆) + (1 − 𝜋)𝑈(𝑊𝐹) 
Making use of monetary or wealth equivalents once more, Enders and Sandler (2002) 
depict expected utility as a function of the terrorist’s wealth in two states: success 
(𝑆) and failure (𝐹). The states of the world are realised with probability 𝜋 and 1 −
𝜋 , respectively. The model provides the theoretical foundation for the statistical 
analysis of terrorist activity for the period from 1970 to 1999. It does so in the 
following sense. Various interventions have been applied by governments over the 
past several decades which can be interpreted as having increased or decreased the 
expected utility that a terrorist may attach to different alternatives. Metal detectors, 
for example, may decrease the expected utility of hijacking. However, the terrorists 
may then be led to substitute some other attack method in place of hijacking. 
Another striking example is the fortification of U.S. embassies. This measure could be 
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expected to decrease the expected utility of a terrorist attack on an embassy and 
lead to a reduction in such attacks. This was found to be the case. However, after the 
fortification of the embassies the number of attacks outside of the embassy 
compounds increased. The theoretical models provide a structure that assists in 
directing empirical analysis and interpreting its results.  
A review of these types of studies and the techniques that are used is presented by 
Enders and Sandler (2005). There are two major databases of terrorist events that 
facilitate these studies: ITERATE and the GTD. Mickolus (1982) describes the 
development of the ITERATE dataset48 covering the period from 1968 to 1977. Some 
of the findings that have emerged from an analysis of this data include the following: 
(1) contemporary terrorist attacks are more likely to result in death or injury than 
leftist terrorism incidents of earlier periods; and (2) transnational terrorism appears 
to follow a cyclical pattern. A discernible rise in terrorist events is observed from the 
late 1960s and a sharp decline in the late 1990s. Alexander and Pluchinsky (1992) 
name ‘demonstration’ and ‘copycat’ effects as likely causes for such cyclical patterns, 
while Sandler and Enders (2004, pp. 306-307) add economies of scale in planning 
terrorist incidents as well as attack-counterattack processes between terrorists and 
government authorities as attributable factors. Sandler and Enders (2004, p. 307) 
also suggest that logistically complex events, such as skyjackings and assassinations, 
are likely to display longer cycles than less sophisticated attacks. As Enders and 
Sandler (2005) show, these studies can also be directed towards more fundamental 
questions including the impact of terrorism on tourism revenues and foreign direct 
investment.  
The economic analysis of terrorism is a part of a multidisciplinary research program 
that encompasses contributions from many other fields of study. As this overview of 
the economic analysis of terrorism shows, over the past two decades it has become 
a substantial stand-alone research program within defence and peace economics. It 
is distinguished by the application of the economic method, broadly characterised as 
                                                     
48 The ITERATE dataset now covers the period 1968 to 2011. 
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the rational choice approach, to the various aspects of the terrorism context. The 
application has yielded important insights into terrorist decision-making. The 
straightforward application of orthodox consumer theory may be used to explore the 
likely outcomes of different government policy options, including deterrence. The 
introduction of risk and uncertainty and the application of expected utility theory 
extends these insights to contexts where the outcomes of terrorists’ choices are 
uncertain and risky. The use of game theory extends these insights further to 
contexts characterised by strategic interaction between the terrorist group and the 
government. As it does in mainstream economics, the theoretical work developed in 
this manner provides a foundation for econometric and statistical analysis aimed at 
identifying empirical relationships between various aspects of the terrorism context. 
This approach is explored in more depth later in this chapter where several economic 
analyses of terrorist activity and media coverage, studies that are directly relevant to 
the research objectives of this thesis, are surveyed in detail.   
3.5 Terrorism and the Media   
The study of terrorism and the media is one of the earliest dedicated research 
programs in terrorism studies. It has attracted contributions from many of the 
individual discipline areas identified in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Under this research 
program’s broad title, many specific investigations have been undertaken. These 
include the study of the relationship between terrorists, terrorist groups and the 
media with special reference to the idea that this relationship may be symbiotic, the 
exploration of contagion and the debate regarding the constraint of media coverage 
of terrorist actions and the media strategies of terrorist groups. This section presents 
a survey of notable contributions to the study of terrorism and the media for the 
period beginning in the late 1970s and continuing to the present day.  
This thesis is concerned with terrorist choice of action within a context where media 
coverage is a desirable outcome. Although this is now generally accepted, its place 
as a foundational supposition underlying the study of the characteristics of media 
coverage of terrorist actions is problematic. The survey of notable contributions 
within this particular research program further identifies the place for this thesis 
within the literature and the contribution that it represents. Most importantly, one 
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of the limitations of the extant studies is the perspective from which these studies 
operate. After stating the supposition that media coverage is important for terrorist 
groups or is a desired payoff which is sought after, the analysis contained in many 
studies proceeds to examine or outline the characteristics of this coverage or this 
payoff and, if the analysis touches on terrorist behaviour at all, tends to deal with 
terrorists’ media strategies which, once again, are supposed to emerge from the 
terrorists’ desire for media attention. This approach disconnects the analytical work 
from the study of underlying terrorist behaviour, especially the terrorists’ choice of 
actions, by obscuring the most important elements of this behaviour behind the 
preliminary supposition about the desirability of media coverage.  
By contrast, the contribution and significance of this thesis is built upon the 
recognition of the interplay between terrorist choice and media coverage and, in 
particular, the idea that terrorist choice is shaped by the media coverage accorded 
to terrorism and is not simply the generic means by which media coverage is 
attained. The characteristics of media coverage shape the terrorist group’s 
expectations about the nature and extent of coverage that may be expected in the 
future. These expectations shape terrorist choice. This thesis reconnects the 
characteristics of the media coverage of terrorist actions with the terrorist group’s 
choice of action. This allows the thesis to develop explanations and to account for 
observed terrorist behaviour that is easily overlooked when the focus drifts too much 
towards the nature of the media coverage and away from the terrorist behaviour 
that may shape and be shaped by it. For example, if media coverage is the desired 
outcome, why do terrorist groups not simply choose the action with the highest 
expected value of media coverage? Why do terrorist groups use more than one 
action, some of which are not associated with the highest expected amount of media 
coverage? Why do equally capable groups, all of which may be supposed to be 
interested in media coverage, not choose identical sets of actions? These are the 
types of questions addressed in this thesis. 
3.5.1 Terrorism as Theatre and the Terrorists’ Desire for Media Coverage 
Perhaps no single theme within the research program of terrorism and the media 
links the act of terrorism with the desirability of media attention as strongly as the 
88 
 
metaphor ‘terrorism as theatre’ 49  or ‘theatre of terror’. Since the inception of 
modern terrorism, the actions of terrorists have been reported on and discussed by 
the media. The foundation of the terrorism and media research program is the 
supposition that media coverage is an important component of the terrorism context 
and, perhaps more importantly, is something that terrorists themselves desire or 
even need. That this supposition can be labelled as such is due to the absence within 
the literature of substantial research of terrorists’ attitudes and beliefs. The 
desirability of media coverage has been inferred from observing the human action 
that shapes the terrorism context; for example, terrorists’ claims of responsibility for 
an action or the perpetration of an act of terrorism in a public place. From time to 
time, however, researchers have been able to gather first-hand evidence of the 
desirability of media coverage from the terrorists’ perspective through interviews; 
for example, B. Hoffman (2006, p. 174) cites McKnight (1974, p. 168) quoting a leader 
of the United Red Army terrorist group (the ‘parent’ group of the Japanese Red Army) 
as saying: “Violent actions … are shocking. We want to shock people, everywhere. … 
It is our way of communicating with the people”.  
The desirability of media coverage is also expressed by Carlos Marighella (1969), one 
of the leaders of the Brazilian guerrilla organisation National Liberation Action, in his 
Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla:  
“The war of nerves or psychological warfare is an aggressive technique, based 
on the direct or indirect use of mass media and rumours in order to demoralise 
the government. In psychological warfare, the government is always at a 
disadvantage because it imposes censorship on the media and winds up in a 
defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through. At this 
point, it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of 
prestige, and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control which is 
liable to be broken at any moment”. 
                                                     
49 According to B. Hoffman (2006, p. 174), ‘terrorism as theatre’ is a phrase coined by Brian Jenkins in 
1974. The concept of ‘Terrorism as Theatre’ or ‘Theatre of Terror’ has been an enduring theme in the 
literature (e.g. Alexander & Finger, 1979; Kupperman, 1979; Alexander, 1980; Wurth‐Hough, 1983; 
Weimann, 1985; Rubin & Friedland, 1986; Nacos, 2003; Weimann, 2005; Shoshani & Slone, 2008). 
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Of course, communication, possibly including a lack thereof, is an essential feature 
of bargaining, negotiation, conflict and strategy. This was recognised some time 
before terrorism studies became a distinct discipline (for example, see Schelling, 
1960, pp. 53-80). It was but a small step, therefore, for researchers to recognise the 
importance of communication, of which the media is a component, within the 
terrorism context. Several plausible rationales can be provided for supposing that 
media coverage is desired by terrorists. These rationales include using the media as 
a means by which terrorists seek to (1) maintain a façade of strength (e.g. 
Kupperman, 1979, p. 59) and create an illusion of power (e.g. Anable, 1979, p. 131); 
(2) reach audiences larger and more diverse than the number of instant victims (e.g. 
Alexander, 1980, p. 180; Crelinsten, 1997, p. 9); (3) create a climate of fear as 
outlined by Miller (1979, p. 81) and Hacker (1980, p. 145), who states: “Terror and 
terrorism aim to frighten and, by frightening, to dominate and control. They want to 
impress.”; (4) spread the terrorist group’s propaganda 50  message to the general 
public (e.g. Fenyvesi, 1979, p. 98; Wilkinson, 1990, pp. 29-31) and their celebration 
of success, i.e. when their demands are met or an event unfolds as planned, to 
(potential) group members and sympathisers; sometimes to the extent of “media 
rape” (Weimann, 1985, p. 434); and (5) communicate with adversaries through 
secure, untraceable channels (Glaab, 2007, p. 33). On the basis of a, by now, very 
plausible and commonly accepted supposition regarding the importance of media 
coverage in the terrorism context and its desirability from the perspective of the 
terrorists, studies quickly began to emerge to explore additional dimensions. One of 
the first to be analysed was the relationship between terrorists and the media. 
3.5.2 The Relationship between Terrorists and the Media 
Beyond the identification of the general importance of media coverage and its 
desirability for terrorists, some researchers conclude that the relationship between 
terrorists and media organisations is symbiotic. A symbiotic relationship is commonly 
understood as a connection between at least two parties that is mutually beneficial 
                                                     
50 For a discussion on the historical background of the phrase ‘propaganda by deed’ see Schmid (1989, 
pp. 540-542) and B. Hoffman (2006, pp. 5-6). Elter (2008, pp. 63-73) provides such an account in the 
German language for the equivalent phrase ‘Propaganda der Tat’. 
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and which, in some circumstances, can reach a level of interdependence. From the 
perspective of the terrorists, media coverage might serve to obtain one or several 
desired outcomes, examples of which were listed in the previous paragraph. Such 
outcomes may not be achievable via a terrorist act alone; that is, if a terrorist event 
is not reported in the media and a wider audience gains no knowledge of it, the 
benefits derived from the act may be minimal for the terrorist. As Walter Laqueur 
(cited in: Weimann, 1985, p. 434) observed in 1976: “The media are the terrorists’ 
best friend. The terrorist act by itself is nothing. Publicity is all”. Weimann and Winn 
(1994, p. 51) quote ABC anchor Ted Koppel, who in 1984 offered the following 
observation: 
“Let me put forward the proposition that the media, particularly television, 
and terrorists need one another, that they have what is fundamentally a 
symbiotic relationship. Without television, terrorism becomes rather like the 
philosopher’s hypothetical tree falling in the forest: no one hears it fall and 
therefore it has no reason for being. And television without terrorism, while 
not deprived of all interesting things in the world, is nonetheless deprived of 
one of the most interesting”. 
Further observations and an analysis of  a “symbiotic process” between terrorists and 
the mass media are offered by Farnen (1990). The author proposes that in seeking to 
achieve their goals “violent groups use and abuse the media and the state” and “in 
turn, are reciprocally used and abused” in the process (Farnen, 1990, p. 99). Several 
other researchers presuppose a symbiotic relationship between terrorists and media 
coverage in their studies and commentary; e.g. Bell (1979, p. 90), L. J. Martin (1986, 
p. 127), Wilkinson (1997, p. 52) , Shoshani and Slone (2008, p. 627).  
The media, as the other party in this presumed mutually beneficial relationship, relies 
on newsworthy events which media personnel may package in a timely manner into 
captivating and informative news stories to attract viewers, readers, sales, and 
advertising revenue in what is a highly competitive media-business environment. Of 
course, media-outlets face some limitations regarding the extent of attention, space, 
and air-time, if any, that they can give to ‘happenings’ in the world. Therefore, media-
personnel need to be selective in what they determine to be newsworthy. This 
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process is not completely idiosyncratic but has been shown to follow certain criteria. 
A seminal study by Galtung and Ruge (1965) identifies and comprehensively 
describes numerous factors which, at least in Western media practice, determine 
cumulatively and compensatory the newsworthiness of an incident. Synthesising the 
work of Galtung and Ruge (1965) and of Dayan and Katz (1992),  Elter (2006, p. 1067) 
lists the following criteria for a news “story”: Timing: does the event come to a 
reportable climax before the editorial deadline?; Aktualität (topicality): is the 
incident current?; Emotionalität: does the incident evoke strong emotions?; 
Kuriosität (unexpectedness): is it an extraordinary incident?; Personalisierung: can 
the incident be linked to persons?; Elitenbezug: do these persons have an important 
role?; Relevanz: does the incident carry sufficient consequences or implications?; 
Negativeffekt: is the incident violent?; Nähe (proximity): does the incident affect the 
[media] audience in some way?; Kontinuität: can the incident be reported on over 
several news cycles?; Eindeutigkeit (unambiguity): is the incident immediately 
comprehensible? Occurrences that meet at least some of afore-mentioned criteria 
and that unfold over some period of time are particularly suitable to becoming 
significant media-events (Elter, 2006, pp. 1067-1068).  
Expanding on this symbiotic relationship and drawing on the ‘theatre of terror’ 
metaphor, the nature of reporting on terrorism as infotainment on the one hand, 
and terrorist groups devising media-oriented acts on the other hand, also attracted 
the attention of researchers. It soon becomes clear that while the terrorism-media 
relationship may be viewed as symbiotic, it is also tenuous. From the perspective of 
the terrorist, media coverage is risky because media coverage accorded to terrorist 
action is variable and includes the possibility of it being lower than expected or 
desired by the terrorist. While it may be assumed that a significant proportion of 
terrorist events would meet and therefore pass the editorial selection criteria 
outlined above, several studies have shown that not all terrorism acts are covered in 
the media and that some attacks have received considerably more media attention 
than others.  
Kelly and Mitchell (1981) examine the reporting of terrorism in the New York Times 
and The Times of London in relation to a random sample of 158 incidents taken from 
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Brian Jenkins’ and Janera Johnson’s publication (1975), International Terrorism: A 
Chronology 1968-1974. Findings by Kelly and Mitchell include: that a sizeable number 
of terrorist events go “completely unnoticed by the Western media” (p. 289); that 
each newspaper exhibits a distinct but “definite regional bias in its coverage of 
transnational terrorism” (p. 278); that hijackings, kidnappings, armed assaults, and 
terrorist events resulting in high numbers of fatalities attract a higher volume of 
coverage (pp. 279-280, 289); and that some terrorist groups attract and hold the 
attention of the press more effectively than other groups (p. 289). In summary, Kelly 
and Mitchell identify a number of potential biases that media personnel may be 
influenced by when determining whether or not and to what extent a terrorist 
incident will be covered, including: (1) regional bias; (2) attack-type bias; (3) fatality-
bias; and (4) terrorist group bias. Further studies confirm the variability of media 
coverage of terrorism events.  
Regional bias was also identified by L. J. Martin (1986, p. 140) and by Carpini and 
Williams (1987, pp. 60-61) who, in their examination of terrorism coverage by three 
major television networks in the United States of America, conclude that “even when 
focusing solely on terrorism aimed at U.S. citizens, network coverage bore little 
relationship to actual patterns of occurrence”. Weimann and Winn (1994) concur. 
Following a comprehensive study51 of media reports on terrorism not only by three 
major US television networks but also by nine international newspapers over the 
period 1968 to 1980, the authors conclude that only a small minority of terrorist 
events are actually reported and “thus, the media exercise a vital gatekeeping 
function” (p. 68). The authors also find that “television networks are especially 
selective, covering in each instance barely one-seventh of the terrorist events that 
take place” whereby the print media report up to one-third of all relevant terrorist 
acts contained in the RAND Corporation database.  
                                                     
51 The study by Weimann and Winn (1994) includes the following nine newspapers: New York Times, 
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), The Times of London, The Daily Telegraph (London), Le Figaro (Paris), 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany), Yediot (Israel), Al-Ahram (Egypt), and the Pakistan Times; 
as well as three US television networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC. 
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Of course, it will be difficult for researchers to determine with any degree of certainty 
whether editorial decisions to exclude certain terrorist events from reporting are 
made on the basis of insufficient newsworthiness of an event, according to the 
criteria established by Galtung and Ruge (1965) and subsequent researchers outlined 
above, or whether editorial or other biases play a role. However, one conclusion that 
may be drawn is that coverage of terrorist events does vary. Despite this variability, 
some terrorist actions draw significant media attention prompting some researchers 
to examine the characteristics of such high-profile 52  terrorist events. With a 
particular focus on the New York Times and coverage of domestic terrorism in the 
United States of America between 1980 and 10 September 2001, Chermak and 
Gruenewald (2006) found that “just 15 incidents [out of 412] accounted for 
approximately 85 percent of the 4 million words published in the New York Times” 
(p. 455). The 15 most news-producing terrorist incidents included the World Trade 
Centre bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and the Olympic Park 
bombing in 1996 (p. 444). Further analysis of the data leads the authors to conclude 
that “sensationalised” cases of terrorism consistently show several characteristics in 
common. They are incidents with casualties, linked to domestic terrorist groups, 
targeting airlines, or using hijacking as a tactic (p. 428). When reporting does occur, 
and even if such coverage is substantial, the specific characteristics of media 
attention are variable and may not necessarily represent the terrorist group in a way 
that meets the group’s publicity preferences or intentions.  
Weimann (1985) examined reports on 381 terrorist events in the Israeli daily press 
over a three year period from January 1979 to December 1981 and identified 13 
different labels used by journalists in reference to the persons, organisation, or 
movement connected with the terrorist act. These references included “positive” 
labels such as “patriots, freedom fighters, liberation movement”, “neutral” 
descriptors such as “guerrillas, army, underground separatists”, and “negative” 
labels such as “murderers, saboteurs, assassins”. Journalists’ choice of label was 
                                                     
52  In this thesis, high-profile terrorist events describe those events which result in significant or 
voluminous media-impact and/or coverage. 
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found to be most strongly related to “political distance”; that is, politically remote 
terrorist organisations tended to be labelled more positively even if the terrorist 
action involved a high degree of violence (pp. 433, 441).    
A related study was undertaken by Picard and Adams (1987) who considered the 
“characterisation of acts of political violence, commonly referred to as terrorism” 
(p. 1) in the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, and the Washington Post for the 
period from 1980 to 1985. Picard and Adams argue that characterisations are a major 
component in the social construction of reality in which the media play an important 
role. The authors dichotomise all characterisations encountered in this study into 
either nominal or descriptive. Nominal characterisations (e.g. hijacking, to bomb, 
gunmen, attack) name persons, actions or events with as much neutrality as possible, 
while descriptive characterisations contain elements of value or judgement (e.g. 
coward, freedom fighter, despicable, brutal). It is important to note that Picard and 
Adams include the term ‘terrorist(s)’ in the descriptive (judgement) category. They 
find that media personnel and witnesses to political violence tend to use nominal 
characterisations whereas government officials tend to use characterisations that 
are more judgmental, inflammatory and sensationalistic (p. 6), leading the authors 
to suggest that “elite U.S. print media personnel” are not significantly guilty of 
sensationalism in their coverage of terrorism (p. 6). The authors further point out 
that characterisations are an important component in the creation of frames of 
reference within which media audiences view events and participants (p. 1). 
Entman (2007, p. 164) defines framing as “the process of culling a few elements of 
perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them 
to promote a particular interpretation”. Further, “frames introduce or raise the 
salience or apparent importance of certain ideas” and can thus encourage media 
audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way. With regard to media reports 
on terrorism, Nacos (2005) identifies various frames as they apply to the 
representation of female terrorists including the “Physical Appearance Frame”, the 
“Family Connection Frame”, the “Terrorist for the Sake of Love Frame”, and the 
“Bored, Naïve, Out-of-touch-with-reality Frame” (pp. 438-445). The author lists 
several examples where terrorist groups have strategically exploited their target 
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society’s gender prejudices and have successfully deployed female terrorists in ways 
that may not have been possible for their male counterparts (pp. 446-447). Nacos’ 
examples suggest that media frames can serve terrorist groups as a tactical 
advantage; a result that at first glance may appear counter-intuitive, especially given 
results of empirical studies that have suggested “an ideological bond” between 
policymakers and reporters, and journalists embracing the official “War on Terror” 
frame (Nagar, 2010, p. 533). With a particular focus on the seven most active and 
lethal groups (during the period from 1998-2004) contained in the Memorial Institute 
for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base, but excluding 
groups with official or direct links to Al Qaeda, Nagar investigates how the New York 
Times and the Washington Times frame politically violent organisations. The author 
finds that politically violent organisations are framed no more frequently as ‘terrorist’ 
after the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) than before. However, the terrorist 
frame is applied more often to groups with an Islamic affiliation and by the more 
conservative of the two newspapers, i.e. the Washington Times (pp. 542-543).  
Other researchers have analysed the content of media attention accorded to 
terrorist actions more closely and have concluded that even if coverage is 
voluminous, such as was the case for the 1985 TWA flight 847 hostage crisis, for 
example, terrorists receive very little “special attention”, nor attention that might 
meet their desire for “respectability” and “legitimacy” (Nacos, Fan, & Young, 1989), 
nor does media coverage tend to include the terrorists’ propaganda message or 
stated grievances (e.g. Jenkins, 1981; Kelly & Mitchell, 1981; L. J. Martin, 1986). In 
some cases, media coverage can have negative consequences for the terrorist group, 
when media reports of terrorist violence increase public opposition and reaction to 
such acts and promote public support for decisive and/or wide-reaching counter-
terrorism measures (e.g. Bassiouni, 1981, p. 23; Glaab, 2007, p. 50). There is no 
doubt, however, that some terrorist events generate a very high volume of media 
attention. Nacos (2003), for example, investigated U.S. print, television, and radio 
news stories in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks and found that, although not 
portrayed in a positive light, Osama bin Laden was accorded more media attention 
than US President George W. Bush, despite the President having given 54 public 
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statements during that period compared to bin Laden, who did not appear in public 
at all and gave no face-to-face interviews (p. 41).  
The volume of media attention that some terrorist attacks generate has led to debate 
about undesirable side-effects of this phenomenon, not only during the news 
gathering process, e.g. media personnel hindering delicate negotiations or efforts by 
law enforcement agents during hijacking  (Ashwood, 1979, pp. 91-92), putting the 
lives of hostages at risk while trying to secure prime footage or information (e.g. 
Fenyvesi, 1979, p. 100; Miller, 1979, pp. 84-85), or “exploiting” the ordeals of terror 
victims for journalistic rewards (Fenyvesi, 1979, pp. 96-97), but also with regard to 
the impact of media reports on the likelihood of additional terrorist attacks in the 
future.   
The proposition that exposure to violent crimes, including news thereof, can result 
in emulation of such acts has a long history. Berkowitz and Macaulay (1971, p. 238) 
and Weimann and Winn (1994, pp. 211-212) cite French sociologist and criminologist 
Gabriel Tarde, who in his book Penal Philosophy, first published in 1890, labelled 
violent crimes that followed ‘Jack the Ripper’ murders in London in 1888 as just one 
example of “suggesto-imitative assaults”, maintaining that “news of sensational 
crimes stimulated aggressive ideas in many readers and prompted some of them to 
similar actions”. More recently, researchers have used the term ‘contagion effect’ to 
describe the assumed influence of media reports on the emulation of acts of 
violence, including terrorism.53  Schmid (1989, p. 558)  puts it rather bluntly with the 
following statements: “Behaviour rewarded is behaviour repeated. Contagion by 
media representation is a very real thing, though it is hard to prove”. Attempts at 
measuring a contagion-effect have been made with context-specific rather than 
widely applicable results (e.g. Midlarsky, Crenshaw, & Yoshida, 1980; Mazur, 1982; 
Holden, 1986; Weimann & Winn, 1994). Ross (2007, p. 221) concludes his literature 
survey on the “terrorism-news media relationship” with the following observation: 
                                                     
53 Weimann and Winn (1994, pp. 211-233) contributes a whole chapter to the “Contagion Effect” 
including various attempts to measure it. Bassiouni (1981, pp. 18-26) also devotes considerable 
attention to the “Contagion Hypothesis”. 
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“Terrorists use the media as a tool to gain increased coverage and [to] communicate 
their message. Although the media may facilitate terrorism, most research indicates 
that it does not cause terrorism. […] The relationship between terrorists and the 
news media will not subside, and in many respects, that interconnectivity will 
increase in years to come”. 
3.5.3 The Media Strategies of Terrorist Groups & Policy Implications 
In recognition of a significant relationship between terrorism and media coverage 
and in continuation of the ‘terrorism is theatre’ theme of the late 1970s (e.g. 
Alexander & Finger, 1979), researchers have suggested that many terrorist acts are 
violent “pseudo-events”  (Schmid, 1989; Boorstin, 1976) designed for the purpose of 
news-making as illustrated by the words of Hacker (1980, p. 143): “Terrorists 
intentionally manufacture, direct, and perfect the sensations they need in order to 
captivate their fascinated audiences. Mass media-oriented terrorism and terrorism-
oriented mass media thrive on sensational, surprising, and exceptional events that 
occupy total audience attention for periods of time”. In addition to Hacker’s 
contribution, the concept of (mass) media-oriented terrorism has been accorded 
considerable attention by Schmid and de Graaf (1982), Nacos (1994, 2002, 2003), 
Weimann and Winn (1994), and G. Martin (2003). Attempts by terrorists to exploit 
the strong linkage between sports and the media by placing their attacks within 
major or well publicised sporting events has been examined by  Galily, Yarchi, and 
Tamir (2015) and Yarchi, Galily, and Tamir (2015). From the perspective of 
criminology, Surette et al. (2009) expand the concept of media-oriented terrorism by 
viewing the phenomenon from an alternative angle: rather than measuring the press 
coverage of individual or high-profile terrorist attacks, the authors turn their 
attention to the media-orientation of the acts themselves. 
Surette et al. (2009) assert that “the desire for media attention is not a constant 
feature of terrorism” (p. 360), but rather that the degree of media orientation 
displayed varies, not only between groups but also between individual acts 
perpetrated by the same group over time. Based on the premise that media-oriented 
terrorism requires a “communication intent” in the form of credit-taking, media 
usable communiqués, and symbolic targets and actions (p. 361), for example, the 
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authors develop a dichotomy of indicators of media oriented terrorism versus non-
media oriented terrorism as shown in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4 Dichotomy proposed by Surette (2009) 
Media Oriented Terrorism Non-media Oriented Terrorism 
Terrorists involve journalists or media personalities in the event Events are unclaimed 
Terrorist group announces their association with event Tapes and photographs are not made public 
Terrorist group informs media of event and purpose Attacks are made in less/ non-newsworthy country 
Terrorist group or individual is willing to be interviewed 
Event is standard in procedure or common to prior 
events 
Terrorist group tapes or photographs event and provides it to the public 
through the internet or media 
Low profile or unknown victims 
Attacks are in newsworthy countries or on people from newsworthy 
countries 
Most common event is a bombing or assault 
Attack is on established or high-profile newsworthy individuals  
Event causes fatalities or injury  
Event is purposely unique and dramatic  
Most common event is hijacking or hostage taking/kidnapping for 
nonmonetary reasons 
 
 
After selecting a representative sample of twenty terrorist groups54 and then each 
group’s ten most recent acts from the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) for the period 
January 1998 to December 2009,  Surette et al. (2009) proceed to score these 200 
terrorist acts using six diverse, high-profile terrorist attacks as benchmarks. Scoring 
results for terrorist acts are then linked back to the perpetrating terrorist group to 
provide an “average media orientation score” for each individual terrorist group. The 
authors find (p. 366) “base of operation” the single most important factor in 
determining a group’s media orientation score; a factor even more significant than 
the number of injuries or fatalities inflicted. Media-orientation was found to be 
highest for European groups with environmental or political aims and lowest for 
groups with communist political or religious goals based in non-Western countries, 
especially South America, India, and Pakistan. The authors raise the possibility that 
media-oriented terrorism is determined by ready access to Western media as much 
as by group goals (p. 366). Gaining access to Western media may be part of the media 
                                                     
54 Groups selected by Surette et al. (2009) fall into four broad categories: al-Qaeda linked (n=5), 
environmental (n=2), religious (n=5), and political (n=8); the group-category ‘political’ is made up of 
three sub-categories: communist (n=3), anti-global (n=2), and national (n=3).  
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strategies used by terrorists. A small number of researchers have studied the media 
strategies of specific terrorist, militant, or political groups and have provided insights 
at various levels of detail; for example, the media strategies of Hizbollah are 
examined by Weimann (2005); those of the German Red Army Faction (RAF) are 
outlined by Steinseifer (2006), Glaab (2007), and Elter (2006, 2008); those of the 
Spanish Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) by Glück (2007); Islamist groups by Richter 
(2007); Al Qaeda by Payne (2009); the Corsican Nationalist by Hoffbauer (2011); the 
Global Islamic Media Front by Torres Soriano (2012); and Jihadist terrorists by Amble 
(2012) as well as Klausen (2015).  
Concerns about the psychological effects of media coverage of terrorism have been 
raised. Jenkins (1981, p. 3) states that “for every actual victim of terrorism, there are 
thousands of vicarious victims”, noting that media coverage of terrorism has the 
potential to cause disproportional levels of public alarm and to exaggerate people’s 
perceptions of the level of terrorist threat their country or community is facing. 
Anxiety-inducing effects of media broadcasts of political violence have also been 
reported by Slone (2000) and by Shoshani and Slone (2008), who note that “[i]n an 
elevated state of alert, even failed or foiled terrorist attempts reported repeatedly in 
the media, can produce a strong alarming effect on a wide audience” (p. 637). Strong 
emotive reactions to media reports on terrorism such as fear, anxiety, and anger 
have, in turn, been linked to citizens displaying a higher tendency for “supporting 
hawkish foreign policy” (Gadarian, 2010, p. 481) and for “selecting a military option” 
(Sirin & Geva, 2013) to combat terrorism. Other concerns relate to the issue of 
terrorism as infotainment, especially in the case of television journalism, where 
“news is simplified, dramatised, and personalised” and where “images substitute for 
ideas, personality for expertise and quick, dramatic solutions are favoured over 
questioning, argument, and compromise” (Crelinsten, 1997, p. 29); and to the 
possibility of media coverage being utilised as a source for learning and instruction 
for (prospective) terrorists (Schbley, 2004). Such trepidations, together with 
previously discussed factors of contagion and other issues of concern, have opened 
the ground for an intense and, by now, long-lasting policy debate regarding the 
terrorism-media relationship. 
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Opinions are diverse and frequently exhibit a familiar tension between the “people’s 
right to know” (Alexander, 1980, p. 179), the principles of press freedom, and 
freedom of speech in open and democratic societies on the one hand and, on the 
other hand, the strategic needs of government and security agencies, particularly 
during situations of actual or perceived crisis and terrorist threat. Contributions to 
the literature have: highlighted the importance of a good rapport between the police 
and the media, and raised concerns about “the strong prospect of increased violence 
caused by improper reporting either during or after an episode of terrorism” 
(McEwen & Sloan, 1979, pp. 53-54); advocated for media self-restraint and 
responsible practice (Wilkinson, 1990, 1997, 2001), for example, in the form of “a 
meaningful and enforceable [media] Code of Ethics” (Schmid, 1989, p. 562); and 
presented arguments for (G. M. Bauer, 1979; Weimann, 1985, p. 443) and against 
(Finger, 1979, p. 119; Miller, 1990, p. 320; Cowen, 2006, p. 243; A. M. Hoffman, 
Jengelley, Duncan, Buehler, & Rees, 2010) imposed restraints on the media, including 
news blackouts during acute terrorist attacks and scenarios. As the media 
environment evolves and alternative pathways continue to emerge for the sharing 
and dissemination of news, information, and ‘propaganda’ content, terrorists and 
security agencies adopt new technologies and adapt their strategies. Contributions 
to the literature that focus on newer communication technologies as they pertain to 
terrorists, the media, and information sharing include Lentini and Bakashmar (2007), 
Asal and Harwood (2008), Salem, Reid, and Chen (2008), Payne (2009), Amble (2012), 
Torres Soriano (2012), and Klausen (2015). Policy and counterterrorism response 
measures for this changing environment have been suggested by Salem et al. (2008, 
p. 620), Weimann and Von Knop (2008), and Amble (2012, pp. 349-350). 
3.6 The Economic Analysis of Terrorism and the Media 
Very few researchers have explored the relationship between terrorism and media 
attention accorded to terrorism from an economics perspective. One such 
contribution is made by Islam and Shahin (1989), who explicitly include media 
coverage not only as a desirable gain for hostage-takers, but also as a commodity 
which hostage-takers are willing to accept in trade negotiations with the government 
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or security agencies for the release of their hostages. Islam and Shahin (1989, p. 
1020) describe the expected utility function of hostage-takers as 
𝐸𝑈 = 𝑝𝑊(𝑛,𝑚) + 𝑞𝐺(𝑛,𝑚) + (1 − 𝑝 − 𝑞)𝐿(𝑛) 
where W represents the gain for hostage-takers if the government refuses to 
negotiate, G the gain if the government does negotiate, and L the loss to hostage-
takers if the government takes punitive action. Importantly, the authors assert that 
gains for the hostage-takers “take place through media coverage” (p. 1020). In the 
expected utility function, m is seen as an independent variable representing 
“occasional manipulation of the media” by the abductors, for example, through the 
release of video footage featuring their hostages, while n represents the number of 
hostages held. The authors suggest (pp. 1022, 1023) that facilitation of media 
publicity for the terrorists is an important element when negotiations in hostage 
scenarios have been entered into, and that governments should aim for overt rather 
than covert negotiations, as the latter denies hostage-takers the publicity gain they 
seek.  
Nelson and Scott (1992), referring to Islam and Shahin (1989), also include media 
exposure in the terrorists’ utility function 
𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑋) 
where 𝑋 is a “vector of terrorist objectives such as ransom, prisoner releases, direct 
political concessions, safe passage out of the country, as well as media attention for 
their cause” (p. 330) and it is assumed that a rational terrorist would substitute 
increased media attention for other objectives, and vice versa, if it meant a greater 
utility gain overall. Using coverage of terrorist incidents in the New York Times 
between 1968 and 1984, Nelson and Scott seek to determine: (a) the relationship 
between specific characteristics of terrorist events and the media coverage accorded 
to them; and (b) whether media coverage Granger causes terrorism. With regard to 
(a) the authors find that only 400 out of 788, or 50.8 percent, of the terrorist events 
recorded in the ITERATE database for the period under investigation received 
102 
 
coverage in the New York Times. Coverage ranged from one column-inch 55  to 
10,864.5 column-inches, the latter denoting the media attention accorded to the 
Iranian hostage crisis, which the authors describe as “an extreme outlier” and control 
for. The Munich 1972 Olympic assassinations, with 1,059.5 column-inches, received 
the second highest amount of media attention (p. 332). Nelson and Scott set column-
inches in the New York Times as the dependent variable and list the following 15 
independent variables to describe terrorist events in their dataset: non-government 
target (NONGOVT), US-target (USTGT), Israeli-target (ISRINV), sequential release or 
substitution of hostages (SEQSUB), terrorists’ self-imposed deadline passed (DPASS), 
number of non-US citizens killed (NUSDEAD), number of US citizens killed (USDEAD), 
number of US citizens wounded (USWOUND), hijacking event (HIJACK), kidnapping 
event (KID), number of terrorists in the attack force (NTAFOR), high-powered 
weapons used (HPW), number of hostages held (NUMHOS), number of days the 
incident spans (DAYS), control variable for the Iranian hostage crisis (IRANHC). Using 
linear regression and with regard to point (a) above, Nelson and Scott (1992) find 
eight terror incident characteristics with a statistically significant relationship to 
media attention in the New York Times. All eight characteristics are found to result in 
media coverage above the mean. Column-inches above the mean are shown in 
brackets: number of US citizens killed (132.3), Israeli-target (125.0), deadline-passed 
(105.6), US-target (65.7), sequential release/substitution of hostages (30.5), number 
of days the incident spans (1.3), number of non-US citizens killed (1.1), number of 
hostages held (0.3). To investigate point (b), that is, whether or not media attention 
causes terrorism, Nelson and Scott (1992, p. 336) proceed by aggregating previously 
described data into quarters56 (n=67) and applying equation 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑡  denotes the number of terrorist incidents per time period 𝑡 
(quarter), and 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑄𝑡  the sum of total column-inches of media coverage per 
                                                     
55 An article is one ‘column-inch’ if it is one inch in length and one column wide. A page in the New 
York Times is six columns wide (Nelson & Scott, 1992, p. 331). 
56 Incidents which began and ended in different quarters are counted as occurring in the quarter in 
which they began (Nelson & Scott, 1992, p. 336). 
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quarter. The authors apply the Granger (1969) causality principle which states that 
“if variable 𝑋 (Granger) causes variable Y, then changes in X should precede changes 
in Y. Therefore, in a regression of Y on other variables (including its own past values) 
if we include past or lagged values of X and it significantly improves the prediction of 
Y, then we can say that X (Granger) causes Y” (Gujarati, 1995, p. 621). Nelson and 
Scott (1992, p. 339) find “no relationship between media attention given to terrorist 
acts in one quarter and the number of terrorist incidents in the next”, thus seemingly 
disproving a commonly held belief of a strong and positive correlation between 
media reports on terrorism and additional terrorist activity (e.g. Mazur, 1982; Rohner 
& Frey, 2007). Some years later, Scott (2001) applied another regression analysis, to 
what appears to be the same data-set utilised in the study of Nelson and Scott (1992), 
to examine media coverage of terrorism when several terror events occur during the 
same period. 
Using a data-set containing column-inches of reporting in the New York Times during 
the period from 1969 to 1984 on 788 terrorism events recorded in the ITERATE 
database,  Scott (2001) shifts the focus from seeking to determine characteristics of 
newsworthy terrorist events to the idea that the public’s, and hence the media’s, 
desire for terrorism coverage is not without limits and that it may well decline if too 
much news of the same or similar type becomes available. Scott (2001, p. 216) 
describes the process by which concurrent terrorist events compete for what is 
limited media attention the “media congestion effect” and refers to Carpini and 
Williams (1987, p. 60) who state: “On a given evening, other pressing events may 
push out coverage of terrorist events that would be covered on a less busy evening.” 
Scott (2001, p. 218) shows this media constraint 𝐾 formally as 
𝐾 = 𝑁 +∑𝑇𝑖
𝑥
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑁  represents the total quantity of television time or newspaper space not 
devoted to terrorism, and 𝑇𝑖   the quantity of media space accorded to terrorist 
incident 𝑥. The author asserts that the “media congestion limit” induces terrorists to 
refrain from action in situations where constraint 𝐾  is reached. He backs this 
104 
 
assertion in two ways: (a) by developing the theoretical model further (pp. 219-221) 
and concluding with the observation of a downward sloping reaction function for 
individual terrorist groups; and (b) by running linear regression using the previously 
described data-set as follows 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  denotes the predicted coverage, 𝑏0  represents the constant 
amount of media coverage (79.73 column-inches), and 𝑏1 the regression coefficient 
or slope of the regression equation. The author finds a statistically significant result 
(t = -10.122) and the coefficient to be negative (-0.124), suggesting that coverage for 
any particular terrorist incident declines by 0.124 column-inches when coverage for 
another terrorist incident increases by one column-inch; leading to the conclusion 
(p. 225) that “significant evidence of crowding-out” has been found, that “one 
terrorist’s gain in media attention is another terrorist’s loss”, and that in order to 
compete successfully for what is limited media attention, terrorists must stage more 
original and more imaginative incidents than other terrorist groups (p. 226).  
Rohner and Frey (2007) also examine the premise of a symbiotic relationship 
between terrorism and the media from an economics perspective. The authors 
consider terrorists and media outlets as two aggregate players in a common-interest-
game and describe the players and their relationship in several steps as follows: (a) 
define each player’s utility function; (b) determine and graph each player’s reaction 
functions, and identify any stable or unstable equilibria; (c) examine stable equilibria 
in a discrete choice game. 
The terrorists’ utility function is defined as 
𝑢𝑇 = 𝛼𝑄𝑆𝑇
𝜃 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑇) 
where 𝑄 =  share of media coverage devoted to terrorism; 𝑆 =  level of 
sensationalism of the newspapers, with 0 ≤ 𝑆 ≤ 1; where 𝛼, 𝜃, 𝛽 are set as positive 
parameters, with 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1; where 𝛼 denotes utility gained from terrorist activities 
and 𝛼 is a function of three marginal benefits (i.e. power, monetary compensation, 
and ideological/missionary gains) all of which are set as positive values by Rohner 
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and Frey; where the terrorists’ time constraint is expressed as 𝐿 + 𝑇 = 1 , with  
𝑇 = time devoted to terrorist activities, 𝐿 = time devoted to non-terrorist activities, 
and 𝛽 =  marginal benefits the terrorists derive from engaging in non-terrorist 
activities. 
The media’s utility function is defined as 
𝑢𝑀 = 𝜒𝑇𝑆𝑄
𝜌 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑄) 
where 𝜒 captures the various factors that determine how lucrative reports about 
terrorism are for the media; where 𝑥, 𝜌, 𝛿 are set as positive parameters, with 0 ≤
𝜌 ≤ 1; where the media’s reporting space constraint is expressed as 𝑄 + 𝑅 = 1, with  
𝑄 = share of media coverage devoted to terrorism, 𝑅 = reports on subjects other 
than terrorism, and 𝛿 = marginal benefits to the media from reports on subjects 
other than terrorism.  
The terrorists’ reaction function 
𝑇 =  (
𝛼𝜃𝑆𝑄
𝛽
)
1/(1−𝜃)
 
and the media’s reaction function 
𝑄 = (
𝜒𝜌𝑆𝑇
𝛿
)
1/(1−𝜌)
 
are obtained by setting 𝜕𝑢𝑇/𝜕𝑇 and 𝜕𝑢𝑀/𝜕𝑄 equal to zero. 
Graphing both players’ reaction functions, for the case where 𝛼𝑆 > 𝛽  and > 𝛿  , 
Rohner and Frey (2007, p. 133) identify three equilibria: a stable “no attack” 
equilibrium at (0;0), a stable “attack” equilibrium at (1:1), and one unstable, 
intermediate equilibrium at (0.64; 0.64). The authors conclude (p. 142) that the 
likelihood of a low terrorism outcome may be increased if attribution of terrorist 
attacks to particular groups is avoided as much as possible, thus indirectly subsidising 
high quality (rather than sensationalist) journalism. The authors test and substantiate 
the findings of their game-theoretic model with an empirical analysis of the media 
coverage of terrorism, terror incidents, and fatalities for the period January 1998 to 
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June 2005. Using data of terrorist incidents and victims from the National Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and then counting the number of times the 
expression “terrorism” or “Terrorismus” appear in the New York Times and in the 
Neue Züricher Zeitung, respectively, the authors find (p. 142) that terrorism and 
media coverage mutually Granger cause each other. Pfeiffer (2012) also provides a 
game-theoretic perspective on terrorism and the media, but finds a stable, 
intermediate Nash equilibrium of terrorism and reporting propensity to emerge 
when both players independently maximise their utilities (p. 215). Pfeiffer (2012, p. 
219) makes clear reference to the “crowding-out” effect empirically shown by Scott 
(2001) and concludes his own analysis with the proposition that the media have a 
“stabilising effect” on terrorism” (p. 223). 
3.7 The Contribution of this Study to the Literature 
Having completed a survey of the literature, we can identify the contribution that 
this thesis represents. Terrorism studies is a broad and multidisciplinary field of 
research encompassing contributions from economics, criminology, psychology, 
political science, sociology, and critical studies. Each of these different disciplines has 
contributed important insights into various aspects of terrorism and terrorist 
behaviour, including Islamic terrorism, suicide terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, the life 
cycles of terrorist groups, and the root-causes of terrorism. Among all of these 
important aspects of the terrorism context, one longstanding problem has been 
identified in the literature survey as being of particular interest. This is the research 
program known as ‘terrorism and the media’.  
Like most of the other research programs within terrorism studies, terrorism and the 
media has been investigated from the perspectives of several distinct disciplines. This 
research program explores a number of different dimensions of the relationship 
between terrorism and the media coverage that is accorded to it. Traditionally, a 
great deal of attention has been given to the idea that terrorist groups and media 
organisations share a symbiotic relationship. This has led researchers to consider the 
media strategies that terrorist groups may have developed and the broader social 
and policy implications of an underlying symbiotic relationship. Contributions to this 
problem have also been received from defence and peace economists. Applying the 
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traditional tools of economic analysis, namely the rational choice approach, 
economists developed a theoretical rationale for terrorist behaviour based upon the 
utility-generating properties of the media coverage that follows terrorist activity. The 
contributions of economic analysis have tended to concentrate on identifying limits 
to media coverage (congestion), developing precise game-theory mathematical 
models of the relationship between terrorists and the media, and applying statistical-
econometric analysis developed within economics to identify causality (Granger 
tests). Now that the work of the economists and other scholars has been surveyed, 
it is possible to identify both the general conclusions as well as some limitations 
characterising the approaches that have been applied to the problem broadly termed 
‘terrorism and the media’.  
The general conclusions that may be drawn from the literature, and indeed from the 
longstanding interest that has been shown and the attention that has been accorded 
to the research program, may be summarised as follows:  
 Media coverage is generally considered to be an important outcome (payoff) 
to terrorist activity; a payoff that terrorist groups desire and, among other 
objectives, aim to acquire as media attention confers them utility 
(satisfaction). 
 Some terrorist activities are newsworthy. Not all terrorist activities, even if 
they may be considered newsworthy at certain times or places, will be 
accorded media attention. This may be due to certain factors, including 
reporting biases, editorial biases, geographical biases and, potentially, 
crowding-out effects and congestion caused by a preponderance of 
competing newsworthy events (not necessarily terrorism) and limits of time 
and space available to journalists.  
 Some scholars have argued that terrorist activities, when the criteria for 
newsworthiness is met, may also have important outcomes for media 
organisations; for example, increased newspaper circulation, television 
viewer numbers, and social media metrics. 
 The plausibility of the argument that the outcomes of terrorist activities are 
important for both terrorist groups and media organisations leads to the 
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hypothesis of a symbiotic relationship and, further, the possibility that media 
coverage may cause or contribute to terrorism.  
 This possibility has also led scholars to consider the media strategies that 
terrorist groups may develop and the plausibility of media-oriented 
terrorism.  
Although the research program reflects multiple perspectives and the conclusions 
are contested and debated, the overarching themes that run through the literature 
depict the terrorist group operating within a context in which media coverage is an 
important outcome for both the group and, potentially, for the media organisations 
that accord such coverage. While terrorist groups may differ in regards to their 
sophistication in interacting with the media and in navigating this context, terrorist 
groups generally understand the importance of attracting at least some media 
attention to their actions even if that attention simply serves to announce publicly 
responsibility for an attack. Some groups will manage this context in a more 
sophisticated way than others and they will engage in actions that may be classified 
as media-oriented.  
Despite the progress that has been made on this research program, several 
limitations may be identified. Some of these are common to the overall research 
program while others are specific to the economic analysis of media coverage and 
terrorist behaviour. These limitations may be summarised as follows:  
 Terrorists desire media attention and this is a general consensus within the 
literature. However, terrorists cannot simply ‘manufacture’ media coverage. 
Rather, terrorist groups choose actions that have a range of possible 
outcomes, each associated with some possible amount of media coverage. 
Even an action that is normally accorded a great deal of media attention may 
be accorded very little. This may be because of the idiosyncrasies of media 
coverage (see above) or the outcomes of the action itself; for example, a 
bombing device planned to detonate at peak hour may explode prematurely 
or not at all.   
109 
 
 In this manner, existing studies are somewhat detached from the choices that 
terrorists make. Terrorists choose actions (bombing, hostage-takings, armed 
assaults etc.). Actions are characterised by a range of outcomes and, in turn, 
the outcomes may be characterised by a range of possible levels of media 
attention.  
 Terrorist choices of actions are subject to risk and uncertainty. The outcomes 
and the amount of media coverage accorded to them may be quite different 
from the average or expected outcomes. The existing literature focuses on 
average outcomes to particular actions without considering the variability or 
risk and uncertainty of outcomes.  
 When choosing an action, the terrorist cannot be sure of any particular 
outcome. As such, even actions that may be accorded the highest average 
amount of media coverage may not be desirable choices for a particular group 
if the higher average is accompanied by the necessity of bearing a higher 
amount of uncertainty.  
 When this is overlooked, certain conclusions may become subject to criticism. 
For example, Rohner and Frey (2007) test for Granger causality and conclude 
that media attention causes terrorist related fatalities. However, terrorist 
groups cannot choose to inflict fatalities but can only choose a particular 
action with a range of possible outcomes. Terrorist groups may not choose to 
engage in the action with the highest expected number of fatalities and, 
according to Rohner and Frey, the highest amount of media coverage because 
that choice may not be consistent with optimal choice under conditions of 
risk and uncertainty. Rohner and Frey’s characterisation of the utility function 
does not allow for this dimension of choice to be considered.  
These limitations primarily stem from an incomplete assessment of the terrorists’ 
choice problem and the nature of the underlying choice, the choice of terrorist action 
(a single attack or attack combinations) which terrorists make in order to obtain a 
possible outcome. There are also some limitations that characterise the quantitative 
approaches that have been applied to this research problem: 
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 The quantitative analysis that has been undertaken to investigate the validity 
of hypotheses concerning the relationship between terrorism and media 
coverage as well as the nature of media coverage accorded to particular types 
of actions is characterised by an overreliance on word searches; for example, 
researchers identify the number of times that a particular word, for example 
‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’, is used in media reports in the context of particular 
events or time-frames. However, this is only a very cursory measurement of 
the amount of media coverage that is accorded to particular terrorist actions 
or even to the actions of a particular group. It is also debatable whether this 
is a measure of the type of media coverage outcome that terrorist groups may 
consider when choosing from a set of alternative terrorist actions. The studies 
that have used more sophisticated measurements of media coverage, for 
example column inches, provide a much more promising foundation for 
analysis.  
To overcome some of the limitations that characterise the existing literature, the 
problem might be better approached from the perspective of the terrorist group 
making a choice under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Under such conditions, 
alternative terrorist actions may be assessed on the basis of the outcomes that can 
be expected and the degree to which the actual outcomes may be expected to 
diverge. If media coverage is desirable, terrorist groups may rank alternative actions 
on the basis of the amount of media coverage they expect an action to generate and 
the variability that may characterise outcomes. An action with the highest average 
amount of media coverage may not necessarily be chosen if its outcomes are very 
variable and therefore risky. This is one potential insight that such an approach may 
generate. A model of terrorist choice in a context where media coverage is an 
important payoff may be developed on the theoretical foundations provided by 
economic theory and behavioural economics. Such a theoretical approach may be 
complemented by an empirical analysis that also accords prominence to both the 
amount of media coverage generated by particular terrorist actions and the 
variability in that coverage over time. Such an empirical treatment would also 
consider refinements in the measurement of media coverage and move beyond 
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analysis based on the frequency with which certain words are used in media reports. 
In light of these comments, the approach taken by this thesis may be summarised as 
follows: 
 The terrorist’s choice problem is treated as a choice between ‘risky 
prospects’, where the risky prospect is the terrorist action (or combinations 
of actions) 𝑖, and the payoff is media coverage 𝑥𝑖  with probability 𝑝𝑖, where 
(𝑝1  + 𝑝2 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑛 = 1) . This approach avoids the confusion of treating 
media coverage as the risky prospect when, in fact, it is the terrorists’ choice 
of action that is the risky prospect. The approach of this thesis also ensures 
that risk and uncertainty are treated. It avoids the potential for erroneously 
concluding that a terrorist will always choose the action with the highest 
amount of media coverage; an assumption that is not necessarily the case, 
because such action may be too risky and the outcome uncertain for it to be 
the optimal choice for a particular terrorist group given the group’s particular 
risk preference. 
 Economic analysis provides at least several different ways for analysing choice 
from among risky prospects including: (a) basic expected utility theory, (b) 
mean-variance expected utility, and (c) prospect theory. In this thesis, basic 
expected utility theory is applied as a first step beyond the implicit expected 
value models of the existing literature. This approach, as will be explained, 
avoids certain logical problems and generates a set of first order conclusions 
regarding the patterns of terrorist choice that might be expected when media 
attention is desirable but uncertain. Second, mean-variance analysis is 
applied. This method is particularly well-suited to dealing with combinations 
of risky prospects (actions). Third, prospect theory is applied to enable 
consideration of additional (behavioural) dimensions of terrorist choice in 
contexts where terrorists not only learn from the media’s response to their 
own actions, but also observe the behaviour of other terrorist groups and 
resulting media attention, before considering and formulating their own 
terrorist activity in the future (i.e. reference points).  
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 Consideration of the terrorists’ decision calculus moves the analysis in this 
thesis from a description of past events towards exploring patterns of future 
terrorist action in contexts where media coverage is a desired payoff. This 
analysis aims to assist law enforcement and security agencies to understand 
how terrorists’ choices of action may be shaped by media coverage in 
particular contexts.  
 The theoretical analysis is explained and underpinned by data from a precise 
geographical and political context in which several terrorist groups were 
active concurrently and in which such groups competed with each other for 
media attention. 
The analysis presented in the thesis is further augmented and strengthened by 
several characteristics inherent in the work for this project: an extensive dataset 
comprising actions by numerous terrorist groups and the media coverage resulting 
from their actions within one specific historical, geographical, and national context is 
compiled and available for analysis; the historical context chosen is one which is 
characterised by a high level of terrorist activity and one in which the terrorism-
media relationship occupied the political agenda and was high in peoples’ 
consciousness; a detailed measurement of print-media space (rather than word 
searches) is performed; the extensive dataset spans a period of ten years and 
facilitates examination of numerous terrorist groups’ activities and the resulting 
media coverage over a considerable time period. This approach facilitates 
examination of terrorist groups’ evolving actions and combinations of actions rather 
than being confined to a focus on individual terrorist events or attack types alone.  
3.8 Conclusion 
The terrorism studies literature encompasses contributions from different 
disciplines. Over the past several decades, much progress has been made and much 
has been learned about terrorism and the behaviour of terrorist groups. A number 
of research programs have endured over almost the entire lifetime of terrorism 
studies. One of these is accorded particular attention in this thesis. This is the 
research program referred to as ‘terrorism and the media’. Progress in this particular 
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research program reflects the general advances that have been made in the 
overarching discipline though, of course, much debate remains and much remains to 
be understood. The existing studies that have been contributed to the literature are 
characterised by some limitations. Overcoming these limitations represents an 
opportunity to contribute an original and worthwhile study to the literature. This 
thesis applies an analytical approach that builds on the existing literature and, where 
possible, minimises or overcomes at least some of the limitations that can be found 
in extant work.   
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Chapter 4  - Theory 
4.0 Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to outline, purely logically or theoretically, a picture 
of the terrorist decision-making process in the terrorism and media context. Terrorist 
actions 𝑖 are treated as risky prospects with media coverage as the variable payoff 𝑥𝑖  
occurring with probability 𝑝𝑖  where  (𝑝1 + 𝑝2 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑛 = 1) . The way in which 
terrorists choose from among the available actions may be depicted in a number of 
different ways. This chapter presents treatments that draw on the basic expected 
utility model, the mean-variance expected utility method, and the most prominent 
behavioural model of the decision-making process, (cumulative) prospect theory. 
The application of these models to terrorist choice in a context where media 
coverage is the relevant payoff represents a core contribution of the thesis. The 
purely logical treatment is complemented by an application of each model to the 
terrorism experienced in West-Germany during the 1970s.  
As explained in the literature survey, the existing studies, when they extend to an 
analysis of terrorist strategy, place considerable emphasis on the amount of media 
attention accorded to actions in the past as the dominant factor shaping terrorist 
choice. This implies that the terrorist will simply choose the action with the highest 
(historical) amount of media attention and bears considerable resemblance to the 
expected value model, which depicts decision-makers as choosing the action with 
the highest expected value. This approach is subject to several limitations, which may 
end in logically untenable conclusions. The basic expected utility model provides an 
advance on this existing analysis and the other models provide a still more 
sophisticated picture of the terrorist decision-making process that generates new 
insights into the patterns that terrorist choices of actions may exhibit when media 
attention is the desired but uncertain outcome of terrorist activity.  
4.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, the analytical perspective that 
shapes the contribution of this thesis is identified. Terrorist actions are defined as 
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risky prospects with variable amounts of media coverage representing the terrorist’s 
desired outcome. In Section 4.3, models of decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty are applied to this choice problem. This represents a formal theoretical 
analysis of the terrorist’s ranking or ordering of preferences over alternative actions 
when media coverage is a desired but uncertain outcome of those actions. In Section 
4.4, the theoretical analysis is concluded.  
4.2 Terrorist Actions as Risky Prospects 
Treating the terrorist’s actions as risky prospects refocuses the analysis onto some 
important but easily overlooked aspects of the choice problem. Researchers, 
governments and law enforcement agencies are interested in the choices that 
terrorists have made or may make in the future. This focuses our analytical attention 
on the actions that are available to the terrorist and the actions that the terrorist 
might choose from among the available alternatives. The literature that has explored 
terrorism and the media provides the foundation for an analysis of this choice 
problem in an important context and has presented compelling arguments to 
support the position that media coverage may be an important variable in the 
terrorist’s decision-making process.  
Terrorists cannot choose the amount of media coverage that is accorded to their 
actions.57 They can only choose an action for which media coverage is one of the 
variable or risky payoffs. An action may not generate any of the outcomes that the 
terrorist planned or expected. An action may generate outcomes that fall very much 
short of or, conversely, very much exceed the expected outcomes. In the previous 
chapter it was pointed out that existing studies focus on the amount of media 
coverage associated with particular types of actions or with particular events. By 
concentrating on the amount of media coverage associated with particular events or 
actions, these investigations may give the impression that terrorists can choose some 
                                                     
57 This is also true of social media. Although the terrorist group can disseminate information almost 
without limit, the number of times the information is accessed or otherwise consumed by an audience 
is variable. Any given post may be accessed many more or many less times than expected. 
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amount of media coverage by taking a particular action. This obscures some key 
aspects of the choice problem.  
A risky prospect is one where the outcomes are uncertain. Terrorist actions generate 
media coverage. The existing literature has demonstrated that this is the case. What 
is not clearly reflected in the existing discourse, however, is the uncertain nature of 
the media coverage that attends a prospective action. A terrorist group that desires 
media coverage and expects terrorist actions to be accorded some amount of media 
coverage chooses from among its prospective actions in a manner that reflects these 
expectations. Some actions may have the potential to generate a very large amount 
of media coverage but have very variable outcomes. Some actions may be expected 
to generate a relatively small amount of media coverage but with more certainty. 
Terrorists will not always choose the former. Treating the terrorists’ set of feasible 
actions as risky prospects enables this circumstance to be incorporated into an 
analysis of the decision-making process. It must be remembered that some terrorist 
actions, perhaps those that fail in the early stages of their execution, may receive no 
media coverage at all. And yet, the action was the outcome of a terrorist’s decision-
making process. It was chosen with an expectation that some media coverage would 
result.  
A substantial multi-disciplinary research program has been devoted to determining 
the processes that people follow when making decisions under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty; that is, the choice from among a set of risky alternatives or prospects 𝑖 
with some payoff  𝑥𝑖  occurring with probability 𝑝𝑖. Both orthodox and behavioural 
economics have approached this task. Although different models highlight different 
aspects of the decision-making process and its behavioural foundations and although 
some models seek only to predict while some seek to describe the decision-making 
process, the prominent models share in common the objective of determining a 
ranking or ordering of the risky prospects confronting the decision-maker. In the 
sections that follow, basic expected utility theory, mean-variance expected utility 
theory, and prospect theory are applied to the terrorist’s choice of action in a context 
where media coverage is the desired but uncertain outcome.   
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4.3 Models of Terrorist Choice under Risk and Uncertainty 
All models of choice under risk and uncertainty aim to describe the process by which 
the decision-maker chooses, predict the order in which the alternative risky 
prospects will be ranked, or prescribe the best risky prospect that the decision-maker 
should choose. These models have a long history. In economics, the basic expected 
utility model was formulated in the middle of the 20th century but its origins can be 
traced to a much earlier time. Even the behavioural models, which emerged as 
alternatives of the basic model, now have a long history of their own. Although often 
seen as competitors, the models complement each other by highlighting different 
aspects of the decision-making process. In this section, the origins of the basic 
expected utility model are sketched from its emergence and eventual replacement 
of the less satisfactory expected value criterion. Theoretical advances, especially 
mean-variance expected utility and the behavioural model called prospect theory, 
are then set out in more detail. Together these models provide a comprehensive 
picture of the decision-making process that terrorists apply when choosing from 
among alternative risky actions, each associated with some expected yet 
fundamentally uncertain amount of media coverage. 
4.3.1 Basic Expected Utility 
Terrorists commonly choose from among a small number of risky prospects or 
actions which are grouped under categories such as: (1) armed assault, (2) 
assassination, (3) bombing/explosion, (4) facility/infrastructure attack, (5) hijacking, 
and (6) hostage-taking/kidnapping.58 The outcomes of such actions are variable. The 
types of outcomes that the terrorists may associate with successful terrorist actions 
might include victims belonging to a particular target-group, injuries and fatalities 
inflicted, as well as an amount of media attention accorded. For the present analysis 
we are specifically interested in the latter. Thus the terrorist’s choice problem is 
treated as a choice from among risky prospects, where the risky prospect is the 
                                                     
58 This categorisation is adopted from the GTD. 
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terrorist’s action 𝑖, and the payoff is a particular amount of media coverage 𝑥𝑖  that 
will result from action 𝑖 with probability 𝑝𝑖, where (𝑝1  + 𝑝2 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑛 = 1).  
One way in which the terrorist’s decision-making process may be modelled and the 
best risky prospect from among the list of alternatives identified is by determining 
the expected value ?̅? of each risky prospect. Formally,  
?̅? = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Although this represents a very simple and straightforward way to compute the value 
of each risky prospect, there are several practical and formal problems that warn 
against such an approach. Fundamentally, applying the expected value model in the 
present context would lead us to conclude that the terrorist would simply choose the 
single action with the highest expected amount of media coverage regardless of risk. 
Not surprisingly, expected value also runs into serious formal difficulties. These 
difficulties are encapsulated by the St Petersburg Paradox. The paradox, first 
identified by Nicholas Bernoulli in 1728, is explained by Machina (1987, p. 122): 
Suppose someone offers to toss a fair coin repeatedly until it comes up heads, 
and to pay you $1 if this happens on the first toss, $2 if it takes two tosses to 
land a head, $4 if it takes three tosses, $8 if it takes four tosses, etc. What is 
the largest sure gain you would be willing to forgo in order to undertake a 
single play of this game? Since this gamble offers a ½ chance of winning $1, ¼ 
of winning $2, etc., its expected value is (
1
2
) × $1 + (
1
4
) × $2 + (
1
8
) × $4 +
⋯ =
$1
2
+
$1
2
+
$1
2
+⋯ = $∞, so it should be preferred to any finite sure gain. 
However, it is clear that few individuals would forgo more than a moderate 
amount for a one-shot play.  
In short, here was a risky prospect with an infinite expected value and yet prospective 
players will usually only pay a few dollars to participate. In fact, risky prospects with 
a much lower expected value would be preferred to it. A ranking of risky prospects 
based on expected value quickly came to be viewed as untenable. It was in order to 
overcome the difficulties presented by the St Petersburg Paradox that expected 
utility was first proposed as an alternative criterion on which to base choices from 
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among risky prospects. Although this proposal dates to the 1700s, it was not until the 
20th century that a formal axiomatic treatment of expected utility theory was 
formulated. Basic expected utility theory says that each possible payoff 𝑥𝑖  is 
associated with an amount of utility (satisfaction) for the terrorist. The payoffs are 
converted into utility numbers by the decision-maker’s utility function which, 
formally, must be one from the class of functions identified by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947). The theory is relatively straightforward. Simply, in the present 
context the expected utility 𝐸𝑈  of an action 𝑖  is the sum of the products of 
probability and utility conferred by media coverage over all possible outcomes of the 
act. The terrorist chooses the action with the highest expected utility of media 
coverage. Formally, 
𝐸𝑈 =∑𝑢(𝑥𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The expected utility model is a mathematical theory. Its foundations consist of a set 
of axioms set down by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947): (1) completeness, (2) 
transitivity, (3) continuity, and (4) independence. These axioms have come to define 
rational behaviour in some parts of economic theory. Formally, 
(1) The completeness axiom states that for any two lotteries or risky prospects 𝐿1 and 
𝐿2 exactly one of the following holds: 𝐿1 is preferred to 𝐿2 , denoted by  𝐿1 ≻ 𝐿2 ; or 
𝐿2  is preferred to  𝐿1  , denoted by  𝐿2 ≻ 𝐿1 ; or the decision-maker is indifferent 
between 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 , denoted by 𝐿1 ∼ 𝐿2. The completeness axiom ensures that the 
decision-maker can compare all risky prospects. 
(2) The transitivity axiom assumes that preference is consistent across any three risky 
prospects; that is, if  𝐿1 ≿ 𝐿2  , and  𝐿2 ≿ 𝐿3  , then  𝐿1 ≿ 𝐿3  also applies. Where ≿ 
denotes weakly preferred; that is,  𝐿1 ≿ 𝐿2 means that  𝐿1 is at least as preferred as 
𝐿2.  
(3) The continuity axiom assumes a tipping point between better than and worse 
than a given middle option. If 𝐿1 ≿ 𝐿2 ≿ 𝐿3 then there exists a probability 𝑝 ∈ (0,1) 
that would make the decision-maker indifferent in the following sense:   
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𝑝𝐿1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐿3 ∼ 𝐿2 
(4) The independence axiom assumes that a preference holds regardless of the 
possibility of another (irrelevant) outcome such that if  𝐿1 ≻ 𝐿2 , and 𝐿3 denotes an 
irrelevant outcome:  
𝑝𝐿1 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐿3 ≻ 𝑝𝐿2 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐿3 
Depicting the decision-making process as one based on expected utility rather than 
expected value represents a theoretical advance in analysing the way terrorists may 
choose from among the attack categories. An ordering of terrorist actions on the 
basis of expected utility may be quite different from an ordering on the basis of 
expected value. Table 4.1 illustrates an example. If we imagine a restricted choice 
between just two attack methods A and B for the terrorist group, each with four 
different payoffs (units of media coverage) and associated probabilities, we can see 
that the terrorist group would choose Action A as the total expected utility of 
Action A (2.6853) exceeds that of Action B (1.7217), although the reverse is true for 
the total expected values of Action A and Action B.  
 
Table 4.1 Expected Value and Expected Utility - An Example 
Payoff 
𝒙𝑨 
Probability 
𝒑𝑨 
Payoff 
𝒙𝑩 
Probability 
𝒑𝑩 
Utility 
𝒍𝒏(𝒙𝑨) 
Utility 
𝒍𝒏(𝒙𝑩) 
Expected 
Utility 
𝑬𝑼𝑨 
Expected 
Utility 
𝑬𝑼𝑩 
Expected 
Value 
𝑬𝑽𝑨 
Expected 
Value 
𝑬𝑽𝑩 
10 0.6 1 0.4 2.3026 0 1.3816 0 6 0.4 
20 0.3 10 0.4 2.9957 2.3026 0.8987 0.9210 6 4 
50 0.08 15 0.1 3.9120 2.7081 0.3130 0.2708 4 1.5 
100 0.02 200 0.1 4.6052 5.2983 0.0921 0.5298 2 20 
Sum 1  1   2.6853 1.7217 18 25.9 
 
The basic expected utility model is a much more sophisticated model of choice under 
risk and uncertainty than the expected value criterion. An important advance is the 
model’s ability to reflect decision-maker characteristics such as the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth and the decision-maker’s risk preferences. Within the 
expected utility model, decision-makers can be risk-averse or risk-seeking and to 
varying degrees. The expected utility model can explain and account for a situation 
where a decision-maker values a risky prospect less than its expected value. Both the 
difference and the relationship between expected utility and expected value are 
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reflected most clearly in the treatment of risk preference that is encompassed within 
the expected utility model. This is explained with reference to Figure 4.1 and Figure 
4.2. 
 
Figure 4.1 The Risk-Averse Terrorist Decision-Maker 
 
We consider a terrorist group faced with a prospect that offers a 60:40 chance of 
receiving 𝑥1  or  𝑥2 units of media coverage, respectively. In both graphs, Figure 4.1 
and Figure 4.2, point  𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 0.60 𝑥1 + 0.40 𝑥2  provides the expected value, and 
point  𝐸𝑈𝐴 = 𝑙𝑛 (𝑥1)0.60 + 𝑙𝑛 (𝑥2)0.40  the expected utility of the prospect. The 
concave utility function of a risk-averse terrorist group is depicted in Figure 4.1. The 
risk-averse terrorist group will prefer the expected value of the prospect, indicated 
by 𝑈(𝐸𝑉𝐴), to the utility gained from engaging in the prospect, indicated by 𝐸𝑈𝐴 . 
Engaging in the prospect carries the risk of obtaining less than the expected value; a 
risk that the risk-averse terrorist group is unwilling to bear.59 The reverse is true for 
the risk-seeking terrorist group. Such a group is described by a convex utility function 
depicted in Figure 4.2. A risk-seeking terrorist group will prefer to engage in the 
prospect (for a chance of gaining a larger amount of media attention) than to lock-in 
                                                     
59 Risk aversion is formally measured by the Arrow-Pratt measures. For relative risk aversion, the 
appropriate measure is −𝑈′′(𝑥)/𝑈′(𝑥). See Pratt (1964, p. 127). 
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the expected value of the prospect. For a risk-seeking terrorist group the utility 
conferred by the prospect, indicated at point 𝐸𝑈𝐴 , is higher than the utility conferred 
by the expected value at point 𝑈(𝐸𝑉𝐴). 
 
Figure 4.2 The Risk-Seeking Terrorist Decision-Maker 
 
The expected utility model applied to the context of terrorism and media coverage, 
therefore, depicts the terrorist as choosing from a set of actions or risky prospects. 
Each action or risky prospect potentially confers various amounts of media coverage 
as possible payoffs 𝑥𝑖  occurring with associated probabilities  𝑝𝑖 . The terrorist 
assesses the payoffs for each action and the utility each individual payoff would 
confer to him. The utilities for each payoff are weighted by their probability and 
summed to find the basic expected utility for each action. The actions are then 
ranked by their expected utilities and the action with the highest expected utility is 
chosen. It is relevant to restate the point that the action chosen by the terrorist may 
not be the one with the highest expected value; that is, the highest expected amount 
of media attention. In particular, the terrorist’s preference for risk will play an 
important role in the selection. To further illustrate this point, a choice between two 
actions, A and B, is graphed in Figure 4.3 using the example outlined in tabular form 
in Table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.3 Risk Aversion – An Example 
 
We consider a terrorist who faces a choice between two actions, C and D. The 
terrorist would clearly prefer to receive the higher expected value of Action D (30) 
over the lower expected value of Action C (23.75), indicated by utilities 3.40D and 
3.16C  respectively. However, neither expected value is guaranteed. Both actions are 
risky. At the same token, the range of possible outcomes for Action C is narrower 
than that for Action D. The prospect of engaging in Action C confers to the terrorist 
an expected utility of 3.05 compared to the lower expected utility of 3.01 for 
Action D. A risk-averse terrorist will therefore prefer the safer gamble of engaging in 
Action C rather than engaging in Action D. 
One of the most noticeable features of expected utility analysis is that the model 
requires a utility function to transform outcomes or payoffs into utility numbers. 
There are many mathematically suitable utility functions. The selection of a particular 
function depends on the nature of the choice problem, aspects of the context and 
other factors that may make one utility function more appropriate than another. In 
economic theory, a handful of utility functions and variations of them have become 
the standard selections in a wide variety of choice contexts. Ultimately, however, the 
selection is an assumption about the decision-maker. The necessity of an additional 
assumption of this nature is one aspect of expected utility theory that may limit its 
appeal and scope. Another potential limitation of this nature is the computational 
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burden that expected utility theory places on the analyst and, by implication, the 
decision-maker. This computational burden is illustrated more directly by Table 4.2 
which presents an example of the information that would be required to compute 
the expected utility for three different actions and just six possible payoffs (units of 
media coverage) for each action. The example assumes that terrorist groups have a 
logarithmic utility function such that the utility conferred by each amount of media 
coverage is the natural logarithm of that payoff. As explained, this utility number is 
multiplied by the associated probability and summed to find the expected utility for 
each action. The terrorist group would choose the action with the highest expected 
utility.  
Table 4.2 Expected Utility Information - An Example 
Action A Action B Action C 
Payoff 
𝒙𝑨 
i.e. units 
of media 
coverage 
Utility 
𝒖(𝒙𝑨) = 
𝒍𝒏(𝒙𝑨) 
Probability 
𝒑𝑨 
 
Payoff 
𝒙𝑩 
i.e. units 
of media 
coverage 
Utility 
𝒖(𝒙𝑩) = 
𝒍𝒏(𝒙𝑩) 
Probability 
𝒑𝑩 
 
Payoff 
𝒙𝑪 
i.e. units 
of media 
coverage 
Utility 
𝒖(𝒙𝑪) = 
𝒍𝒏(𝒙𝑪) 
Probability 
𝒑𝑪 
 
5 1.6094 0.0500 20 2.9957 0.2250 20 2.9957 0.0500 
10 2.3026 0.1500 30 3.4012 0.2995 30 3.4012 0.1000 
15 2.7081 0.3000 40 3.6889 0.3000 40 3.6889 0.1500 
20 2.9957 0.2000 50 3.9120 0.1500 50 3.9120 0.2500 
25 3.2189 0.3000 60 4.0943 0.0250 100 4.6052 0.3500 
30 3.4012 0.0000 70 4.2485 0.0005 200 5.2983 0.1000 
 
Economic theory, then, provides a basic, yet potentially limited, model with which to 
analyse terrorist choice. According to this basic expected utility model, terrorists 
choose from among feasible actions, which include armed assault, assassination, 
bombings, attacks on facilities or infrastructure, hijacking, and hostage-
taking/kidnapping, in a manner that maximises expected utility. Some amount of 
media coverage is expected to be associated with each possible outcome. The 
expected utility model implies that the terrorist will consider these outcomes and the 
chances with which they can be expected to occur and arrive at a preference ordering 
across the set of feasible attack methods. The attack method that has the highest 
expected utility, though perhaps not the highest expected amount of media 
coverage, will be ranked first on the preference ordering and, according to the basic 
expected utility model, will be the attack method that the terrorist group chooses to 
undertake.  
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As the basic model of choice under risk and uncertainty, expected utility provides a 
relatively clear perspective from which to view choice problems. Terrorists choose 
from a set of (feasible) alternative actions. The risk that terrorists confront is the 
possibility that the outcome of their chosen action will be different from that which 
they expected or desired. Actions are risky because, in this context, the amount of 
media coverage that may be accorded to an action is uncertain. According to the 
expected utility model, the terrorist selects the action with the highest expected 
utility. Although representing a significant theoretical advance over the expected 
value criterion, the expected utility model does have limitations. Some of these have 
been overcome by further developments in the theory of decision-making under risk 
and uncertainty. Having developed an application of expected utility to the analysis 
of terrorists’ choice of action when media coverage is the desired but uncertain 
outcome, the following sections move beyond basic expected utility to models that 
permit particular features of the context to be explored more directly and in a 
manner that overcome some of the problems that have come to be identified with 
the basic expected utility model. 
4.3.2 Mean-Variance Expected Utility  
An alternative approach to basic utility analysis is computationally less burdensome, 
does not require the analyst to assume a particular utility function, and may be used 
to generate insights into the terrorist group’s choices without dispensing with the 
underlying logic of choice implied by the basic expected utility model. In addition, the 
alternative approach highlights aspects of the decision-making process that are not 
emphasised or easily dealt with within the basic expected utility framework. This 
alternative approach is the mean-variance utility analysis developed by Markowitz 
(1952) and Tobin (1958) and introduced into the economic analysis of terrorism by 
P. J. Phillips (2009). This section outlines mean-variance utility analysis and its 
implications for terrorist choice in a context where media coverage is the desired 
payoff. 
As Markowitz (1952, p. 77) explains, this approach begins with relevant beliefs about 
the future and ends with the choice of a particular action or a combination of actions. 
The basic expected utility model helps us to identify the flaws in assuming that the 
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terrorist or terrorist group must choose the action with the highest expected value. 
The basic expected utility model highlighted the need to consider the range of 
outcomes and their utilities and the probabilities with which they are expected to 
occur. The riskiness of each action is reflected by its distribution of expected 
outcomes. Because expected outcomes emerge not from thin air but from 
experience and observation, risk can be more easily represented by some measure 
of the variability of observed outcomes. Mean-variance utility analysis uses such a 
measurement of risk (i.e. variance) and highlights the relevance in the decision-
making process of both expected payoffs and the variance or risk of those payoffs. 
The terrorist or terrorist group interested in media coverage will consider both the 
expected media coverage and the variance of that media coverage when choosing 
their actions.  
This approach represents the terrorist group as forming preferences over alternative 
actions on the basis of just two relevant variables – mean or average payoff and 
variance (𝜎2); that is, the amount of media coverage expected to be generated by 
each alternative action and the divergence of the possible actual outcomes from that 
which was expected. The result is a much simpler mean-variance depiction of 
expected utility: 
𝐸𝑈 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎, 𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎
2 ) 
This simplified representation of expected utility produces approximately the same 
ranking or ordering of preferences that would be determined on the basis of a full 
expected utility analysis (see Levy & Markowitz, 1979; Kroll, Levy, & Markowitz, 
1984). However, the computational burden on both the analyst and the terrorist is 
decreased. All that is required is that the terrorists have some knowledge of the 
average media coverage that has been associated with previous terrorist actions and 
some knowledge about the ups and downs in media coverage that has been accorded 
to those actions. Sometimes a bombing, for example, will produce a lot of media 
attention, other times, especially if the bombing fails, there may be little attention 
accorded to it at all. Like other types of economic decision-makers, terrorists have 
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different preferences for risk and the actions they choose will be determined by their 
individual risk preference. 
Over time terrorist groups will use more than one attack method and, what is more, 
the aggregate of terrorist groups will use them all; therefore, the set of actions 
includes not only individual attack methods but many possible combinations of 
attack methods. Overlooking combinations means overlooking many of the 
alternative actions that are available to terrorists. The same reasoning applies to 
combinations as applies to individual actions: the terrorist or terrorist group will not 
necessarily choose the combination of actions with the highest expected amount of 
media coverage. The trade-off between risk and reward remains a fundamental 
feature of the choice problem. However, the nature of this trade-off is shaped in 
important ways when combinations of actions are possible. Most importantly, 
combining actions may result in more expected media coverage at each level of risk.  
The amounts of media coverage accorded to different actions move up and down in 
an imperfectly correlated manner over time. Figure 4.4 illustrates a hypothetical 
scenario for a combination of kidnapping and bombing. Kidnappings generally attract 
higher media coverage than bombings and both actions experience fluctuations in 
the amount of media coverage that can be expected. A combination of kidnapping 
and bombing may generate an expected amount of media coverage with less risk 
than either action taken individually. This is due to the dampening effects that 
imperfectly correlated payoffs have on each other; for example, at point a in Figure 
4.4, gains in media coverage from bombing can partially offset a decline in media 
coverage from kidnapping. As it is impossible to incur negative amounts of media 
coverage (terrorist groups cannot retrospectively lose media coverage that has 
already occurred nor can they lose media coverage they never had in the first place) 
combining the two actions may produce more media coverage over time with less 
variability or more certainty than would be possible without the combination.  
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Figure 4.4 Gains from Combinations 
 
The implications of this type of analysis for terrorism studies are far-reaching. Based 
on subjective assessments of risk, law enforcement agencies (and researchers) may 
conclude that some attack methods are less risky than others and, therefore, a 
terrorist group that chooses lower risk attack methods is more risk-averse and never 
likely to choose a higher risk attack method. This alignment of risk preferences with 
choices is not clear cut, however, even when much more technically sophisticated 
analysis is brought to bear. When risk is defined as variance, it may still be the case 
that a more risk-averse decision-maker will be observed to allocate resources to a 
higher risk (higher variance) prospect. This counter-intuitive outcome is explained 
only once it is realised that, over certain ranges at least, a higher proportion of 
resources allocated to a higher risk prospect combined with a lower risk prospect 
may result in a less risky (lower variance) combination (as in the example above). This 
result, the precise details of which are worked out by Mathews (2004, 2005), gives 
us some preliminary insights into the value that a more formal analytical approach 
such as the one presented here may hold. More risk-averse terrorist groups may 
choose higher risk attack methods in combination with lower risk attack methods. 
Subjective assessments of risk and risk preference are prone to errors that can be 
overcome by a more formal analysis.   
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Mean-variance analysis, then, depicts the terrorist or terrorist group as choosing 
from among alternative actions and combinations of actions by assessing: (1) the 
mean or average amount of media coverage that can be expected from an action or 
combination of actions; and (2) the risk or variance of the expected media coverage. 
For individual actions, mean and variance are easily computed. Although the average 
amount of media coverage that can be expected from a combination of actions is 
also easy to compute, the variance must take into consideration the imperfect 
correlation that has just been introduced into the discussion. The expected media 
coverage 𝜇𝑖 for a combination of actions 𝐸𝑐 is: 
𝐸𝑐 = ∑𝑤𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The proportion or weight of each individual action in a combination of actions is given 
by 𝑤𝑖. The risk or variance 𝜎𝑐
2 of a combination is:    
𝜎𝑐
2 =∑∑𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜌𝑖𝑗𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
∑𝑤𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 
The correlation structure of the media coverage accorded to different actions must 
be incorporated into the analysis. The degree of correlation between two different 
actions 𝑖 and 𝑗 is expressed by 𝜌𝑖𝑗, the weight assigned to each attack method by 𝑤𝑖 
and 𝑤𝑗, and the variance for each attack method by 𝜎𝑖 and 𝜎𝑗, respectively. Usually, 
two constraints are applied such that the sum of the weights assigned to the actions 
within a combination equals one and the assigned weightings cannot be less than 
zero.  
The mean-variance analysis implies that all of the terrorists’ alternatives, both 
individual actions and combinations of actions, can be depicted by their average or 
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expected amount of media coverage and their variance. In principle, all of the 
attainable alternatives can be depicted by a single picture such as Figure 4.5: 
 
Figure 4.5 The Terrorists’ Set of Alternatives as Mean-Variance Pairs 
 
For fixed probability beliefs  (𝜇𝑖, 𝜎𝑖𝑗)  the terrorist group has a choice of various 
individual attack methods and combinations thereof. The opportunity set of all 
obtainable risk-reward pairs, where reward is the expected amount of media 
coverage and risk the variance of coverage, is depicted as the shaded area in Figure 
4.5. Following Markowitz (1952, p. 82), the terrorist group would (or should) want to 
select individual attack methods and attack method combinations that are efficient 
and lie at the uppermost boundary of the opportunity set, indicated by a solid line in 
Figure 4.5. Efficient choices of attack methods or combinations of attack methods 
are those that have minimum risk for a given expected amount of media coverage 
(or more), or alternatively, choices that can be expected to return the maximum 
amount of media coverage at a given level of risk (or less).  
The process of computing an optimal or efficient opportunity set is formally 
described as the solution to the following quadratic programming problem: 
max𝐸𝑐 = ∑𝑤𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
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Subject to holding the level of risk for the combination of attack methods constant 
at 𝜎𝑐
∗:   
𝜎𝑐
∗ = √∑∑𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜌𝑖𝑗𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The problem is also subject to the constraint that the sum of the various weightings 
assigned to the attack methods within a combination must equal to one and that 
assigned weightings cannot be less than zero. When a number of iterations of this 
programming problem are completed, a number of efficient attack method 
combinations computed, and results graphed, the outcome is an efficient 
opportunity set as shown in Figure 4.6. It has the concave structure that emerges as 
a result of the imperfect correlation that characterises the media coverage accorded 
to different attack methods and the gains that can be obtained by the combination 
of two or more attack methods. The programming problem can be illustrated; for 
example, a randomly selected combination A will be associated with a particular level 
of expected media coverage and risk. The solution to the quadratic programming 
problem will determine the highest level of expected media coverage possible while 
keeping the level of risk constant. The solution to the problem takes us from the 
randomly selected combination A to the efficient combination B. Although the 
discussion so far has been purely theoretical-hypothetical, when empirical-historical 
data on media coverage associated with different terrorist actions is used as the 
foundation for an application of the type of analysis that we have been describing, 
an opportunity set that contains the terrorist group’s opportunities to obtain media 
coverage from deploying different combinations of actions emerges from the data 
and exhibits the same properties, especially concavity, that we have been discussing 
in our theoretical-hypothetical explanation of the method.  
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Figure 4.6 Sample Solution to a Quadratic Programming Problem 
 
The advantage of the Markowitz method is its clear geometry. So far, the terrorists’ 
complete set of alternatives and the efficient or optimal set of alternatives have been 
depicted. It is also possible to depict different types of terrorists or terrorist groups 
and show which region of the efficient set a particular type of terrorist will be more 
interested in choosing from. Figure 4.7 depicts a terrorist group’s preferences and 
risk profile as an indifference curve map superimposed over the opportunity set. The 
terrorist group is assumed to prefer more (expected) media coverage to less. The 
group is prepared to accept additional risk, up to a limit consistent with its risk 
preference, if the media coverage that is expected to result from the action increases. 
Obtaining the highest expected media coverage at a particular level of risk is what 
the group will be interested in and more media coverage with less risk is desirable. 
As such, utility increases in the direction of the arrow shown in Figure 4.7.  
Point 𝑀 shown in Figure 4.7 indicates actions which the terrorist group may choose 
in order to maximise the expected amount of media coverage at a particular level of 
risk. This is the point that maximises expected utility for the terrorist group. It will 
choose the attack method or combination of attack methods located at point 𝑀. 
Actions at the intersection with indifference curves 𝑢2  and 𝑢1  are sub-optimal 
choices. Actions which lie on indifference curve 𝑢4 may be highly attractive to the 
terrorist group but such actions are infeasible as they lie beyond the opportunity set 
and therefore are unavailable to the terrorist group. Although seemingly stylised, the 
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concave opportunity set can be determined empirically or analytically using historical 
data for the media coverage accorded to the results of various terrorist actions.  
 
Figure 4.7 Mean-Variance Utility Maximisation – An Example 
 
Mean-variance utility analysis depicts the terrorist as making decisions solely on the 
basis of the mean and variance of media coverage accorded to different terrorist 
actions. This might appear to be restrictive but the mean and variance reflect many 
aspects of the terrorism context. The average or mean of media attention that has 
been accorded to terrorist attacks in the past is the most likely foundation for the 
formation of terrorists’ beliefs about what media coverage may be expected to result 
from an action in the future. Variance reflects the chances that the actual outcome 
may vary from what was expected. In doing so, it encompasses to some degree all of 
those things that might cause such a divergence between expected and actual 
outcomes. Variance in media attention over time is due to a number of factors 
including: (a) editorial policies, decisions, and biases; (b) government restrictions on 
media reports on terrorism; (c) attacks perpetrated by other terrorist groups, where 
simultaneous or closely consecutive attacks by one or several terrorist groups may 
limit the media attention that will be accorded to any one of them; (d) other (more) 
newsworthy events crowding out reporting on relatively minor terrorist attacks from 
the news cycle; and (e) government security measures which may foil terrorist 
attacks and preclude what might otherwise have resulted in substantial media 
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attention; and everything else that effects the success or failure of terrorist actions.60 
All of these factors which produce variance in media coverage over time, for different 
actions and from action to action, must be reflected in the statistical variance of 
media coverage.  
4.3.3 Behavioural Model: Prospect Theory 
Both the basic expected utility model and mean-variance analysis can generate 
insights into terrorist choice under conditions of risk and uncertainty. In the analysis 
presented in Chapter 6, these models are operationalised using the data gathered 
for this thesis. This generates insights into the patterns of terrorist behaviour that 
might be exhibited in a context where media coverage is the desired payoff. These 
insights can be complemented further by the application of a behavioural model of 
choice under risk and uncertainty. Although there are many such models, prospect 
theory has emerged as the dominant descriptive or normative model of risky 
decision-making. In addition to encompassing some aspects of the risky decision-
making process that are overlooked in the orthodox models, prospect theory 
provides a richer theoretical framework with which to explore terrorist behaviour. In 
the context in which we are interested, this means providing additional insights into 
terrorist choices that are shaped in some way by a consideration of the media 
coverage that may result from an action or combinations of actions over time.  
Prospect theory overcomes one of the shortcomings of orthodox expected utility 
theory. This is decision-makers’ systematic tendency to weight probabilities 
nonlinearly. In particular, decision-makers tend to overweight unlikely outcomes and 
underweight more likely outcomes. For example, if the probability for an outcome is 
0.85, decision-makers might assign a weighting to the outcome of 0.81, whereas if 
the probability for an outcome is 0.10, decision-makers might assign a weighting of 
0.12. This is not an error in judgement but a decision-making bias. Decision-makers 
                                                     
60 For example, a bomb may not detonate at the planned time or it may not detonate at all; an 
assassination target may fail to arrive at the time or location expected; a hostage may escape; a flight 
intended for skyjacking is cancelled; a member of the terrorist group backs out of participating; 
weapons may jam. Conversely, the terrorist group may inflict more damage than expected, for 
example, more people are gathered at the target location than was anticipated. 
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are aware of what the probabilities imply about the likelihood of particular outcomes 
yet they choose to assign weights in the manner just described. This decision-making 
bias contradicts the independence axiom of basic expected utility which implies that 
probabilities are weighted linearly. Prospect theory is the most prominent 
behavioural model that attempts to incorporate this nonlinear weighting of 
probabilities into a descriptive model of the decision-making process under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty.  
In addition to providing one method for correcting this oversight of the basic 
expected utility model, prospect theory introduces several additional factors that can 
be used to generate insights into terrorist decision-making that are beyond the reach 
of the orthodox theoretical frameworks. The main findings of prospect theory can be 
summarised as follows (Levy & Wiener, 2013, p. 2): 
1. Most people violate the independence axiom and weight probabilities 
nonlinearly. 
2. People are concerned with changes relative to a reference point rather than 
absolute payoffs. 
3. People act to maximise the expected value function 𝑉(𝑥) which is S-shaped; 
concave for gains and convex for losses. The value function is steeper for 
losses than gains. People are loss averse and feel losses more keenly than 
gains.  
4. Subjective decision weights are assigned to probabilities and are employed 
in calculating expectations. In the cumulative version of the theory, 
cumulative probabilities are subjectively altered.  
Applied to terrorist choice in a context where media coverage is a desired payoff, 
prospect theory allows us to deal with a number of important aspects of the decision-
making process. Possibly the most important new insight emerges from a 
consideration of the reference point and its role in shaping the terrorists’ choice of 
action. For example, if another terrorist or terrorist group has recently received a 
particular amount of media coverage from an action, this amount may become the 
terrorists’ reference point against which the potential outcomes of alternative 
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possible actions are assessed. Prospect theory, then, allows us to consider how 
terrorists’ choices might be shaped with reference to the outcomes of actions 
perpetrated by other groups. The reference point may also be formed on the basis 
of outcomes generated by the group’s own prior actions. These actions, whose 
outcomes shape the group’s reference point, might have recently occurred or, 
alternatively, refer to a particular spectacular event from some time past. Of especial 
interest are those cases where rivalries between terrorist groups can be identified. 
In this case, each group may alternately shape the reference point of the other 
through the outcomes of its actions.  
Assessing outcomes against a reference point highlights the possibility that a terrorist 
group will potentially view some amount of media coverage, either small or large, as 
a loss if it is less than that reflected in the reference point. This deeper or more 
complex perception of gains and losses also extends to incorporate the way in which 
terrorists’ choices are shaped following an action that generates outcomes in excess 
of the reference point or, alternatively, below the reference point. If the group’s 
action yields an amount of media coverage in excess of the reference point (a gain), 
the group may be expected to become more risk-averse in order to consolidate or 
protect its gains. This will shape its choices of actions or combinations of actions, 
discouraging the group from engaging in actions with more variable (risky) outcomes. 
Conversely, a group whose action yields an amount of media coverage less than the 
reference point (a loss) may become more risk-seeking in order to recover or re-
establish its position. This may encourage the group to select more risky actions or 
combinations. This continuous interaction among groups in the terrorism context 
shapes and reshapes their choices of actions.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory in response to their 
experimental findings which showed that people systematically violate the 
predictions of expected utility theory, as described in points 1 to 4 above. Despite its 
impact and the fact that prospect theory is widely regarded as the best description 
of how people evaluate risk in experimental settings (Barberis, 2013, p. 173), 
Kahneman and Tversky’s original prospect theory model attracted some criticism, 
especially with regard to possible violations of stochastic dominance. Quiggin (1982) 
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identified the use of cumulative probabilities as the key to overcoming this problem. 
In addition, the application of the original version of the theory had been limited to 
gambles with at most two nonzero outcomes. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
overcame such limitations with the publication of a modified version of their theory 
known as “cumulative prospect theory” for which Daniel Kahneman was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in economic science61 in 2002.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992) proposed a new value function and a new 
probability weighting scheme to replace both the utility function and the way 
probabilities serve as weights in expected utility theory:  
𝑉 =∑𝑣(∆𝑥𝑖)𝜋(𝑝𝑖) 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the expected utility or value  𝑉 of a 
prospect is expressed in terms of two scales 𝑣 and 𝜋. The scale 𝜋 is a decision weight 
attached to each probability 𝑝𝑖. This scale changes the impact that a probability has 
on the value of a prospect and accounts for the observation that people tend to 
overweight small probabilities and underweight other probabilities. The scale 𝑣 
associates a subjective value (or utility) number with each outcome. The outcomes, 
or 𝑥’s, are not absolute values but changes (gains or losses) relative to a reference 
point. The core of cumulative prospect theory can be expressed formally as: 
𝑣(∆𝑥) = {
𝑣(∆𝑥)𝛼 ∆𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−∆𝑥)𝛽 ∆𝑥 < 0
} 
 
𝜋𝑖 = {
𝜋𝑖
− = 𝑤−(𝑝1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑖) − 𝑤
−(𝑝1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑖−1) ∆𝑥 < 0
𝜋𝑖
+ = 𝑤+(𝑝𝑖 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑁) − 𝑤
+(𝑝𝑖+1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑁) ∆𝑥 ≥ 0
} 
 
                                                     
61 Regrettably, Amos Tversky passed away in 1996 at the age of 59. Otherwise, he would surely have 
shared the Nobel Prize with Daniel Kahneman (Barberis, 2013, p. 173). 
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≔ 
{
 
 
 
 𝑤+(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛾
(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)1/𝛾
∆𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑤−(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛿
(𝑝𝛿 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛿)1/𝛿
∆𝑥 < 0
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each parameter is designed to accommodate one of the behavioural biases that 
typify decision-making under risk and uncertainty. The S-shaped value function that 
Kahneman and Tversky derive incorporates these properties. This S-shaped utility 
function is shown in Figure 4.8. 
 𝜆 is the loss aversion parameter which measures the intensity with which a 
person feels a loss of some magnitude relative to a gain of an equal magnitude. 
  𝛼 and 𝛽 are concavity and convexity parameters that reflect risk aversion and 
diminishing sensitivity.   
 𝛾 and  𝛿  reflect non-linear probability weighting (overweighting of unlikely 
outcomes and underweighting of more likely outcomes).  
 Tversky and Kahneman (1992, pp. 311-312) determine the following parameter 
and weighting values:  𝜆 = 2.25, 𝛼 = 0.88, 𝛽 = 0.88, 𝛾 = 0.61, and 𝛿 = 0.69. 
 
Figure 4.8 Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) S-shaped Utility Function 
 
Like expected utility theory and mean-variance analysis, prospect theory can be used 
to describe or predict how a decision-maker will order alternative risky prospects. 
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Prospect theory can also be used to retrace decision-making processes. This is 
accomplished for empirical data later in this thesis. For now, the following example 
serves to illustrate the main points of application. Consider a terrorist or terrorist 
group confronted with two alternative risky prospects, which may be two alternative 
terrorist actions with different expected amounts of media coverage. We know from 
findings proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992) that people do not 
consider probabilities in a linear fashion, but instead overweight small probabilities 
and underweight larger probabilities. This behaviour results in an inverse S-shaped 
probability weighting function as illustrated in Figure 4.9. It is a set of decision 
weights or transformed probabilities which in prospect theory are used in place of 
linear probabilities to weight the value that the decision-maker attaches to 
outcomes, formally 𝑤𝑝 × 𝑣(𝑥),  in the same way as expected utility uses linear 
probability to weight the utility of outcomes, formally 𝑝 × 𝑢(𝑥).  
 
Figure 4.9 Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1992) Probability Weighting function 
 
Consider a single risky prospect A, which might be a particular type of terrorist attack 
method, expected to generate media coverage. The action is a risky prospect with 
payoffs  𝑥𝑖   each expected to occur with probability 𝑝𝑖 where (𝑝1  + 𝑝2 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑛 =
1). For this example, media coverage will be measured in column inches. We consider 
a terrorist or terrorist group for whom an outcome of 14 column inches of media 
coverage represents the reference point for their decision-making process. An 
outcome higher than the reference point will be considered a gain, an outcome lower 
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than the reference point will be considered a loss. For example, if a terrorist incident 
successfully attracts enough media attention to warrant 2 column inches of media 
coverage, this would be treated as a loss by a terrorist group with a reference point 
of 14. Alternatively, an outcome of 16 column inches of media coverage would 
constitute a gain for the terrorist group with a reference point of 14. 
A series of outcomes for this hypothetical action along with the accompanying series 
of cumulative probabilities is listed in Table 4.3. Each cumulative probability is 
transformed using Tversky and Kahneman’s  (1992) power functions with the 
parameter values introduced previously: 
𝑤+(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛾
(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)1/𝛾
(𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠) 
 
𝑤−(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛿
(𝑝𝛿 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛿)1/𝛿
(𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠) 
 
The value of outcomes is determined by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) valuation 
function, keeping in mind that outcomes are not absolute values but are treated as 
either gains or losses relative to the terrorist group’s reference point: 
𝑣(∆𝑥) = 𝑣(∆𝑥)𝛼 (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠) 
𝑣(∆𝑥) = −𝜆(−∆𝑥)𝛽 (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠) 
 
The final step in the valuation process is to weight the values of outcomes by the 
decision weights and sum to determine the prospect value. Like expected utility, 
decision-makers compare or rank prospects according to prospect value. If the 
terrorist or terrorist group must decide between this prospect A and a second 
prospect B then the decision would be made by assessing each alternative and 
choosing the one with the higher prospect value. To complete the example, the 
details of a hypothetical alternative prospect B are presented in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.3 Cumulative Prospect Value for a Single Risky Prospect – A 
Media Coverage 
(column inches) 
Cumulative 
Probability 
w –/+ Δx (x - r) v(x) Weights x Values 
0 0.006209665 0.028922418 - 14 -22.9496 -0.6637802 
1 0.009815329 0.039187189 - 13 -21.5007 -0.8425521 
2 0.01513014 0.052045231 - 12 -20.0383 -1.0429006 
3 0.022750132 0.067761043 - 11 -18.5612 -1.2577321 
4 0.033376508 0.086508205 - 10 -17.0680 -1.4765216 
5 0.047790352 0.108348497 - 9 -15.5566 -1.6855390 
6 0.066807201 0.133225631 - 8 -14.0249 -1.8684844 
7 0.09121122 0.178061158 - 7 -12.4700 -2.2204346 
8 0.121672505 0.205028881 - 6 -10.8881 -2.2323930 
9 0.158655254 0.23314739 - 5 -9.27419 -2.1622538 
10 0.202328381 0.262230157 - 4 -7.62071 -1.9983794 
…      
15 0.50 0.420639354 +1 1.00000 0.420639354 
…      
20 0.797671619 0.605481263 +6 4.83919 2.93004175 
…      
30 0.993790335 0.932310376 +16 11.47164 10.69513086 
   Prospect Value = 58.78 
Note: Reference point 14, Mean 15, and Standard Deviation 6, 
with values for parameters and weightings according Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 
Table 4.4 Cumulative Prospect Value for another Single Risky Prospect – B 
Media Coverage 
(column inches) 
Cumulative  
Probability 
w –/+ Δx (x - r) v(x) Weights x Values 
0 0.001349898 0.010326024 -14 -22.94960 -0.236978159 
1 0.002979763 0.017667724 -13 -21.50070 -0.379868498 
2 0.006209665 0.028922418 -12 -20.03835 -0.579557603 
3 0.012224473 0.045273714 -11 -18.56129 -0.840338381 
4 0.022750132 0.067761043 -10 -17.06800 -1.156545165 
5 0.040059157 0.097042502 -9 -15.55664 -1.509655703 
6 0.066807201 0.133225631 -8 -14.02496 -1.868484465 
7 0.105649774 0.191386849 -7 -12.47007 -2.386606867 
8 0.158655254 0.23314739 -6 -10.88819 -2.53855266 
9 0.226627352 0.277095452 -5 -9.27419 -2.569836657 
10 0.308537539 0.322922135 -4 -7.62071 -2.46089524 
…      
15 0.773372648 0.585876465 +1 1.00000 0.585876465 
…      
20 0.977249868 0.861913817 +6 4.83919 4.17096882 
…      
30 0.999996602 0.999245488 +16 11.47164 11.4629865 
   Prospect Value = 75.88 
Note: Reference point 14, Mean 12, and Standard Deviation 4, 
with values for parameters and weightings according to Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 
The terrorist or terrorist group with a reference point of 14 accords a higher prospect 
value to prospect B. This ranking reflects the decision-making process embedded 
142 
 
within prospect theory, including loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity and reference 
point dependence. The reference point is particularly important in determining the 
order of preferences for a terrorist group. To see why, consider a different terrorist 
group characterised by a reference point of 22 rather than 14. Both prospects A and 
B are less likely to generate outcomes beyond 22 column inches (than beyond 14 
column inches). The domain of losses for a terrorist group with a reference point of 
22 is therefore much larger than the domain of losses for a terrorist group with a 
reference point of 14. As such, the prospect value accorded to both attack methods 
is lower for the terrorist group with the higher reference point. More importantly, 
however, the terrorist group with the higher reference point prefers prospect A to 
prospect B. A higher reference point switches the ordering of the two prospects.  
For a terrorist group with a reference point of 22, the prospect value for prospect A 
is –56.33 whereas the prospect value for prospect B is –70.21. The terrorist group 
with the higher reference point prefers the more risky action A (the action with the 
higher average payoff and higher standard deviation). Bearing the higher standard 
deviation is necessary for the terrorist group if it is to have any chance of generating 
an outcome in excess of its relatively high reference point. There are some prospects 
which more than fully meet the expectations of terrorist groups with very low 
reference points, or in periods when terrorist activity is subdued; whilst for other 
groups with higher reference points, or in periods of more intense terrorist activity, 
only much more risky actions will provide any opportunity at all to generate gains or 
outcomes in excess of the terrorist group’s reference point. This highlights the 
importance of reference point dependence in the analysis of terrorist choice.   
Surprisingly, there are still only relatively few well-known and broadly accepted 
applications of prospect theory in economics. The discussion presented in this 
section, however, highlights the ways in which prospect theory can complement 
orthodox analysis and help to develop a deeper understanding of decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty. One of the challenges that has confronted economists 
and psychologists in applying prospect theory, both in the laboratory and the field, is 
the difficulty of defining precisely what gains or losses are and what may constitute 
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a reference point in each setting.62  In the terrorism context that we have been 
discussing, plausible empirical reference points can be identified. One such reference 
point is the outcomes achieved by competing terrorists or terrorist groups. By 
assessing the media coverage that might be accorded to different actions against a 
reference point such as this, prospect theory becomes operational and capable of 
delivering insights into terrorist choice and the possible influence of inter-group 
competition on those choices. By incorporating reference point dependence, risk 
aversion in the domain of gains, risk-seeking in the domain of losses and loss aversion 
into a model of risky decision-making, prospect theory provides a deeper description 
of the decision-making process and is one which may be utilised to learn more about 
terrorist choice in a context where media coverage is the desired payoff to 
alternative actions. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In the terrorism and media studies literature, when analysis is directed towards 
terrorist strategy, it is usually implied that terrorists will choose the action that has 
yielded the highest amount of media attention in the past. As a model of terrorist 
choice this can only take us so far. The advances that have been made in decision 
theory in economics and psychology during the past five decades allow for the 
development of a much more sophisticated understanding of terrorist choice in this 
context. In this chapter, the basic expected utility model, the mean-variance 
expected utility model and (cumulative) prospect theory were introduced in order to 
explore more deeply the ways in which terrorist choice might be shaped by the media 
attention accorded to different actions.  
In the first instance, before applying decision theory to anything, it is recognised that 
terrorist actions are risky prospects with media coverage as the variable outcome. 
The amount of media attention, if any, accorded to an action is an uncertain outcome 
of terrorist activity. Terrorist actions include bombing, assassination, armed assault, 
hostage-taking, facility/infrastructure attacks and hijacking. Choices from among 
                                                     
62 For a comprehensive review of the literature and a discussion of recent efforts to apply prospect 
theory in a variety of contexts, see Barberis (2013). 
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these alternatives are the outcomes of decisions taken under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty. The choice process in economic theory is depicted as a process that 
produces an order of preferences. A number of different models have been proposed 
in the literature which can be used to determine such preference orderings. The 
analysis promises to shed more light on terrorist decision-making, the role of media 
coverage in shaping those decisions and the effect of various decision-making 
processes encompassed by the different decision-making models. 
The purely logical application of these models to this context already leads us to new 
conclusions regarding the patterns of choice that might be expected. The basic 
expected utility model leads us away from concluding necessarily that terrorists will 
choose the action that has been accorded the most media attention in the past. In 
addition, the importance of considering the decision-maker’s risk preference is 
highlighted. Even this basic model allows more to be said about terrorist choice in 
this context. It can be augmented further by the application of more advanced 
models of decision-making. Terrorist groups are observed to choose different actions 
over time and, more interestingly, to combine actions within periods or over time. 
Mean-variance analysis allows us to account for this observation and to provide it 
with a logical structure that leads us to realise that terrorist groups that combine 
actions, even naïvely or non-strategically, may expect higher media attention with 
less uncertainty than we might suspect had the correlation structure of media 
attention across actions not been considered. The opportunity set confronting 
terrorists is a concave set.  
The two orthodox models are complemented by prospect theory, which includes 
several additional variables that are not part of the orthodox frameworks. Terrorists 
are sometimes suspected to have copied or emulated the actions of other terrorists. 
Sometimes this is more than just a suspicion. It has been confirmed by the terrorists 
themselves. Prospect theory incorporates the concept of a reference point, which 
allows this type of behaviour to be explored. A terrorist group may observe the 
amount of media attention accorded to the actions of another group. The media 
attention accorded to the actions of this rival group may become the group’s 
reference point. Together with the concepts of loss aversion and risk aversion in the 
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domain of losses, particular patterns of terrorist choice are once more expected to 
emerge. In particular, a group may be observed to engage in higher risk actions in an 
attempt to record an amount of media attention that exceeds the reference point.  
The application of models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty to the 
terrorism and media context allows us to develop a deeper narrative regarding the 
patterns that terrorist choices may be expected to exhibit if media attention is a 
desired but uncertain outcome of terrorist activity. These patterns of choices may 
guide policy-makers and law enforcement agencies when they consider the actions 
of terrorists and terrorist groups in contexts where media attention is considered to 
be an objective of the terrorists’ actions. Although the models might appear formal 
and static, they can produce conclusions that pertain to the dynamics of terrorist 
decision-making. For example, by considering terrorist choice through the lens of 
prospect theory, a situation in which a terrorist group, which is known to have rival 
groups, perpetrates an action that is accorded a particular amount of media 
attention, the relative willingness of those rivals to engage in more or less risky 
actions may be inferred. Similarly, if a terrorist group is observed to perpetrate a 
particular combination of actions and media attention is known to be an important 
consideration for that group, the group’s preferences may be inferred from the 
choices that it has made. This picture, which has been developed purely logically in 
this chapter, is crystallised and developed more fully by applying, in Chapter 6, the 
decision-making models to the terrorism experienced in West-Germany during the 
1970s. The data that facilitates this development was gathered through substantial 
independent archival research. The steps that were taken in this regard are described 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5  - Data and Archival Research 
5.0 Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to explain the rationale for choosing the data set and 
to outline the procedures that were implemented in gathering and organising it. The 
objective of the study is to explore terrorist choice in a context where media 
coverage is the desired but uncertain outcome of terrorist actions. The patterns of 
terrorist choice that may be expected in such a context were outlined purely 
theoretically in Chapter 4. The picture that was developed in that chapter is further 
crystallised by using actual media coverage data to operationalise the models. The 
data gathered for this part of the study concerns the terrorism experienced in West-
Germany during the period from 1970 to 1980. This is a time and place that has 
attracted substantial interest within terrorism studies due to the nature of the 
terrorist groups that were concurrently active there and the relevance that they 
retain for contemporary analysis of terrorist behaviour, including the relatively 
sophisticated media strategies that certain groups are known to have had and the 
strategic competition that certain groups were known to be engaged in with each 
other.  
The operationalisation of the models of terrorist choice that were introduced in the 
previous chapter requires the measurement of some set of payoffs. When the 
relevant payoff is media attention, the measurement of the media attention 
accorded to different terrorist actions during the period under consideration is 
necessary. After detailing, using the GTD, all of the terrorist incidents recorded for 
West-Germany between 1970 and 1980, archival research was undertaken to gather 
each piece of media attention accorded to each attack. The resulting dataset of 
media coverage is unique and provides a rich picture of the nature of the terrorism 
experienced in West-Germany during this period. When used in conjunction with the 
models of decision-making introduced in Chapter 4, a deeper picture emerges of the 
patterns of terrorist choice that might be expected when media attention is a desired 
outcome of terrorist activity. In this chapter, the dataset and its collection process 
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are described and a rationale provided for the decisions that were made in 
undertaking this aspect of the project.  
5.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, the locations where the archival 
research was undertaken are described. Media coverage data is not publicly available 
and must be gathered by hand from either archives or online sources. In this case, 
the data was collected from archives stored in libraries in Berlin, Germany. Section 
5.3 provides a rationale for focussing on the West-German terrorism experience and 
presents a detailed description of the material gathered during visits to the archives 
in Berlin. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 outline practical considerations in gathering, storing 
and transporting data as well as collating, organising and measuring media coverage 
for the terrorist incidents perpetrated in West-Germany during the period from 1970 
to 1980. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.  
5.2 Description and Location of the Archives 
The data used in this study was collected from the archives of the Zentral-und 
Landesbibliothek Berlin and the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The data collection was undertaken at these 
locations during periods of intense archival work in 2012 and 2013. The nature and 
location of archival holdings and the circumstances and conditions of access is an 
important consideration relevant to the decisions made regarding scope of the 
research project as well as being among the most significant factors that impacts 
upon the data collection phase of an archive-based research program. A description 
of the nature and location of the archival holdings and the steps that must be taken 
in order to undertake archival research with those materials at those locations 
provides the context necessary for a full appreciation of the challenges characterising 
the data collection phase as well as providing the information necessary for the data 
collection phase of the project to be replicated. This is particularly important in the 
context of this project due to the redevelopment of a main library facility and the 
temporary location of archival material at off-site locations.  
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5.2.1 Zentral-und Landesbibliothek Berlin 
The Zentral-und Landesbibliothek Berlin is Germany’s largest public library, housing 
close to 3.4 million media. It is the city’s official library. Founded in 1995 through the 
fusion of the Amerika-Gedenkbibliothek at Hallesches Ufer (formerly in West-Berlin) 
and the Berliner Stadtbibliothek at Schlossplatz (formerly in East-Berlin), the Zentral- 
und Landesbibliothek Berlin is recognised as a symbol of success in the reunification 
of Berlin. At the time of writing, the Zentral- und Landesbibliothek Berlin is located 
at two distinct branches. Archival research at the Zentral- und Landesbibliothek 
Berlin as part of the data collection procedure for this study was undertaken at the 
Berliner Stadtbibliothek in the district of Berlin-Mitte. In the future it is possible that 
branches of the Zentral- und Landesbibliothek Berlin will be consolidated at a single 
location. Such a consolidation would represent another chapter in the history of the 
institutions that form the Zentral- und Landesbibliothek Berlin, a history that now 
extends many decades. 
The history of the Amerika-Gedenkbibliothek branch of the Zentral- und 
Landesbibliothek Berlin begins just after the Second World War. The library was a gift 
from the American people to the citizens of Berlin to commemorate their joint efforts 
in withstanding the blockade of the city by Soviet occupational forces in 1948 and 
1949. Designed by German and American architects as a public library, the Amerika-
Gedenkbibliothek was opened in 1954 in Berlin-Kreuzberg as a symbol for the 
freedom of education and opinion (Bildungs- und Meinungsfreiheit). Today, the 
Amerika-Gedenkbibliothek holds collections for the humanities and fine arts, fiction, 
film, music, the art library, as well as a children’s and young adult library and learning 
centre.  
The Berliner Stadtbibliothek is the older of the two branches of the Zentral- und 
Landesbibliothek Berlin. It was founded in 1901 and, in line with democratic reforms 
at that time, the aim was to make educational resources readily accessible to broad 
sections of the population. Today, the Berliner Stadtbibliothek is housed in a complex 
of heritage-listed buildings in Berlin-Mitte and includes the Ribbeck-Haus, Berlin’s 
oldest Renaissance building from 1624. The Berliner Stadtbibliothek holds collections 
for the fields of natural sciences, medicine, economics, urban studies and law, as well 
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as the centre for Berlin-Studien and Historical Collections. It is here that researchers 
can access microfilm, microfiche, and scanners to view archival copies of historical 
and modern newspapers circulated in Berlin.  
 
Exhibit 5.1: Entrance to the Berliner Stadtbibliothek 
   
Notes: the entrance to the Berliner Stadtbibliothek in Breite Straße in Berlin-Mitte features the 4.1m by 6.0m 
A-Portal (1965) by Berlin blacksmith artist and photographer Fritz Kühn (1910-1967). It shows the letter A in 
117 variations forming a so-called letter carpet (Buchstabenteppich).  
 
5.2.2 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz 
The Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (Berlin State Library) is the property of the Stiftung 
Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation) and Germany’s 
largest scientific universal library. The library holds and preserves more than 11 
million printed books and periodicals as well as 2.2 million items in special collections 
containing many unique manuscripts, music scores, maps, and autographs not only 
by classical composers and writers such as Johann Sebastian Bach, Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart, Ludwig van Beethoven, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, but also 
from other occidental (abendländische) and oriental historical sources, plus more 
than 10 million items on microfilm and 12 million images in the picture archives.63 
Holdings of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz have grown over 
a period of more than 350 years. Early collections were first made accessible to the 
public by the Große Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg in the Churfürstliche 
Bibliothek zu Cölln an der Spree, initially from the Apothekenflügel (apothecary wing) 
                                                     
63  Information obtained from the official website of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer 
Kulturbesitz at http://staatsbibliothek-berlin.de accessed 24 April 2016.  
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Exhibit 5.2: The Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz 
 
of his palace and later moved to a newly constructed Königliche Bibliothek (royal 
library) at boulevard Unter den Linden, where one of the current houses of the 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz is still located today. The history 
of the Staatsbibliothek closely parallels that of German history and over time the 
library has undergone various phases of establishment, neglect, expansion, damage 
through war, division, unification and finally restoration.  
In an effort to protect the collection from bombing, other damage, and pillage, 
significant parts of the library’s holdings were evacuated from Berlin to about 30 
different locations around the German Reich during the Second World War. After the 
war, much of the collection was returned either to the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer 
Kulturbesitz in Berlin-West or to the Deutsche Staatsbibliothek in Berlin-East. 
However, up to 400,000 items are believed destroyed, another 300,000 items are still 
missing or are located in libraries in Poland and the former Soviet Union. One graphic 
example of the separation of parts that could be considered to belong together is the 
original score of Beethoven’s 8th Symphony: the first, second, and fourth movement 
are located in Berlin, while the third movement is held in Krakόw, Poland. Conversely, 
intensive efforts are expended by the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer 
Kulturbesitz today to ensure that holdings, which found their way into the library’s 
collection through looting by National Socialists, are returned to their owners.   
In 1992, just a couple of years after the formal reunification of Germany, the two 
state libraries located both in the East and in the West of Berlin were administratively 
joined to form the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz. To achieve 
easier use of this large library across two different sites and locations, the branch at 
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Unter den Linden 8 is to develop into a historical research library encompassing 
collections to the end of the 19th century, while the branch at Potsdamer Straße 33 
will house collections from the start of the 20th century and form a modern research 
library. The buildings have undergone several rennovations. During the period when 
the archival research for this project was being undertaken, a further redevelopment 
of the institution was underway.  
To ensure that appropriately equipped facilities could be offered while building 
restoration and renovations were continuing, parts of the collection were housed off-
site at the storage magazine in Berlin-Friedrichshagen, while the newspaper archives 
and the children- and young-adult collections were temporarily housed in the 
Getreidespeicher (granery) at Westhafen, a large heritage-listed inland freight-port 
on waterways in Berlin-Moabit just north of the city centre (see Exhibit 5.3). Here, in 
the Zeitungsabteilung (newspaper department) of the Staatsbibliothek zu 
Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz, researchers can access original print copies of 
historical newspapers and scanned copies held on microfilm and microfiche. Print 
copies of historical newspapers are bound in large, heavy volumes and may be 
ordered for private viewing. For conservational reasons, photocopying of orginal 
newspapers is not permitted. Digital photographs may be taken, provided no flash or 
tripod is used. 
 
Exhibit 5.3: Westhafen, Temporary Location in 2013, Zeitungsabteilung 
   
 
5.3 Data Selection 
Drawing on the GTD, an overview of terrorist activity in Western Europe was 
presented in the second chapter of this thesis. This study of terrorist choice of action 
152 
 
in a context where media coverage is a desirable but uncertain outcome to terrorist 
activity focuses on those terrorist actions that were perpetrated within West-
Germany. Data regarding the timing and nature of these attacks (for example, 
perpetrators, attack type, target type) was sourced from the GTD. The attention that 
was accorded to these events by the West-German print media is used as the 
foundation for the economic analysis of terrorist choice in this particular context. 
Relevant data was gathered from the library archives described in the previous 
section. The next sections present a more detailed rationale of the time period 
chosen, the location of attacks, the print media selected and an explanation of other 
relevant contextual factors. The steps taken to gather, organise and measure this 
media coverage data are explained in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
5.3.1 Terrorism in West-Germany and East-Germany: 1970 to 1990 
From 1949 to 1990 Germany was divided into two separate states, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Both countries were 
governed by two very different political systems, each with contrasting conditions 
and requirements for press reports and freedom of expression. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
a very significant difference between the number of terrorist events reported in the 
GTD for West-Germany compared with reports for East-Germany over the same 
period. Given that journalistic practices and conditions for press reporting varied 
significantly between the two Germanys, data of terrorist events and resulting media 
attention cannot be meaningfully aggregated or compared. This thesis, therefore, 
focuses on terrorist events on West-German soil and the resulting media attention 
in West-German media only.  
5.3.2 Most Active Terrorist Groups in West-Germany 1970-1990 
In West-Germany between 1970 and 1990, a total of 270 terrorist attacks were 
perpetrated by more than 60 different terrorist groups. More than two-thirds (179) 
of these attacks were staged by just five major groups: the Red Army Faction64 (80),  
                                                     
64 Members of the Baader-Meinhof Group always referred to their group as the ‘Red Army Faction’ 
(RAF). Records in the GTD attribute attacks pre 1978 to the Baader-Meinhof Group and attacks from 
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Figure 5.1 Terrorist Incidents in West-Germany (FRG) and East-Germany (GDR), 1970-1990 
 
 
Table 5.1 Attacks by Five Most Active Groups in West-Germany, 1970-1990 
 RAF RZ IRA 2J CN Subtotal % of * Total* 
1970 1     1 10 10 
1971 2   1  3 60 5 
1972 7   2 1 10 71 14 
1973 7 1  2  10 67 15 
1974 3 5  2  10 77 13 
1975 2 8  1 1 12 80 15 
1976 1 7  2 5 15 79 19 
1977 5 8   1 14 78 18 
1978 1 2 10 1  14 82 17 
1979      0 0 8 
1980   4 1  5 31 16 
1981 6     6 43 14 
1982  5    5 50 10 
1983 1 1    2 50 4 
1984 6     6 55 11 
1985 17 5    22 79 28 
1986 8 8    16 84 19 
1987  2 1   3 43 7 
1988 1  3   4 80 5 
1989 9  7   16 100 16 
1990 3  2   5 83 6 
 80 52 27 12 8 179  270 
 
Revolutionary Cells (52), Irish Republican Army (27), 2nd June Movement (12), and 
Croation Nationals (8). Table 5.1 Attacks by Five Most Active Groups in West-
                                                     
1978 onwards to the Red Army Faction. In the interest of a clearer analysis, the attacks by the Baader-
Meinhof Group and the Red Army Faction will be aggregated under the label RAF. 
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Germany, 1970-1990Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show how attacks by these five groups 
were spread across the 20 years from 1970 to 1990 and the percentage of their 
attacks in aggregate of the total number of terrorist incidents perpetrated by all 
groups in West-Germany during each year of the period. 
 
Figure 5.2 Attacks by Five Most Active Groups in West-Germany, 1970-1990 
 
 
In aggregate, the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the five most active 
groups in absolute and as a percentage of terrorist activity perpetrated by all groups 
in Germany was about equal across both decades: 89 of 134 attacks (or 66.4%) during 
the 1970s and 85 of 130 attacks (or 65.3%) during the 1980s. The 1970s were a period 
during which five prolific terrorist groups were very much concurrently active in 
Germany. During the 1980s, on the other hand, individual groups appear to have 
withdrawn for much longer periods at a time and some groups, like the 2nd June 
Movement and the Croatian Nationalists, faded away altogether. This is important 
because concurrently active terrorist groups provide an opportunity for a unique 
application of prospect theory to the analysis of terrorist choice in a context where 
media coverage is a desirable but risky payoff and where groups may reference their 
own actions against the outcomes of actions perpetrated by other groups.  
The application of prospect theory promises to develop important and unique 
insights into different dimensions of terrorist choice in this context. One especially 
important aspect of terrorist choice that can be explored as part of this application 
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of prospect theory is the relevance of a terrorist group’s reference point in shaping 
its choice of action. As explained in the previous chapter, the reference point concept 
is analytically significant because decision-makers can and do view positively valued 
outcomes, which in this context would be a positive amount of media coverage, as a 
loss if it fails to exceed the reference point. The reference point shapes decision-
making. A terrorist group’s reference point may derive from its observations of the 
outcomes achieved by other groups.  In this context, the amount of media coverage 
that the terrorist group identifies as its reference point from which its alternative 
actions will be assessed may be the amount of media coverage obtained by a 
competing group’s most recent or most successful action. The context for this study, 
the Federal Republic of Germany for the period of the 1970s, provides a very unique 
context within which to explore this type of behaviour for the first time. This 
analytical rationale is augmented by the broader significance of the period in 
Germany’s modern history.  
The 1970s were a tumultuous period for many countries. The Vietnam War continued 
and, indeed, increased in intensity during the early part of the decade. Social unrest 
and upheaval emerging during the 1960s remained an important factor shaping 
domestic and foreign affairs. Economic problems, unfamiliar in the relatively 
prosperous post-war period and exacerbated by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1974, 
befell many Western economies. Although its economy remained strong for most of 
the time65 , the 1970s represented a period of significant political unrest in the 
Federal Republic of Germany culminating in the “German Autumn” (Deutscher 
Herbst) and its aftermath, which included the assassination of Federal Attorney 
General Siegfried Buback, the failed kidnapping and subsequent shooting of 
Dresdner Bank speaker Jürgen Ponto, a failed rocket launcher attack on the building 
of the Federal Attorney's office in Karlsruhe, and the kidnapping and subsequent 
murder of Employer Association President (Arbeitgeberpräsident) Hanns Martin 
                                                     
65 There was a sharp contraction in GDP in 1975 which interrupted the economic miracle Germany 
experienced after the Second World War. 
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Schleyer. These events attracted a significant amount of media attention and public 
interest over sustained periods.  
Although television66 became more accessible to a larger percentage of the German 
population during the 1970s and 1980s, the print media remained a dominant source 
for people’s daily news during the 1970s. According to a report by Der 
Bundesminister des Inneren in 1982 (cited in Schoenbach, 1987, p. 376), newspaper 
circulation in West-Germany grew by 41 percent from 17 million in 1965 to 24 million 
in 1979. On an average workday, newspapers (76%) were reaching about as many 
members of the West-German adult population as did television (77%), with radio 
audiences being somewhat smaller (69%) as reported by Media Perspektiven 1985 
(cited in Schoenbach, 1987, p. 385). While the rise of television has been 
accompanied by a fall in newspaper readership in many countries around the world, 
the effect has been far less prominent in Germany. A high newspaper readership of 
85 percent on an average workday in Germany in the mid-1970s declined by just 
5 percent over 20 years to 1997 (Atanassoff, 1997; cited in Schoenbach, Lauf, 
McLeod, & Scheufele, 1999, p. 226). Furthermore, the amount of time the average 
German adult spends reading a newspaper (40 minutes on a week-day) has remained 
surprisingly constant over many decades, prompting some commentators to 
describe Germany as a perennial “Zeitungsland” (a land of newspapers).67 
Many German citizens have traditionally commuted to and from work using public 
transport, often purchasing a newspaper on the way or taking a subscription copy 
from their mailbox to read while on the train or the bus, during meal breaks at work, 
and again on their way home in the evening. Even today, breaking or high-impact 
news stories are not merely distributed via online platforms or social media, but 
continue to form part of the news coverage contained in printed newspapers and 
their online equivalents. The decision to focus data collection and analysis in this 
thesis on terrorist attacks on West-German soil during the years 1970 to 1980 and to 
                                                     
66 In 1970, 68 percent of West-German households owned a television set. By the end of the 1980s 
the percentage had grown to 95 percent (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2008). 
67 See Media Perspektiven 1985 (cited in Schoenbach, 1987, p. 385). 
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examine press attention that resulted in the West-German print media finds strong 
rationale in the nature and characteristics of the media environment and media 
consumption trends of the period. The rationale for the choice of newspapers from 
which to gather the data for the analysis - Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt - 
can now be provided.  
According to 2014/2015 data published by the Bundesverband Deutscher 
Zeitungsverleger e.V. (Federation of German Newspaper Publishers), with 351 
different daily newspapers (of these 129 newspapers with Vollredaktion68, which 
publish 1,528 local editions), citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany enjoy the 
largest variety of newspapers in Europe, followed by Italy with 111 newspapers, 
Spain (110), the United Kingdom (94), France (84), Sweden (75), Norway (74), Finland 
(46), Denmark (30), the Netherlands (28), Austria (15), and Ireland (9). Of the younger 
members of the European Union, the Czech Republic (79), Bulgaria (61), Poland (35), 
and Hungary (30) have the largest variety of newspapers on offer. With 16.8 million 
daily newspapers sold, the German newspaper market is the largest in Western-
Europe followed, albeit with a significant gap, by Great Britain with a circulation of 
9.8 million. It is significant to note that while newspaper sales in Germany have 
dropped by about 29 percent over the past 38 years (from 23.5 million daily sales in 
1976 to the above mentioned figure of 16.8 million in 2014), the overall number of 
major daily newspapers has decreased merely by 7 percent (from 374 in 1976 to 351 
daily newspapers in 2014) while the number of regional and local editions increased 
by 88 percent (from 813 in 1976 to 1,528 in 2014).69  
With 374 major German daily newspapers and 813 regional and local editions to 
choose from in the 1970s, any number of combinations of papers could have been 
                                                     
68 German daily newspapers with Vollredaktion write the majority of their own content as opposed to 
printing content sourced from external editorial offices. 
69 M. W. Thomas (1980, pp. 7-10) lists print-media circulation figures for Germany in 1976 as well as 
relevant background information. He points to the introduction of the Pressefusionskontrolle (controls 
over fusions of the press) in 1977/78 as a significant milestone in the German print-media market. 
Pressefusionskontrolle regulations enabled the Bundeskartellamt to prevent take-over moves by large 
publishers (including Axel Springer), thus counteracting undue concentration of the press in the hands 
of just a few publishing houses.  
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selected for this project. It was necessary, within the constraints on time and 
resources that set limits on the scope of the project, to select newspapers in such a 
way as (a) to make the aggregation of data on media coverage meaningfully possible, 
(b) to capture the maximum number of readers, both nationally and internationally, 
while (c) seeking to include a representative cross-section of the population in terms 
of socio-demographic indicators as well as (d) a balanced mix of political leanings of 
newspaper editorial staff and readers. To satisfy the requirement for meaningful data 
aggregation, all newspapers selected are daily newspapers rather than Sunday 
papers or weekly news-magazines, such as Der Spiegel or Stern. All selected 
newspapers needed to have national, rather than regional, circulations and be sold 
internationally to ensure satisfactory scope of readership and reporting. A survey of 
the German print-media market in the 1970s (e.g. M. W. Thomas, 1980), identified 
the following major national, daily newspapers: Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, and Frankfurter Rundschau. Circulation 
data for these major newspapers was compiled from a range of sources70 and is 
shown in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 Major national, daily Newspapers in West-Germany 
Title Format & Distribution Circulation Leaning 
Bild 
daily (Mon-Sat), tabloid, 
broadsheet, national 
1966 
> 4 mill 
1972 
3.5 mill 
1978 
4.8 mill 
1993 
4.3 mill 
conservative, but also 
provocative and 
polarising 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(Munich) 
daily (Mon-Sat), 
broadsheet, national, plus 
approx. 150 countries 
- 
1976 
+300,000 
1978 
317,000 
1993 
304,499 
left-liberal, centre-left 
Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
daily (Mon-Sat),  
broadsheet, national, plus 
approx. 120 countries 
- - 
1978 
296,000 
1993 
391,013 
conservative, centre-right, 
economically liberal 
Die Welt 
(Hamburg) 
daily (Mon-Sat), national, 
plus approx. 130 
countries 
1969 
227,000 
1974 
224,000 
1978 
223,000 
1993 
209,677 
conservative, centre-right, 
economically liberal 
Frankfurter 
Rundschau 
daily (Mon-Sat), national, 
broadsheet, from May 
2007 tabloid format 
 
- 
 
- - 
1993 
189,000 
social-liberal, left-liberal 
 
                                                     
70 Circulation data and information: for Bild (Harenberg, 1980, p. 114); for Frankfurther Allgemeine 
Zeitung (Dürr, 1980, p. 63); for Süddeutsche Zeitung (Dürr, 1980, p. 63); for Die Welt (Harenberg, 1980, 
p. 114); for the Frankfurter Rundschau (Flottau, 1980); 1993 national circulation figures for all 
newspapers listed (Röper, 1993). Circulation figures for Bild and Die Welt were confirmed with Axel 
Springer corporate archives in Berlin in August 2016. 
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Given the strong circulation figures of Bild, it was immediately clear that this 
particular newspaper would need to form a part of the analysis. The inclusion of the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung was also an easy decision to make given the paper’s national 
and international reach, its relatively strong circulation figures, but most importantly 
the renowned quality of the paper’s journalism and editorials, the role that the paper 
played as “opinion-leader media” (Noelle-Neumann & Mathes, 1987, pp. 403, 405), 
and its contrasting counterweight to the sensationalist nature of Bild, a tabloid. 
Either the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, another reputable newspaper similar to 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung with regard to its leading role and “elite readership” 
(Noelle-Neumann & Mathes, 1987, p. 403; Schmutz, van Venrooij, Janssen, & 
Verboord, 2010, p. 504), or Die Welt could have been chosen to represent a 
conservative leaning, with each option presenting relative advantages and 
disadvantages. On balance, however, it was decided to include Die Welt for two main 
reasons: the broader international reach of Die Welt and, more importantly, the 
qualitative standing of Die Welt located in the medium range between tabloid, on 
the one hand, and reputable opinion-leader media on the other hand. Another 
important consideration was the more international nature of coverage in Die Welt, 
which was potentially more likely to include coverage of terrorist events perpetrated 
by transnational groups, such as the IRA, a very active group in West-Germany (see 
Figure 5.2 above). In order to further intensify collaborations between international 
press bureaus and to facilitate the exchange of staff cross-nationally, Die Welt 
together with Le Figaro in France, The Daily Telegraph in Britain, and the ABC 
newspaper in Spain, founded the European Dailies Alliance in 2001 (Rybak, 2001). 
Bild, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Die Welt are described in further detail below. The 
discussion and the references upon which it is based characterise the newspapers as 
they were in the 1970s, the time period relevant for this study. 
5.3.3 Bild-Zeitung (Bild) 
The Bild-Zeitung (literally: picture-newspaper), commonly referred to simply as Bild, 
has been Germany’s best-selling tabloid for over 60 years. The paper was founded by 
Axel Cäsar Springer (1912-1985) in 1952, who used the style and contents of high-
circulation British tabloids as a model for Bild. The paper, which initially consisted 
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mainly of pictures, brief captions, comic strips, short-stories, and horoscopes, is 
frequently described as Springer’s “gedruckte Antwort auf das Fernsehen” (printed 
response to television).71 Springer’s concept was simple yet ambitious: to create a 
paper which would be omnipresent, available at almost every street corner, 
inexpensive to purchase, quick to read, and one which would only contain content 
expected to be of interest to at least 90 percent of its readers (Konradin Medien 
GmbH, p. 2); that is, to print only content that was likely to increase the circulation 
of Bild and thus advertising revenue. 
In the 1960s, an unabashed Springer declared “the masses, not intellectuals” as the 
target-audience for Bild which increasingly contained stories about film stars, 
celebrities and sports rather than reports or analysis of a political nature. Springer 
backed the editorial stance of Bild with the following observation (Brumm, 1980, p. 
137): “Ich war mir seit Kriegsende klar, daß der deutsche Leser eines auf keinen Fall 
wollte, nämlich nachdenken” (Since the end of war it was clear to me that if there 
was one thing which the German reader definitely did not wish to do, it was to think). 
The concept for Bild as escapism and diversion from the humdrum and plights of 
everyday life was highly successful: a daily newspaper as authoritarian “friend and 
guide” to interpret selected events for the reader, to present ready-made views of 
the world, and even to tweak or invent stories, as needed.  As Germany’s only supra-
regional tabloid, Bild reached sales in the 1970s three times as high as those of all 
other German tabloids combined (Brumm, 1980, p. 130). 
From the outset, the editorial stance for Bild was conservative and nationalist, 
presenting the world in black and white, as Brumm (1980, p. 134) describes: the 
world presented to Bild readers is dominated by a perpetual fight of good against 
evil. Good are Christianity, an intact family life, reverence for authority, technical 
progress, economic growth and the free market […]. Evil on the other hand are 
communism and socialism, doubting technical progress or economic growth 
ideologies, as well as any restrictions imposed on private wealth – after all, anyone 
                                                     
71 See for example Brendel (2012). 
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who finds himself without means had clearly not worked hard or smartly enough. In 
many respects, Springer sought to impact and even change the nation’s psyche 
(“[den] Geist der Nation ändern”) and to influence German politics and political 
decisions (Brumm, 1980, pp. pp132-133; Konradin Medien GmbH). Bild as a 
“Kettenhund” (attack dog) had an important function towards this goal. Tensions 
between the Springer press and left-leaning ideologies and intellectuals were 
frequent, reaching a peak in the late 1960s when the Springer publishing house in 
Hamburg together with Bild delivery vans became the target in student protests, 
which often turned violent, characterised by slogans such as “Enteignet Springer!” 
(“Expropriate Springer!”).  
University academics, intellectuals, and university students remained a popular 
target of Bild under the editorial direction of Günter Prinz, editor-in-chief from 1971 
to 1980, many of whom in turn actively boycotted the paper. While the circulation of 
Bild did drop during the early 1970s, the paper with its mix of sex, facts and fiction 
from politics and crime, and consumer tips, never lost its position as Germany’s most 
widely recognised and most read daily. In fact, Bild quickly regained and even 
surpassed previous circulation figures by 1978. Populist and sensationalist coverage 
in Bild provided plenty of material for the paper’s critics and in addition rogue 
journalistic practices frequently attracted the attention of the German Press Council 
(Deutscher Presserat) founded in 1956. Where other German newspapers generally 
accepted critique gracefully and sought to facilitate the publication of opposing 
views, editors for Bild steadfastly refused to print reprimands issued to Bild by the 
German Press Council; neither did the paper entertain nor print counterstatements 
regardless of how well-grounded they may have been (Brumm, 1980, p. 142). 
As a result of such refusals and research revelations published by investigative 
journalist Günter Wallraff, who had conducted undercover research and editorial 
work in the Bild editorial office in Hannover for several months in 1977, the German 
Press Council entered a crisis and in 1982 ceased operation altogether (Deutscher 
Presserat, 2016a, p. 9). The organisation resumed operation in February 1985 but not 
until several publishers, including Bild, had agreed to abide by negotiated 
agreements, which to this day include the printing of German Press Council 
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reprimands in the next issue of the paper rebuked. Between the start of statistical 
records (in 1986) and 2015, merely one reprimand was issued to the Südddeutsche 
Zeitung (in 2001), just two to Die Welt (one each in 2002 and 2005), while Bild 
received 130 such reprimands.72   
5.3.4 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
In the 1960s, American Time magazine described the Süddeutsche Zeitung as the best 
German newspaper, while The Times of London proposed that the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung offered the best of West-German journalism (Dürr, 1980, p. 63). In October 
1945, a license for the Süddeutsche Zeitung was granted in Bavaria by the American 
allies and it was understood that the Süddeutsche Zeitung would neither be a general 
gazette devoid of opinion nor bound to any particular political ideology or world 
view. Since its inception, the number of commentators who describe the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung as either too ‘red’ or too conservative have been about equal in 
number and this balance has been maintained. The most common classification of 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung as “links-liberal” (left-liberal) is at best the “am wenigsten 
falsche Vereinfachung” (the least incorrect simplification, see Dürr, 1980, p. 62). The 
claim to be a liberal newspaper means in the first instance to allow different political 
opinions to be heard, to exclude extreme points of view on either end of the 
spectrum and thus to maintain liberal space along the spectrum where different 
political views may express themselves both in support of and in opposition to each 
other (Dürr, 1980, pp. 63-64).  
In 1947, Süddeutscher Verlag publishers developed out of the successful Süddeutsche 
Zeitung. The newspaper-arm Süddeutsche Zeitung remains its largest and most 
important product. Notably, the link between Süddeutsche Zeitung management and 
the publishing house is not one single editor-in-chief, but rather a six-member council 
of editors who routinely discuss all important matters and seek to arrive at joint 
decisions. An important principle upheld by the editorial office is the strict separation 
                                                     
72 See: Deutscher Presserat (2016b). 
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of opinion from news. In the Süddeutsche Zeitung this principle is realised with its 
Seite 4. This ‘page 4’ is exclusively reserved for commentary and opinion pieces. 
Seite 3 is another trademark of the Süddeutsche Zeitung. ‘Page 3’ is reserved for 
feature articles and reports contributed by editors and foreign correspondents and 
provides substantial background information on selected issues. Readers of the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung can be confident that they are accessing comprehensive news 
coverage of highest journalistic quality.73 Overall, no other comparable German daily 
newspaper meets the obligation of comprehensive chronicling of events as keenly as 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung while strictly avoiding political indoctrination of their 
readership (Dürr, 1980, pp. 74, 79).  
5.3.5 Die Welt 
Die Welt newspaper was founded by the British occupying forces in Hamburg in 1946. 
German press license holders had a vision for Die Welt as a journalistic bridge to other 
nations, their peoples and ways of life and thinking – something new for German 
citizens in 1946 who for twelve years had been presented with a distorted picture of 
the world (Sasse, 2012, p. 3). As soon as 1946, a foreign correspondent was sent to 
London and early links were formed to London’s The Times news service. While Die 
Welt did not quite develop into a German version of The Times, Die Welt has 
continued to follow more of an international and especially English language outlook 
than other German dailies. As mentioned previously, allied British interests in West-
Germany after the Second World War were often targeted by the IRA, which was one 
of the most active groups in West-Germany during the 1970s. The international 
scope and implications of these activities may be considered to have been relatively 
more comprehensively encompassed by the reporting of Die Welt. In addition to its 
circulation and reader demographics, this provides an additional rationale for the 
choice of Die Welt as a print media source for the analysis presented in this thesis.  
                                                     
73 The following example may serve to illustrate the thoroughness of Süddeutsche Zeitung journalists: 
after receiving 2.6 Terabyte of confidential data from a lawyers’ office in Panama, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
journalists worked with a team of around 400 colleagues and in collaboration with the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists for more than 12 months to examine the data carefully before 
publishing a report on the Panama Papers in the evening of 3 April 2016. 
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In 1953, the by then well-established and successful Die Welt was taken over by Axel 
Springer who through this hotly contested purchase sought to acquire a newspaper 
that would appeal to the educated middle-class and thus complement his already 
very successful Bild newspaper for the masses (Sasse, 2012, p. 1). The purchase made 
Springer the most powerful newspaper proprietor in Germany. Somewhat 
controversially, Springer reinstated Die Welt’s very first editor-in-chief, Hans Zehrer, 
who had been dismissed from office in 1946 after it became apparent that Zehrer 
had published Die Tat, a reactionary-racial monthly magazine in the Third Reich, and 
had since been viewed as a “Steigbügelhalter” (lit. stirrup holder) for the Nazis; in 
other words, as somebody who had aided the Nazis’ rise to power.   
Under the direction of reinstated editor-in-chief Hans Zehrer, Die Welt developed a 
style that at least outwardly appeared independent and above party lines, 
representing a middle-class, liberal-conservative profile (Sasse, 2012, p. 3). Despite 
Zehrer’s ultra-conservative background he appeared to tolerate a wide range of 
views which lent Die Welt a flair that was both lively and interesting. The relationship 
between Hans Zehrer and Axel Springer became less amicable in ensuing years. 
Nevertheless, Zehrer remained editor-in-chief with Die Welt until shortly before his 
death in 1966. Axel Springer appears to have led his media empire with an underlying 
authoritarian style, taking care that all Springer publications, including Bild and Die 
Welt, followed a philosophy encompassed by four principles, (Harenberg, 1980, p. 
118; Sasse, 2012, p. 3): „Engagement für die deutsche und europäische Einheit, 
Aussöhnung mit den Juden und Unterstützung der Lebensrechte des Staates Israel, 
Einsatz für die freie und soziale Marktwirtschaft sowie Bekämpfung des politischen 
Totalitarismus gleich welcher Richtung” (Engagement for German and European 
unity, reconciliation with the Jewish peoples and support for the rights of the State 
of Israel, commitment to a free social market economy and the fight against political 
totalitarianism regardless of its nature; translation to English by the author). 
During the turbulent 1960s, Die Welt adopted a strongly right-leaning course and 
from 1965 the subtitle “Große nationale Zeitung” (major national newspaper). Staff 
were selected who seemed able and willing to follow this new direction and who 
would assist in fighting fashionable leftist tendencies (“modische Links-Strömung”) 
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where liberty is confused with debauchery or a reins-less ride (“Freiheit mit 
Libertinage, einem Ritt ohne Zügel”) (Sasse, 2012, pp. 3, citing former editor in chief 
Matthias Walden). More liberal feature writers soon left Die Welt and a period of 
high staff turn-over ensued.  
In a half-page text in the newspaper’s edition from 31 December 1974, Die Welt 
provides a description of the role it sees for itself: “Der Wind hat sich gedreht./ Viele 
Menschen in unserem Land sind der ideologischen Herausforderung müde./ Sie 
suchen wieder nach der Bewahrung des Bewährten./ Sie verlangen nach Sicherheit 
vor radikaler Gewalt./ Sie wollen einen Staat mit Autorität./ Sie fragen nach Ordnung 
in Freiheit./ [...] DIE WELT ist immer für die Bewahrung des Bewährten eingetreten./ 
DIE WELT ist deswegen heute die Zeitung von morgen“ (The wind has changed./ Many 
people in our country are tired of the ideological challenge./ They are searching again 
for the preservation of that which has proven its worth./ They demand security from 
radical violence./ They want a state with authority./ They are asking for order and 
freedom./ […] DIE WELT has always advocated for the preservation of that which has 
proven its worth./ Therefore, DIE WELT is today the newspaper of tomorrow.) 
(German text: Harenberg, 1980, p. 119; translation to English by the author). 
Die Welt was not a profitable venture for Axel Springer and faced strong competition 
from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and to a lesser degree from the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung. Nevertheless, Die Welt was considered an important part of the Springer 
portfolio and was retained under a substantial investment of resources (for details 
see Harenberg, 1980, p. 123). In a radio interview in April 1976, Axel Springer 
described the situation of Die Welt as that of a difficult yet favourite child. He 
believed that in a unified Germany, with Berlin as the capital, Die Welt could have 
emerged as the most successful Springer publication with political radiance for a new 
and reasonable Germany. Instead, the paper had found itself a victim of political 
developments (Harenberg, 1980, p. 126). 
5.4 Data Collection, Storage and Transport 
Media coverage accorded to acts of terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany for 
the period from 1970 to 1980 was collected from the three newspapers: Bild, 
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Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt. The starting point for the data collection process, 
however, was the GTD. From records contained in the GTD, a list was created of all 
terrorist acts perpetrated on the soil of the Federal Republic of Germany between 
1 January 1970 and 31 December 1979 (n = 272). Acts for which the perpetrator(s) 
remain unknown were excluded (n = 138). Also excluded were those acts for which 
the perpetrators had been identified, but for which neither the number of persons 
killed nor the number of persons injured are known (n = 22), leaving the total number 
of acts to be examined as n = 112.  For each of these 112 acts, respective media 
coverage in Bild (Berlin edition), Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Die Welt was examined. 
For each act, media coverage was counted during all consecutive days of coverage 
and across all pages within each newspaper issue up to the point at which the first 
break in media coverage occurred; ‘break’ being the first issue of each newspaper 
during which no coverage of the event occurred at all, regardless of whether or not 
reporting about the event was picked up again within days or weeks after the initial 
break in coverage.  
Archives held at the Zentral- und Landesbibliothek Berlin were visited during 
June/July 2012 to assemble relevant media coverage in Bild, and again in 
September/October 2013 to collect relevant data from Die Welt. The newspaper 
archives held by the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz at 
Westhafen were visited during August/September 2013 to assemble relevant media 
attention in the Süddeutsche Zeitung. A further visit to Berlin in July/August 2016 
permitted final checks, including confirmation of newspaper circulation figures with 
Axel Springer corporate archives. 
Archival records for all three newspapers were accessible on microfilm. Starting with 
the date on which each attack was perpetrated as indicated by records in the GTD, 
relevant boxes of microfilm were assembled for each of the three newspapers. Then, 
using microfilm-readers in each location, all pages of each newspaper were visually 
scanned for coverage pertaining to each of the 112 single attacks of relevance. Once 
relevant reporting was visually identified, the entire newspaper page was 
electronically scanned and stored on a flash-drive, mostly in PDF format. Because of 
the large physical dimension of each single page in the Süddeutsche Zeitung and in 
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Bild, as well as the small news print in the Süddeutsche Zeitung and in Die Welt, each 
newspaper page often required multiple electronic scanning attempts (a) to enlarge 
the print to a level that was readable to the naked eye and allowed visual 
confirmation that an article did in fact contain relevant coverage, (b) to achieve a 
clear lens focus, and (c) to adjust suitable black and white contrast levels. Steps (b) 
and (c) were necessary to ensure adequate readability of all text when, in later steps 
undertaken once I had returned to Australia, each page was to be physically printed 
and relevant data measured.  
In total, over 570 newspaper pages containing relevant media coverage were found, 
prepared for scanning and collected from Bild, 470 from the Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
435 from Die Welt. Locating (and not missing) relevant media coverage for 112 
different acts of terrorism across three different newspapers in print required high 
levels of concentration, work with many dozens of microfilms and the visual 
scanning, and often detailed reading, of over 15,000 pages of newspaper text in the 
German language. Having completed the task of data selection and collection, I 
returned to Australia with approximately 1,475 carefully named individual files of 
relevant media coverage to commence the task of data measurement.  
5.5 Data Measurement 
In Australia, all 1,475 electronic copies of collected newspaper pages were 
individually printed on A4 paper. Again, every single page was visually scanned, read 
in detail where required, and all relevant areas of news coverage marked; often with 
the help of a magnifying light. Included in the assessment of relevant space of media 
coverage were: headlines, subheadings, text, photos and white spaces within each 
news article. If the article was framed by lines, the white spaces inside the lines and 
the lines themselves were included. If the article was not framed, only 50 percent of 
the white space between relevant text and unrelated passages were included. If a 
newspaper page contained more than one article of text, each area was marked 
individually, excluding all unrelated space. At the conclusion of this process, each 
page had been adequately prepared for actual data measurement. 
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Of course, A4 printed copies of newspaper pages do not represent the actual size of 
a newspaper. However, as entire newspaper pages had been scanned from the 
microfilm archives held in Germany, it is possible to determine the percentage of 
space that each story takes up on a page. This percentage can then be applied to the 
physical dimension of an actual paper copy of each newspaper to arrive at the 
physical area a story had taken up. Historical paper copies of each newspaper were 
available for viewing in the reading room of the Staatsbibliothek zu 
Berlin/Preußischer Kulturbesitz at Westhafen and physical measurements taken. 
Results are shown in Table 5.3, which also includes conversion of an area measured 
in square millimetres (mm2) to one measured in column inches (c”).  
A column inch is a unit of space one newspaper column wide by one inch high. In the 
United States, a common newspaper column measurement is about 11 picas (or 1.83 
inches) wide. One inch equals 25.4mm. Consequently, an area measured in column 
inches can be converted to an area measured in mm2 (or vice versa) as follows: 1 
column inch (c”) = 1 x 25.4mm x 1.83 x 25.4mm = 1,180.6428mm2.  
 
Table 5.3 Newspapers' Physical Dimensions 
Newspaper Sample* Dimensions of printable area per page  1 page in mm2 1 page in c” 
Bild (Berlin) 1975 H 518 mm x W 365 mm 189 070 160.142 
Die Welt (Hamburg) 1975 H 520 mm x W 360 mm 187 200 158.558 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (München)  1975 H 470 mm x W 350 mm 164 500 139.331 
Precise dates of above samples: Bild (29.4.1975 Nr 99), Die Welt (2.5.1975 Nr 101), Süddeutsche Zeitung (5.5.1975 Nr 102)74 
 
The area taken up by relevant media coverage on the printed copies of newspaper 
pages was initially measured in square millimetres and then converted to a 
percentage of the printed page. The step of measuring was time consuming as many 
newspaper articles are irregular in shape as shown in the page samples depicted in 
Exhibits 5.4 to 5.6. Consequently, the area of many articles needed to be measured 
in several smaller blocks before the whole area of relevant media coverage could be 
                                                     
74 Care was taken to ensure that the physical copy selected for each newspaper was representative of 
the time period relevant for this study. 
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determined. Upon completion of the data measurement task, data were entered into 
a spreadsheet in percentage figures and then converted to column inches in 
preparation for data analysis and, specifically, to be used as representative payoffs 
for terrorist actions in a context where media coverage is desired by terrorists and 
terrorist groups, but remains a risky and uncertain outcome of any prospective 
terrorist activity.   
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Exhibit 5.4: Front Page Bild dated Thursday 8 September 1977 
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Exhibit 5.5: Front Page Süddeutsche Zeitung dated Friday 2 September 1972 
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Exhibit 5.6: Front Page Die Welt dated Wednesday 2 August 1977 
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5.6 Conclusion 
Existing studies of media and terrorist activity implicitly assume that terrorists can 
manufacture guaranteed amounts of media coverage from engaging in certain acts 
of terrorism. This overlooks the fact that media coverage is risky and uncertain. An 
attack may fail to produce any coverage at all or may fail to produce as much 
coverage as expected or may fail to produce enough coverage to exceed a terrorist 
group’s reference point. Conversely, a terrorist action may be accorded far more 
coverage than the terrorist group had expected. The models of choice under risk and 
uncertainty introduced in the previous chapter are applied to this context in order to 
shed more light on important points such as these and provide an alternative 
theoretical standpoint from which to study such significant problems as a potential 
symbiosis between the media and terrorist groups.  
The models of choice under risk and uncertainty, expected utility theory, mean-
variance expected utility theory and the behavioural model, prospect theory, depict 
the choice process in different ways. Each model, however, requires some set of 
payoffs to provide the foundation for the decision-maker’s choices and subsequent 
actions. To analyse terrorist choice of action in a context where media coverage is 
the desired but risky and uncertain payoff requires a dataset consisting of the 
amount of media coverage accorded to different types of actions that represents the 
data available to the terrorist groups choosing which actions to perpetrate. The 
terrorist group need not possess the full dataset but must be plausibly aware, for 
example, that a certain competing group had achieved a particular outcome or that 
a particular type of action had been associated with some amount of media coverage. 
Previously, the sophistication in this regard of the active terrorist groups in the 
Federal Republic of Germany during the 1970s has been pointed out. Among other 
things, this provided a part of the rationale for choosing this particular context for 
analysis.  
In this chapter, the data collection process was described. Starting with a complete 
set of terrorist actions perpetrated by known offenders with known outcomes 
undertaken in the Federal Republic of Germany during the period from 1970 to 1980, 
the amount of media coverage accorded to each of these actions was collected. 
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Three newspapers, chosen among other things on the basis of circulation, 
demographics, political orientation and reporting scope, were selected as the 
representatives for this media coverage. The three newspapers are Bild, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and Die Welt. During periods of intense archival research, working with both 
physical newspaper holdings and micro-film holdings, many thousands of pages of 
newsprint were examined and hundreds collected from these three newspapers for 
each of 112 distinct terrorist incidents reported by the GTD. The precise dimensions 
of these articles was subsequently measured and converted into standard 
newspaper-specific statistics of space percentage and column inches. The outcome 
of this data collection process, this final dataset, is presented in the following chapter 
along with its application as the foundation for the analysis of terrorist choice of 
action in a context where media coverage is the desired but risky and uncertain 
payoff to terrorism.    
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Chapter 6  - Results and Discussion 
6.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty were introduced 
to develop new insights into the patterns that may characterise terrorist choice when 
terrorists are concerned with generating media attention by terrorist activity. In this 
chapter, data gathered from archives in Berlin is used to operationalise these models 
within the terrorism context experienced by West-Germany in the 1970s. The news 
stories that constitute the dataset reveal very clearly the dynamic nature of terrorism 
and the media attention that is accorded to it. Each terrorist incident recorded during 
the period is part of a wider social context that can be easily obscured in purely 
statistical analysis. In this chapter, details of particular attacks and the news stories 
that accompanied them are included alongside the more technical work so that a 
more complete picture of terrorism in all of its starkness and the reality of the impact, 
or lack thereof, of individual terrorist attacks can be more fully appreciated. 
The media attention that is accorded to acts of terrorism is a complex phenomenon 
encompassing a number of problems and issues. Terrorist groups seek media 
attention but they cannot guarantee that any particular action will be accorded a 
certain amount of attention. Media attention is, from the perspective of the terrorist 
group, desirable but uncertain. The context in which acts of terrorism are 
perpetrated and in which acts of terrorism are reported upon in the media is complex 
and dynamically evolving. The amount of attention received by any single act of 
terrorism varies over time as too does the amount of attention received from 
different alternative actions. The overarching objective of this thesis is to determine 
the patterns that may characterise terrorist choice by applying several different 
models of the decision-making process and determining, through the lenses provided 
by those models, the ways in which terrorist choice of attack method or action may 
be shaped by the media attention that terrorism receives. This chapter complements 
the purely theoretical discussion presented in Chapter 4 and crystallises the patterns 
of terrorist choice that were identified in that chapter.  
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6.1 Overview of the Chapter 
Section 6.2 presents detailed statistical results of the archival research conducted 
into the media coverage of terrorism in West-Germany during the period from 1970 
to 1980, both by attack method category and by media outlet. The inherent 
variability of media attention accorded to terrorist acts is demonstrated and 
highlighted by providing the background story of several pertinent historical 
examples of terrorist acts perpetrated in Germany. In Section 6.3 terrorist choice 
under conditions of uncertainty are examined and discussed by applying 
complementary analytical models of decision-making to the empirical dataset 
collected in German archives: (1) expected utility theory, (2) mean-variance analysis 
and (3) prospect theory. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter.  
6.2 German Print Media Coverage of Terrorism 1970 to 1980 
By the middle of July 1972 no less than 17 bombings had been perpetrated on West-
German soil in just over five months. Averaging almost one bombing per week, some 
of these terrorist actions barely raised a flutter in the German print media. However, 
on Saturday 20 May 1972, German citizens passing their regular newsstand could not 
have helped noticing the large headline announcing “Zwei Bomben im Springer-Haus 
explodiert” as well as three photographs: a small image showing damage to the 
façade of the Springer Publishing House in Hamburg, a much larger photograph of a 
male person lying on an ambulance stretcher with his eyes closed and blood 
streaming along his face and immediately to the left a third photograph positioned 
in the centre of the page. It resembles a police mugshot, shows a male person aged 
about 35 and is entitled with the headline “Dreifaches Mordgeständnis vor der 
Berliner Kripo” (tripple confession to murder in front of the Berlin Criminal 
Investigation Department). It is not immediately clear if the bombing and the 
murders are related, but it is likely that many people passing the newsstand would 
have stopped, read further and possibly purchased a copy of Bild before starting into 
the Pfingsten (Pentecost) long weekend.  
On the morning of Tuesday 23 May, a large front-page headline in Bild reports 
queues of many kilometres in length as 500,000 West-Germans and 70,000 East-
177 
 
Germans returned across border checkpoints of the divided country after visits “to 
the other side” over the long Pentecost weekend. A photo showing destroyed 
carriages of a roller coaster ride which had derailed in Bayreuth causing three deaths 
can be seen in the centre of the page. Barely 5% of the front page are taken up by a 
small commentary article with only indirect reference to the Springer House 
bombing. A significant drop from the previous issue of Bild where almost 40% of the 
front page were devoted to the bombing incident. Springer’s other daily newspaper 
Die Welt continues front page (26.07%) news of the bombing for a second day, while 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung moves the event from the first page after the initial 
reporting day. Together, the three newspapers devote 515.20 column inches (c”) to 
the bombing of the Springer Publishing House. This amount of 515.20 c” is 
substantially higher than the 4.90 c” accorded to the bombing of the Yugoslav 
Consulate in Munich on 15 June 1972, but low in comparison with the 925.42 c” 
devoted to the bombing of US Army Headquarters in Heidelberg on 24 May 1972.  
The total amount of media coverage accorded to bombing and the other attack 
method categories delineated by the GTD was determined using the data collected 
and measured as described in Chapter 5. After the data had been entered into an 
Excel spreadsheet it resulted in a substantial data-file of just under 4,000 rows and 
64 columns. The spreadsheet now contained the amounts of media coverage (c”) 
accorded by each of the three newspapers (Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt) 
to each of the seven attack method categories individually on each day in the 10 year 
period from 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1979. Data for individual days were 
summed per newspaper and per attack method to provide data for each of the 120 
months in the period under investigation. The aggregated results for the entire 
period, 1970 to 1980, are presented in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1 Media Coverage by Attack Method on West-German Soil, 1970-1980 
 % of Total 10yr c" Totals Bild c" SZ c" Die Welt c" 
Hostage Taking 0.5737 29595.62 10696.81 8809.05 10089.76 
Assassination 0.2709 13975.92 3794.76 5085.14 5096.03 
Bombing /Explosion 0.0727 3748.67 1836.09 1004.83 907.75 
Armed Assault 0.0346 1783.70 784.49 816.19 183.02 
Hijacking 0.0263 1355.88 553.05 346.38 456.46 
Facility /Infrastructure Attack 0.0216 1113.21 375.93 431.37 305.91 
Unarmed Assault 0.0003 13.61 0.00 8.16 5.45 
 1.0000 51586.61 18041.13 16501.10 17044.37 
  % of Total 0.349725106 0.319871851 0.330403043 
  Position 1 3 2 
 
Table 6.1 lists all relevant attack method categories and the respective media 
coverage (c”) that was accorded to each category by each of the three newspapers 
Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt individually and in aggregate during the 10 
year period under consideration. Attack method categories are listed in descending 
order according to the relative share of media attention accorded to each. For 
example, during the period from 1970 to 1980, the category Facility/Infrastructure 
Attack received merely 1,113.21 c” (2.16%) of the 51,586.61 c” (100%) grand total of 
media attention accorded to all attack method categories combined. It is interesting 
to observe that the relative share accorded by Bild to each of the seven attack 
method categories follows the aggregate order exactly. Apart from a small variation, 
the same is true of Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt. Further, it is interesting to note 
that each of the three newspapers contribute about equally to the overall coverage 
of terrorism; that is, 35% of all space (c”) devoted to the coverage of terrorist attacks 
over the 10 year period occurred in Bild, 33% in Die Welt, and 32% in the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, respectively. No evidence is found for a significant difference between the 
space accorded to the reporting of terrorism incidents in tabloid, high-quality and 
medium quality newspapers. Finer differences exist, of course. For example, while 
many column inches in Bild can be taken up by super-sized headlines and numerous 
photographs, comparatively more space is devoted in the Süddeutsche Zeitung to 
reports and discussions of more substantial length printed in smaller text font sizes. 
Bombing received the third highest amount of media coverage in each of the three 
newspapers individually and in aggregate making up 7.27% of the grand total 
(51,586.61 c”) of media attention accorded to all attack categories combined. Two 
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other attack methods received more attention than bombing, both in aggregate and 
in each of the three newspapers individually. They were the categories Hostage-
Taking (57.37%) and Assassination (27.09%). Added together, these two attack 
method categories made up 84.46% of the media attention accorded to all attack 
categories combined over the 10 year period from 1970 to 1980. 
The media attention accorded to assassinations was high, but as was the case for 
bombings, considerable variation can be observed in the coverage of individual 
assassination incidents. For example, an assassination attempt on Bundesrichter 
(federal judge) Wolfgang Buddenberg (aged 60) in Karlsruhe on Monday 
15 May 1972 made front-page news in Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung and in Die Welt the 
following morning. Coverage in all three newspapers displayed a photograph of 
Buddenberg’s damaged VW-Beetle beneath which a bomb had been placed on the 
passenger side of the vehicle which detonated when Buddenberg’s wife, who 
normally drove her husband to work, had started the car at lunchtime. The bomb 
missed Wolfgang Buddenberg who, against his usual habit, had walked to work that 
morning. The assassination attempt took centre-stage in both Die Welt and 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, but in Bild the reader’s attention was drawn to an even bigger 
headline, “Lehrer in der Schule erstochen – BERLIN: Mutter wollte Katastrophe 
verhindern – Sohn war schneller” announcing a fatal stabbing of a teacher by a 
student, showing photographs of both the victim and the alleged offender. The sub-
headline, stating that the offender’s mother had wanted to avoid the catastrophe 
was placed beneath the article covering the assassination attempt on Federal Judge 
Buddenberg and again it is not immediately clear whether or not the two events were 
related, which makes the centre headline all the more eye-catching. Overall, the 
assassination attempt on Federal Judge Buddenberg took up 22 to 35% of the front 
page in each of the three newspapers and continued with a very small amount of 
coverage merely in Die Welt on the following day. In aggregate, 199.92 c” were 
devoted to this particular assassination incident before news coverage moved on to 
other topics and events.  
During the 1970s, Süddeutsche Zeitung carried no advertisements on the front page 
and Die Welt only a minimal amount. Bild, on the other hand, regularly printed four 
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to five front-page advertisements which together covered about 25% of the available 
printing space; the remaining space normally made up of one main story headline 
plus several smaller news items. On Wednesday 6 September 1972, however, this 
was not the case. A thick black line framed just one story on the front page in Bild: 
the shooting of members of the Israeli sporting team in the Olympic village in Munich 
by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September. The report takes up almost all of 
the available front-page printing space and occupies 100% of the next three pages in 
Bild. The first part of the report consists of an oversized headline, sub-headline, a 
photo of a young bride and groom and another photo of a mature woman weeping 
into a white handkerchief. Subsequent parts of the Bild report are also completely 
framed by a thick black line.75 The first four pages in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on that 
day are also entirely devoted to coverage of this assassination incident and reporting 
in Die Welt is similarly extensive. Coverage is even more voluminous as more details 
of the event became known and coverage continues in the six subsequent issues of 
Bild and Die Welt and in another seven issues of the Süddeutsche Zeitung. In 
aggregate 9,660.23 c” of media attention were devoted by the three newspapers to 
this particular assassination incident, 48 times more than the media attention 
accorded to the previously described assassination attempt on Federal Judge 
Buddenberg and 21 times more than another assassination incident perpetrated in 
Karlsruhe on 25 August 1977 which was aimed at Generalbundesanwalt (Public 
Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice) Kurt Rebmann. Bombings and 
Assassinations incidents are generally of short-duration and as we have seen, the 
media attention (c”) accorded to individual instances of such attacks can vary 
significantly. An even starker difference in the coverage accorded to individual 
terrorist incidents can be found when attack types of long-duration such as hostage-
taking events are (a) compared to each other and even more so when (b) compared 
across the various attack method categories. 
                                                     
75  Incidentally, it is a traditional custom in Germany for funeral notices and stationery such as 
condolence cards and envelopes for death notices to be framed with a black line; thus providing 
advance notice about the nature of the correspondence even before the recipient opens the 
envelope. 
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During the 1970s, three hostage-takings (kidnappings) took place on West-German 
soil and as can be seen in Table 6.2 the amount of media attention (c”) accorded to 
each individual incident varies significantly from 8,356 c” in the case of Peter Lorenz 
(in 1972) to 2,566 c” in the case of Jürgen Ponto (in 1977) to more than 18,672 c” in 
the case of Hanns Martin Schleyer (also in 1977). What is perhaps even more startling 
is the length of time that readers would have encountered coverage on these events 
when turning the pages of their regular newspaper. In aggregate the three 
newspapers covered the Lorenz kidnapping for 30 consecutive issues, the Ponto 
kidnapping attempt for 24 consecutive issues and the Schleyer kidnapping for 129 
consecutive issues. Reports about the Schleyer kidnapping could be found in the print 
media for a period spanning more than 55 consecutive days. No other terrorist 
incident throughout the 1970s was accorded media attention of a similar scale or 
duration. In fact, 8 armed assaults, 4 assassinations, 17 bombings and 13 attacks on 
facilities/infrastructure received no coverage at all in Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
Die Welt.      
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Table 6.2 Some Specific Examples of Terrorist Incidents and their Media Coverage 
Date Target City Perpetrator Bild c" #p #i SZ c" #p #i Welt c" #p #i Total c" Total #p Total #i TargetType AttackType 
13/02/1972 
Jewish Seniors' 
Residence Munich PFLP 149.70 4 2 377.80 12 5 118.30 5 3 645.80 21 10 Other Facility/Infrastruct. 
15/05/1972 Wolfgang Buddenberg Karlsruhe RAF 71.57 2 1 48.06 2 1 80.29 4 2 199.92 8 4 Government (General) Assassination 
19/05/1972 Springer-Haus Hamburg RAF 191.72 4 2 102.77 5 2 220.71 3 2 515.20 12 6 Journalists & Media Bombing/Explosion 
24/05/1972 US Army Headquarters Heidelberg RAF 413.49 5 3 289.08 11 4 222.85 4 3 925.42 20 10 Military Bombing/Explosion 
15/06/1972 Yugoslav Consulate Munich Croat.Nat. 0.00 0 0 2.70 1 1 2.20 1 1 4.90 2 2 Government (Diplomatic) Bombing/Explosion 
05/09/1972 Olympic Village Munich Black Sept. 2574.84 26 7 3868.26 41 8 3217.13 33 7 9660.23 100 22 Private Citizens & Property Assassination 
05/08/1973 Springer Guesthouse Kampen RAF 41.67 2 1 35.64 2 1 174.98 6 3 252.29 10 5 Journalists & Media Facility/Infrastruct. 
27/02/1975 Peter Lorenz Unknown 2nd June Movement 3914.67 40 13 1681.77 28 8 2759.89 32 9 8356.33 100 30 Government (General) Hostage Taking 
30/07/1977 Jürgen Ponto Frankfurt RAF 663.77 12 6 714.07 23 10 1188.46 20 8 2566.30 55 24 Business Hostage Taking 
25/08/1977 Kurt Rebmann Karlsruhe RAF 121.21 4 3 143.52 7 4 192.09 6 3 456.82 17 10 Government (General) Assassination 
05/09/1977 Hanns Martin Schleyer Cologne RAF 6118.37 89 40 6413.21 125 44 6141.41 107 45 18672.99 321 129 Business Hostage Taking 
29/06/1979 Soviet Travel Agency Frankfurt Territrl Resist Army 0.00 0 0 3.30 1 1 2.20 1 1 5.51 2 2 Tourists Facility/Infrastruct. 
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Table 6.3 Annual Media Coverage by Attack Method Category76, 1970-1980 
 Armed Assault (c") Bombing / Explosion (c") Facility / Infrastruct. (c") 
YEAR Bild SZ Die Welt TOTAL Bild SZ Die Welt TOTAL Bild SZ Die Welt TOTAL 
1970 190.02 737.92 128.75 1056.70 124.96 213.05 19.65 357.66 271.02 383.29 118.30 772.61 
1971 127.83 9.64 0.00 137.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.93 0.00 3.93 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 961.30 543.53 559.08 2063.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 0.00 48.31 48.31 96.33 39.78 10.01 146.11 41.67 35.64 174.98 252.29 
1974 0.00 2.66 0.00 2.66 134.98 6.26 34.03 175.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.31 0.00 45.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1976 40.93 0.00 0.00 40.93 228.19 45.35 117.00 390.54 63.24 5.21 10.42 78.87 
1977 0.00 5.29 3.03 8.32 34.25 9.70 42.30 86.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1978 425.71 0.00 0.00 425.71 188.63 73.68 93.61 355.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 60.66 2.93 63.60 67.45 28.17 32.08 127.70 0.00 3.30 2.20 5.51 
TOTAL 784.49 816.19 183.02 1783.70 1836.09 1004.83 907.75 3748.67 375.93 431.37 305.91 1113.21 
 
 Hijacking (c") Hostage-Taking (c") Assassination (c") 
YEAR Bild SZ Die Welt TOTAL Bild SZ Die Welt TOTAL Bild SZ Die Welt TOTAL 
1970 553.05 346.38 456.46 1355.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2646.41 3916.34 3297.41 9860.16 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.10 2.63 6.49 28.22 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 142.30 291.20 309.16 742.66 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3914.67 1681.77 2759.89 8356.33 93.07 8.07 43.59 144.73 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 43.49 82.55 126.03 
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6782.14 7127.28 7329.87 21239.29 893.86 823.40 1356.84 3074.11 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TOTAL 553.05 346.38 456.46 1355.88 10696.81 8809.05 10089.76 29595.62 3794.76 5085.14 5096.03 13975.92 
                                                     
76 The category Unarmed Assault has been omitted from Table 6.3 to facilitate a visually more pleasing table presentation. As shown in Table 6.4, for the period 1970-1980 
just one unarmed assault is recorded in the GTD. The incident occurred in 1978 and was accorded a total of just 13.61c”: zero  c” in Bild, 8.16c” in Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
5.45c” in Die Welt (as shown in Table 6.1). 
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The aggregated data for the 1970s encompasses, obviously, day by day and year by 
year coverage as events unfolded. To illustrate the rolling evolution of media 
attention to terrorism from year to year, Table 6.3 presents the annual statistics for 
six attack method categories. Even a cursory glance at the table will reveal substantial 
variations in the media attention that was accorded to the coverage of incidents 
within each of the attack method categories from year to year (i.e. row by row), but 
also when comparisons are made between the various attack method categories 
within each individual year (e.g. 1977). There are many factors which might influence 
and underlie such variability. One such factor is easily determined and conveyed from 
data contained in the GTD. It pertains to the number of terrorist incidents 
perpetrated during each of the ten years, together with a classification of these 
attacks across the seven relevant attack method categories. Table 6.4 presents this 
data for the 112 terrorist incidents of relevance in this investigation across the ten 
year period from 1970 to 1980.  
 
Table 6.4 Number of Attacks77 per Type and Year in West-Germany, 1970-1980 
 
Armed 
Assault 
Unarmed 
Assault 
Bombing / 
Explosion 
Facility /  
Infrastruct. 
Hijacking 
Hostage 
Taking 
Assassin- 
ation 
Total  
1970 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 7 
1971 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
1972 0 0 8 0 0 0 4 12 
1973 2 0 6 4 0 0 1 13 
1974 1 0 5 1 0 0 2 9 
1975 1 0 6 0 0 1 1 9 
1976 5 0 5 5 0 0 3 18 
1977 3 0 7 2 0 3 2 17 
1978 1 1 13 1 0 0 0 16 
1979 1 0 2 5 0 0 0 8 
Total 18 1 54 21 1 4 13 112 
 
There are many other factors that underlie and influence the variability that 
surrounds the media attention that individual terrorist attacks receive. Some pertain 
to characteristics of the relationship between terrorist groups and the media and to 
                                                     
77  Excluded are attacks for which the perpetrators are recorded as ‘unknown’ in the GTD. Also 
excluded are attacks for which both the number of persons injured and the number of persons killed 
are recorded as ‘unknown’ in the GTD. 
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the evolving media strategies that some terrorist groups devise in order to enhance 
their chance of media attention. Many such aspects were described in Chapter 3. 
They include the success or failure of an intended terrorist action itself and criteria 
such as the timing, level of violence, unexpectedness and topicality of an attack, the 
number of news cycles that a particular terrorist incident can be reported on, the 
emergence of other high-impact news that competes for editorial space and 
attention, for example, attacks perpetrated by other terrorist groups and the 
innovation of new attack methods, but also other unforeseen events such as 
newspaper printer-strikes or Presseblocks (news black-outs), either self-imposed 
within media circles or in response to demands by government or security agencies. 
The terrorism-media context is dynamic and constantly evolving. 
Within this complex evolving context, decisions are made by governments, security 
agencies and law enforcement agents, journalists, editors, publishers and terrorist 
groups. The aggregate statistics that describe terrorism in any period or place show 
a static picture but when the newspaper reports are retrieved from the archives, a 
more dynamic and real picture immediately begins to be created. These were real 
attacks perpetrated by real terrorist groups with real consequences and real victims. 
It also begins to emerge that the terrorism and media environment is not so complex 
as to be intractable completely. It is possible for the public and others, including 
terrorist groups, to keep track of the flow of news regarding terrorism and to develop 
some idea of the amount of attention accorded to different actions.78 All interested 
parties in this dynamic context observe actions and reactions closely and they will 
use available information towards decision-making processes. Of course, even during 
the most turbulent times, decisions continue to be made and at least some decision-
makers will act rather than wait for the context to settle. Terrorist groups seeking 
                                                     
78 Of course, acquiring this information is not costless but neither is it extremely costly. Regular and 
interested readers of newspapers could gather the necessary information with minimal expense 
(monetary and time). Interestingly, it could be argued that the cost of information acquisition has 
been declining over many years with the availability of newspapers, television and now the internet. 
To explore the relevance of information costs for terrorist decision-making is a promising avenue for 
research. This would draw on the classical papers dealing with the economics of information and those 
studies that have examined the impact of information costs and asymmetry on bargaining and conflict 
resolution; see S. J. Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), Stiglitz (1985) and Reed (2003).  
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media attention for their actions must accept that media attention is uncertain and 
that the actual amount of coverage received may diverge from what was expected. 
In a context such as this, each of the complementary models of the decision-making 
process promises to identify aspects of the environment that could not be identified 
before or, if they could, provide new perspectives from which to understand them. 
It is to this application that we turn.  
6.3 Terrorist Choice Under Uncertainty 
In Chapter 4, the theoretical structures of three alternative models of decision-
making under risk and uncertainty were outlined: (1) expected utility theory; (2) 
mean-variance analysis; and (3) prospect theory. Each model highlights different 
aspects of the ways in which individuals and groups choose and each can provide a 
unique yet complementary perspective on decision-making processes. The particular 
context that is the focus of this analysis is the terrorists’ choice of action or attack 
method where media coverage is the desirable but uncertain outcome of terrorist 
activity. Application of these complementary models of the decision-making process 
depicts the terrorist groups as ordering their preferences for attack methods and 
combinations of attack methods based on expectations of media attention accorded 
to those actions and the risk that the actual media attention accorded to an action 
will diverge from what was expected. Although terrorist groups may always prefer 
more media attention to less, they will not necessarily prefer the attack method that 
promises the chance of the greatest amount of attention.  
6.3.1 (Basic) Expected Utility Theory and Terrorist Choice 
If terrorist groups could guarantee that a particular amount of media attention would 
be accorded to a particular action or actions, then presuming that the terrorist group 
prefers more media attention to less, the preference ordering of actions would 
simply follow the amount of media attention each yields, from most to least. 
However, terrorist groups cannot guarantee that a particular amount of media 
attention will be accorded to a particular action or actions; they can only form an 
expectation of such before an action is perpetrated. The media attention expected 
to result from an action is subject to risk and uncertainty. As such, each action or 
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attack method is best viewed as a risky prospect or gamble expected, but not 
guaranteed, to yield some amount of media attention, 𝑥𝑖, with probability 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 +
…𝑝𝑛 = 1. The preference ordering of actions or attack methods, which represent 
chances of obtaining media attention, will not necessarily place the action with the 
highest expected media attention in first place.   
Each model of the decision-making process provides an analytical method for 
determining a preference ordering across risky prospects. The basic expected utility 
model depicts the decision-maker as assessing the alternative actions or attack 
methods on the basis of expected quantities of media attention and their associated 
probabilities. The decision-maker’s preferences are reflected in the utility function. 
The utility function converts quantities of media attention into utility numbers which 
are then weighted by the associated probabilities and summed to determine the 
expected utility of each action or attack method. The decision-maker prefers the 
action with the highest expected utility. Actions can be ranked in order of preference 
on the basis of their expected utility. Formally, therefore, the application of the 
expected utility model is a straightforward analytical exercise undertaken with the 
objective of determining the expected utility numbers that would be attached to 
each available risky prospect from which the decision-maker may choose. In the 
present context, the expected utility attached to each available attack method is the 
objective of the analysis. Expected utility derives from expected media attention.  
The preference ordering, based on the expected utility numbers, is however not 
simply the outcome of a purely computational exercise. The conversion of the 
quantities of media attention into utility numbers requires the choice of a utility 
function which, in addition to having certain formal mathematical properties 
required by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theoretical framework, has important 
economic properties that reflect the preferences of certain types of decision-makers. 
The choice of which function to apply in any given case depends on the analyst’s 
assessment of the relevance of particular properties in the particular case. For 
example, one type of utility function may provide a better reflection of the decision-
maker’s risk preferences in one case and yet for another scenario may not be deemed 
applicable. Although utility functions can be found in any order of complexity and 
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mathematical subtlety, several well-known functions are typically used in economic 
analysis because of their generally desirable economic and mathematical properties 
and the fact that they approximate the preference orderings that would be derived 
from much broader classes of functions. The logarithmic utility function is one such 
popularly chosen function for economic analysis. It is the function that is applied in 
this analysis.   
The logarithmic utility function, 𝑈(𝑥) = ln (𝑥), reflects a decision-maker who is risk-
averse but not greatly so and who exhibits constant relative risk aversion, decreasing 
absolute risk aversion and decreasing marginal utility. 79  These properties are 
generally ‘sensible’ in most economic settings. Importantly, however, maximising a 
logarithmic utility function is analogous with a rule of decision-making that is logically 
unobjectionable; that is, the maximisation of a logarithmic utility function is 
equivalent to maximising the geometric-mean of the decision-maker’s rate of 
accumulation of 𝑥. Since decision-makers prefer more 𝑥 in each case, it is logical for 
them to maximise the rate at which they accumulate it. This has led Rubinstein 
(1976), for example, to declare that logarithmic utility maximisation describes all 
rational decision-makers. More formally, Arrow (1965, pp. 36-37) provides a rigorous 
mathematical treatment to support the thesis that utility, in general, must be 
approximated by a logarithmic function.  
Given the widespread use of logarithmic utility and the strength of the arguments 
that have been brought to bear to support its use, both in terms of logic and in terms 
of pure mathematics, we imagine that terrorist groups exhibit, approximately, the 
preferences that are mirrored by the logarithmic utility function and proceed to apply 
the function to convert quantities of media attention into utility numbers. Because 
the logarithmic function is consistent with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
mathematical framework, the index of utility numbers that results and the 
                                                     
79 The Arrow-Pratt measure (see Chapter 4) for absolute risk aversion for the logarithmic function is 
𝐴(𝑥) =
1(−𝑥−2)
𝑥−1
= 𝑥−1. This measure is decreasing, 𝐴′(𝑥) = −𝑥−2 < 0. The measure for relative risk 
aversion is 𝑅(𝑥) =
−𝑥(−𝑥−2)
𝑥−1
= 1. This measure is constant, 𝑅′(𝑥) = 0. Diminishing marginal utility is 
reflected in the increasing slope of the logarithmic function which increases at a decreasing rate.  
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preference ordering determined on the basis of the final expected utility numbers 
will be consistent with the preferences of the underlying decision-maker who is 
reflected in the logarithmic function. Simply, the application of the function does not 
disturb the underlying preferences of the decision-maker. It reflects the preferences 
accurately. Of course, given what has been said about logarithmic utility and the rate 
of accumulation of 𝑥, the preference orderings that are determined on the basis of 
maximising a logarithmic utility function can be interpreted as the ordering of 
terrorist actions that maximise the rate at which the terrorist group’s accumulated 
media attention grows.  
The basic expected utility model says that each possible amount of media attention 
𝑥𝑖  is associated with a utility number through the decision-maker’s utility function 
which, formally, must be one from the class of functions identified by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1947). Applied to the present context the expected utility 𝐸𝑈 of 
an action 𝑖 is the sum of the products of probability and utility conferred by media 
coverage over all possible outcomes of the act. The terrorist chooses the action with 
the highest expected utility of media coverage. Formally, 
𝐸𝑈 =∑𝑢(𝑥𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
To determine the probability 𝑝𝑖  associated with each quantity of media attention, it 
was assumed that media attention is normally distributed. The resulting probabilities 
serve as weights in the decision-making process depicted by the basic expected utility 
model. Because of the evolving and dynamic nature of the societal, media and 
terrorism context that describes the period under investigation and which in turn 
underlies and shapes the archival data of media coverage accorded to terrorism 
throughout that time, expectations are determined via a rolling rather than a static 
or retrospective approach. Terrorist groups are viewed as dynamic decision-makers 
who base future choices on the culmination of experiences and observations 
gathered up to the point at which their next decision is due. As such, the amount of 
media attention (c”) that a terrorist or terrorist group might expect at the start of 
each year, while planning subsequent attacks, is based on the rolling average of 
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media attention accorded to attacks in each of the various attack method categories 
in previous years.  
Expectations at the start of 1972, for example, are based on what was usually or 
typically accorded to attacks in each category in the two previous years. The 
expectation at the start of 1973 is based on what was typical for the three preceding 
years and so on. At the start of 1980, information and observations on the media’s 
response to terrorist activity cumulatively gathered throughout the whole of the 
1970s are available to inform the terrorist decision-maker. Using this data, the 
expected utility for a subsequent attack in any of the available attack method 
categories and a preference ordering can be determined for each year. This is 
presented in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5 Expected Utility (logarithmic) Preference Ordering80 (Looking Forward at the Start of Each Year) 
at the 
start of 
Armed 
Assault 
Unarmed 
Assault 
Bombing/ 
Explosion 
Facility / 
Infrastruct. 
Hijacking 
Hostage- 
taking 
Assassin- 
ation 
1970 - - - - - - - 
1971 - - - - - - - 
1972 2 - 4 3 1 - - 
1973 4 - 3 5 2 - 1 
1974 4 - 3 5 2 - 1 
1975 4 - 3 5 2 - 1 
1976 5 - 4 6 3 2 1 
1977 5 - 4 6 3 1 2 
1978 5 - 4 6 3 2 1 
1979 5 7 4 6 3 2 1 
1980 3 7 5 6 4 1 2 
 
The preference orderings can be interpreted in two equivalent ways: first, as the 
ordering of preferences of a particular type of utility maximising decision-maker (i.e. 
a decision-maker characterised by a logarithmic utility function); second, as a ranking 
                                                     
80 There is no explicit treatment of resource constraints in this analysis, but resource constraints are 
only relevant for particular groups’ involvement in particular actions. Resource constraints do not 
affect the desirability of particular actions and therefore the preparedness that law enforcement 
should strive towards. One interpretation of the analysis is that attack types which require resources 
beyond the reach of a particular terrorist or terrorist group would preclude this attack type from being 
included in the group’s preference ordering. However, this being said, the analysis identifies an 
ordering of preferences that holds for all groups. 
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of attack methods in order of their influence on the maximisation of the rate at which 
a terrorist group’s accumulation of media attention grows. The highest ranked attack 
method, if chosen, would be the attack method expected to increase the decision-
maker’s share of total media attention at the fastest rate.  
These evolving preference orderings reflect: (1) the preferences of a terrorist group 
with logarithmic utility and (2) the dynamics of the attack method choices that would 
be expected to maximise the decision-maker’s rate of accumulation of publicity. 
Although, for the reasons explained above, it is reasonable to expect that the 
preferences of at least some of the groups that were active during this period of time 
are consistent with logarithmic utility, it is not necessarily the case that all groups will 
be so described at every point in time. However, the analysis allows a more detailed 
picture of the decision-making process to be developed and draws out certain 
aspects of the decision-making process and its context that might have escaped 
analytical attention before. Imagine that at the start of 1972, our terrorist decision-
maker described by the logarithmic utility function and forming preferences on the 
basis of expected utility has observed terrorist events, the media attention accorded 
to them, responses by government and security agencies as well as other 
developments in the terrorism context during the preceding two years. Our decision-
maker would have ranked available choices of attack methods as follows: hijacking 
first, armed assault second, facility/infrastructure attack third and 
bombing/explosion fourth.  
Going forward into 1972, therefore, we would have expected our terrorist decision-
maker to choose hijacking, armed assault, facility/infrastructure attack and 
bombing/explosion, in that order. The amount of media attention accorded to each 
attack method in the preceding two years and its variability shape the expectations 
of our decision-maker but so too do the preferences for risk that are embedded 
within the logarithmic utility function. The level of risk aversion reflected in a 
logarithmic utility function is relatively low and hijacking is the attack method with 
the highest level of uncertainty at the beginning of 1972. Not all terrorist groups will 
be risk-seeking enough to choose it, even if the required resources are available to 
them. As such, a new insight is obtained from the perspective provided by this 
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analytical model, regardless of whether terrorist groups do or do not choose to 
perpetrate the attack method that is ranked highest by our logarithmic utility 
decision-maker. Because, as explained above, the maximisation of logarithmic utility 
is analogous to the maximisation of the growth rate of the accumulation of media 
attention in this context, a terrorist group that does not choose the attack method 
that is ranked highest by a logarithmic utility decision-maker may see their share of 
total media attention in the ensuing period contract. If we believe, for example, that 
a terrorist group in a particular context is, at least for the time being, unlikely to be 
able to resource the highest ranked attack method or is too risk-averse to perpetrate 
it, we can expect their share of publicity to shrink. This conclusion, however, is only 
a temporary one and must be adjusted dynamically as future periods unfold and as 
additional decisions are observed. A terrorist group does not necessarily have to be 
inactive to witness a diminution in its share of total media attention. 
One of the most important factors that can shape and re-shape a preference ordering 
is the deployment of ‘new’ attack methods that have not been tried before or have 
not been tried for some time. A new attack method represents an entrepreneurial 
opportunity that may produce an outcome that is surprisingly high. The first group 
or groups to perpetrate such an action may receive media attention that is 
substantially higher than that which could have been obtained by perpetrating the 
attack method that would, in the absence of the new attack method, have been 
ranked highest by our logarithmic utility decision-maker. Such an example emerged 
in 1972 within the dataset that we have been considering.  
In 1972 just two attack types were deployed by terrorist groups active during that 
year. Twelve attacks were perpetrated: eight bombings and four assassinations. In 
the period under investigation prior to 1972, no terrorist group had committed an 
assassination. The first deployment of assassination immediately moved this attack 
method to the top of the preference ordering for a logarithmic utility decision-maker 
in 1973, removing hijacking from rank one but also causing further shifts in the 
preference ordering for that year. The category Bombing/Explosion moved up the 
preference ordering by one position (from 4 to 3), thus becoming more attractive 
than before, while the categories Armed Assault and Facility/Infrastructure Attack 
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were shifted down the preference ordering by two positions each (from 2 to 4 and 
from 3 to 5, respectively), thus becoming less attractive attack methods and less 
likely to be chosen by logarithmic utility decision-makers seeking to maximise their 
accumulation of media attention in this terrorism context.   
In 1973 and in 1974, no new attack methods were introduced and the relative ranking 
of the attack method categories stabilised and remained unchanged for three 
consecutive years (1973, 1974 and 1975). This stability in the preference orderings is 
a new observation generated by the analysis. Of course, further research may explore 
such a point in more detail but within the present analysis the preference orderings 
exhibit a tendency to stabilise in the absence of new attack method types being 
deployed by the terrorist groups that were active during the period. In 1975, the first 
hostage-taking for the 1970s was recorded in West-Germany. This action was 
particularly successful at attracting media attention and resulted in the new attack 
method category Hostage-Taking attaining the second-highest rank in the preference 
ordering for 1976 at the expense of the category Hijacking, which was shifted 
downwards from second position to third along with all other attack types which 
similarly shifted down the preference ordering by one place. The success of the 
deployment of hostage-taking in 1975 was not significant enough, however, to place 
it at the top of the preference ordering of a logarithmic utility decision-maker. The 
category Assassination remained in first position on the preference ordering for 
1976.  
What follows is a period of high terrorist activity during the course of 1976, 1977 and 
1978. However, no new attack methods were introduced and the preference 
ordering remained predominantly stable. Interestingly, the attack methods Hostage-
Taking and Assassination alternated between first and second positions in the 
preference ordering. Before 1975, there had not been any hostage-takings recorded. 
In 1975, as discussed, there was a single hostage-taking. Its relative success in terms 
of attracting media attention placed it in second place, behind Assassination, looking 
forward into 1976. In 1976, there were several assassination attacks but no instances 
of hostage-taking. Despite this, Assassination fell to second place in the preference 
ordering looking forward into 1977 and Hostage-taking was in first place. In 1977, 
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there were three recorded hostage-takings, two of which were accorded significant 
media attention. There were also two recorded assassinations, which attracted 
significant media attention but less than was accorded to the hostage-takings. This 
seems to have had the effect of balancing the trade-off between average outcomes 
and variability in favour of Assassination as an attack method in spite of the fact that 
the hostage-takings perpetrated in 1977 received several times as much media 
attention. One particularly successful (single) period does not necessarily propel an 
attack method to the highest place on the preference ordering and the absence of 
an attack method from a (single) period does not necessarily push it down the 
preference ordering. Indeed it may push it up. It is difficult to imagine that these 
types of insights could be gained without the theoretical framework applied in this 
analysis.    
During the years 1976, 1977 and 1978, while Hostage-taking and Assassination vied 
for first place on the preference ordering, all other attack method categories 
remained unchanged. During the course of 1978, an unarmed assault was 
perpetrated for the first time but attracted very little media attention and occupied 
the last position in the preference ordering looking forward into 1979, while the 
categories Armed Assault, Bombing/Explosion, Facility/Infrastructure Attack and 
Hijacking remained in the same position for a fourth consecutive year (1979). It is 
interesting to note, however, that two attacks, one in 1978 and one just six days 
before Christmas in 1979, precipitated a reordering in preferences. This time, it was 
not a previously untried attack method which prompted the re-shuffle of the 
preference ordering but two examples of armed assault.  Armed Assault had been in 
fifth position in the preference ordering since 1976 and there were relatively few 
incidents in which its deployment attracted any media attention of note. This 
changed somewhat in May 1978 when two female members of the 2nd June 
Movement terrorist group perpetrated an armed assault on a remand prison in West-
Berlin during which they forcefully freed another member of the group from custody 
and escaped. The incident attracted more than 425 c” in Bild but no mention in either 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung or in Die Welt. The following year, a second armed assault 
was perpetrated in Munich by the group Commando 15. October. It attracted 60 c” 
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in the Süddeutsche Zeitung and just 2.93 c” in Die Welt. Together with the previous 
year’s attack, however, this event and the very small attention it received was 
enough to prompt a change in the preference ordering looking forward into the year 
1980 in which, among other changes, the category Armed Assault moved up to rank 
three from rank five after having held the lower ranked position for four consecutive 
years. We observe that even a small amount of media attention can reorder 
preferences, especially for attack methods that had previously occupied lower 
positions in the preference ordering.  
As was explained above, the maximisation of logarithmic utility is analogous to the 
maximisation of the growth rate of the accumulation of media attention in the 
context of this thesis. A terrorist group that does not choose the attack method that 
is ranked highest by a logarithmic utility decision-maker may see their share of total 
media attention in the ensuing period contract. A contraction of media attention and 
a corresponding decline in the relevance of any particular terrorist group as a 
recognised terrorist organisation in the eyes of the media, government and the public 
at large is even more likely during periods in which activity by competing terrorist 
groups is high. Table 6.6 lists some key characteristics of terrorist activity and media 
attention accorded to terrorism during each of the ten years under consideration and 
highlights periods of the most intense activity. Cyclic phases are evident; both for the 
amount of media attention (c”) accorded to terrorist activity (see Figure 6.1), but also 
for the aggregate number of terrorist attacks perpetrated. Even more significant is 
the observation that the number of attack methods deployed overall as well as the 
number of attacks perpetrated that rank first on the preference ordering rose when 
the number of well-known terrorist groups who were competing for prevalence in 
media coverage and public attention was also high. This observation is particularly 
evident during the years 1976 and 1977. 
Main competitors for media attention in the context of the 1970s in West-Germany 
were undoubtedly the RAF, 2nd June Movement and the Revolutionary Cells. Inter-
group rivalry between the RAF and the 2nd June Movement intensified particularly 
after the latter group had successfully executed the hostage-taking of Peter Lorenz 
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Table 6.6 Competition between Major Groups 
Year 
Media 
Attention 
p.a. (c") 
# of Attacks 
perpetrated 
# of Attack 
Types 
deployed 
# of times 1st 
ranked Attack 
Type deployed 
# of 
Groups 
active 
Main Perpetrators (in descending order of 
activity)  
1970 3,542.85 7 4 - 5 PFLP (mainly), RAF, 3 others 
1971 141.4 3 2 - 2 RAF, 2ndJune 
1972 11,924.07 12 2 0 4 RAF (mainly), BlackSept, 2ndJune/ Croat Nat. 
1973 474.94 13 4 1 6 RAF (mainly), 2nd June, RevCells, 3 others 
1974 920.59 9 4 2 5 RevCells, RAF, 2nd June, 2 others 
1975 8,546.37 9 4 1 6 RevCells, RAF, 2nd June/ Croat Nat., 2 others 
1976 636.37 18 4 3 7 RevCells, Croat Nat., 2nd June, RAF, 3 others 
1977 24,407.98 17 5 3 7 RevCells, RAF, Croat Nat., 4 others 
1978 795.24 16 4 0 7 IRA (10 bombings), RevCells, RAF/ 2nd June, 3 others 
1979 196.8 8 3 0 5 no attacks by established groups 
Total 51,586.61 112 - - - - 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Cycles of Media Coverage of Terrorism (c”) in West-Germany 
 
 
in February 1975; an event not only successful with regard to the fact that all 
terrorists’ demands for the release of their hostage were met but also in terms of the 
substantial media coverage received as was shown in Table 6.2. While the total 
number and the variety of terrorist attacks decreased by only a small amount in 1978, 
deployment of attack types that were ranked first on the preference ordering 
dropped significantly, from three to zero. It is worth noting that 13 of the 16 terrorist 
incidents that occurred in 1978 were bombings and 10 of those were perpetrated by 
the IRA within just a couple of days in late August 1978. The IRA had not previously 
been active in West-Germany during the 1970s. Many members of the early 
generation of the RAF had died in prison in 1977, so the competition between well-
established terrorist groups decreased significantly after 1977. None of the groups 
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that were active in 1979, the last year in the period under study, were well-known or 
had previously shown high activity. 
6.3.2 Mean-Variance Analysis and Terrorist Choice 
One aspect that has been mentioned a number of times throughout this thesis is the 
fact that terrorist groups do not choose just one single type of action or attack 
method. Within a given period or across periods, terrorist groups choose a 
combination of different attack methods. Analysing terrorist choice in any context, 
including one where media attention is the desired but uncertain outcome of 
terrorist activity, requires the capability to encompass this observed behaviour into 
an analytical framework and provide a rationale for it. It is also important to recast 
our understanding of the terrorist group’s opportunity set. In a context where 
terrorist groups combine different actions with imperfectly correlated outcomes, the 
opportunity set exhibits quite different properties from that which characterises a 
context where only single attack methods are chosen. In fact, failure to consider the 
implications of combinations may result in a serious miss-assessment of the terrorist 
group’s opportunities and feasible choices.  
In this section, a mean-variance analysis (described in Chapter 4) is presented. Using 
the data collected for this investigation, the mean-variance efficient opportunity sets 
for a rolling series of periods are determined. Even before examining the choices that 
terrorist groups might have been expected to make from these opportunity sets, the 
analysis generates a new way of looking at the opportunities that were available to 
terrorist groups to obtain some amount of expected media attention at some level 
of risk and how the positive trade-off between the magnitude of expected media 
attention and its expected standard deviation oscillated and evolved over time. Like 
the analysis presented in the previous section, this allows new conclusions to be 
reached about the period under consideration and opens new avenues for discourse 
regarding terrorism and the media in general. For example, it becomes clear that in 
the early 1970s, it was possible to expect a higher amount of media attention at 
almost every level of risk than during the later 1970s. This curtailment of 
opportunities and its intermediate oscillations during the entire period can be 
observed very clearly from the analysis presented here.  
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The analysis of the structure of the opportunity set in a context where terrorist 
groups combine attack methods is complemented by the study of optimal terrorist 
choice; that is, the nature of the ways in which terrorist groups may be expected to 
combine attack methods in order to obtain the highest amount of expected media 
attention at a given level of risk. Within a mean-variance framework, the terrorist 
group’s choice of attack method combination is shaped predominantly by its level of 
risk aversion. Therefore, by inspecting the mean-variance efficient opportunity set at 
different levels of risk it is possible to determine the nature of the combinations of 
attack methods that might be chosen by terrorist groups with particular risk aversion 
characteristics within particular periods. For example, when we consider the entire 
period from 1970 to 1980, it can be determined that bombing and armed assault 
dominate the efficient combinations at lower levels of risk while assassination and 
hijacking dominate efficient combinations at higher levels of risk. More risk-averse 
terrorist groups may therefore have chosen combinations of armed assault and 
bombing. Of course, observed choices might indicate the terrorist group’s level of 
risk aversion which may also prove to be useful knowledge for law enforcement.  
As explained in Chapter 4, mean-variance analysis requires no additional 
assumptions regarding utility functions or probability distributions.81 The discussion 
in the opening part of this chapter stressed the vividness of the media context. 
Terrorist groups, especially those with a developed media strategy, could be 
expected to have some idea regarding the relative media attention accorded to 
different actions and the ups and downs in this media attention over time. This is 
enough information to form a preference ordering based on average outcomes and 
their variability. It should also be pointed out that, while combining different types 
of actions makes sense as a diversification strategy, the terrorist group’s adoption of 
this strategy may be either naïve or sophisticated. The strategy does not have to be 
                                                     
81 It is well-known that a mean-variance preference ordering can only be guaranteed to be consistent 
with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms if outcomes are normally distributed or if utility is 
quadratic. While this was thought to be a fatal flaw of the approach, it is now generally accepted that 
mean-variance preference orderings mirror those generated by other types of functions, including 
logarithmic utility, and that the advantages of the approach are considerable in terms of simplicity 
and computability.  
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very sophisticated or even deliberate to work. The media attention accorded to 
different types of action, both within a period and across periods, varies as we have 
seen. The variability is not perfectly correlated and as a result of this there are 
benefits to be had in terms of reduced risk or increased expected payoffs by 
combining attack methods. These benefits may be reaped even by the terrorist group 
with the most naïve approach to diversification; that is, the group that merely senses 
the value of not putting everything in the same basket. Such and other insights are 
explored further in the analysis and discussion that follows.  
 
Figure 6.2 Efficient Set: Optimal Media Attention at Each Level of Risk, 1972 
 
The efficient set of combinations is that set of opportunities available to the terrorist 
group that yields the highest expected amount of media attention at each level of 
risk. It can be calculated or determined for any series of media attention data like the 
set that has been gathered for this thesis. It would be possible, therefore, to compute 
an efficient set for circumstances where television or online media attention has 
been measured. The identification of the opportunity set is an important analytical 
achievement because it allows us to see the structure that characterises the 
terrorists’ opportunities to obtain media attention by combining different actions. 
When planning and preparing future terrorist action, terrorists must choose from a 
set of plausible attack methods. If attack methods have been deployed before, the 
terrorist group with an interest in media coverage, will soon develop a sense both of 
the amount of media attention that may be expected to result from any particular 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
E
xp
ec
te
d 
M
ed
ia
 A
tte
nt
io
n 
(c
")
Standard Deviation (Risk) of Media Attention (c")
200 
 
attack type and of the associated risk that the actual media coverage will differ from 
the expected.  
For this thesis, data was gathered within a particular context; that is, the terrorism 
context in West-Germany during the 1970s and the media attention accorded to 
terrorist actions in that context as reflected in the coverage accorded by 
representative newspapers. From the first part of this chapter and certainly from 
working closely with the data in preparing it for analysis, it is possible to develop a 
sense of the media attention accorded to different actions and its variability over 
time that is likely very similar to the inferences that may have been formed by 
terrorist groups at the time. One quickly realises, for example, that some 
assassinations attract a lot of media attention over a sustained period, while others 
do not. Some hostage-taking events are well publicised and last for many days or 
weeks in the media, while others vanish more quickly or fail altogether. Bombings 
occur frequently, as do attacks on facilities and infrastructure, but such attacks rarely 
attract voluminous media attention. All media coverage is variable. Further, the 
media attention accorded to each of the various attack methods does not move up 
or down in unison. Media attention accorded to different attack methods is 
imperfectly correlated. As such, it may be prudent for the terrorist group to hedge 
its bets and not to place all its resources into one basket.  
Figure 6.2 shows the efficient frontier of the terrorists’ opportunity set looking 
forward into 1972 (based on observations from 1970 to 1971) determined by 
applying the Markowitz method described in Chapter 4 to the data gathered for this 
thesis. The vertical axis represents the media attention (c”) that is expected to result 
from the deployment of a particular attack method combination and the horizontal 
axis the standard deviation or risk that the actual media coverage received when the 
attack combination has been perpetrated will divert from the outcome expected. The 
efficient frontier is concave in shape and positively inclined. The positive inclination 
derives simply from the positive trade-off between risk and reward. The concavity 
derives from the imperfect correlation, which can be computed formally or simply 
inferred from observation. If two or more attack methods are perfectly positively 
correlated, combining an attack method with more variable outcomes with an attack 
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method with less variable outcomes increases the expected payoff and the variability 
of the combination in a linear fashion. In any context where the payoffs are 
imperfectly correlated, combining a more risky attack method with a less risky attack 
method increases the expected payoff and the variability non-linearly. Terrorist 
groups can capitalise on this correlation structure by deploying combinations that 
have higher expected amounts of media attention at each level of risk. The expected 
payoffs to terrorist activity, measured in terms of media attention, would be 
underestimated by any analytical framework that did not take imperfect correlations 
of payoffs into account.  
The terrorist group may derive benefits from this imperfect correlation by naïvely 
avoiding allocating all of its resources to a single attack method, simply out of some 
attempt at prudence. The increases in expected media attention that can be obtained 
at the same or a lower level of risk through combining more than one attack method 
are most clearly demonstrated by comparing the expected media attention and its 
variability of a single action with the expected media attention of a combination of 
more than one action. For example, at the start of 1980 the average amount of media 
coverage that could be expected from a single armed assault was 112.42 c” with a 
risk or standard deviation of 185.32. If, however, armed assault were deployed at a 
reduced rate of 35% (instead of 100%) and combined with bombing (at 59%), 
hostage-taking (2.4%) and assassination (3.7%) the terrorist group can expect an 
increased payoff of 133.87 c” (instead of 112.42 c”) at a much lower risk or standard 
deviation of 100 (instead of 185.32). This increased efficiency is possible due to the 
imperfect correlation between attack methods and through deployment of attack 
method combinations (P. J. Phillips, 2009), an aspect not previously considered in 
studies of terrorism. It was first applied to media coverage of terrorism events by 
Pohl (2015). Similarly, if terrorists perpetrated bombings only, they could expect an 
average of 68.54 c” of media attention with an associated risk or standard deviation 
of 80.32. However, a slightly higher amount of media coverage (69.32 c”) can be 
expected with a substantially lower level of risk (50 instead of 80.32) when bombing 
(at 49.97%) is deployed in combination with armed assault (12.92%), unarmed 
assault (35.81%) and a small resource allocation to hostage-taking (1.3%).  
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Figure 6.3 Efficient Set: Optimal Media Attention at Each Level of Risk, 1972 & 1979 
 
A striking result of this analysis is the observation that after 1972 the terrorists’ 
opportunity sets shifted (a) downwards and (b) to the left in the direction of the 
lower-risk range. In other words, after 1972 terrorists could expect lower amounts of 
media attention at each level of risk. At the same time, however, new efficient 
combinations at the lower end of the risk spectrum became available providing more 
risk-averse terrorists or terrorist groups the opportunity to obtain modest amounts 
of media attention with more certainty than was previously possible. If we accept the 
premise that shifts in the terrorists’ opportunity set reflect the aggregate effect of 
many single factors such as previous terrorist attacks perpetrated, media attention 
to terrorism, editorial decisions, strategic interventions by government and security 
agencies and many other variables, then tracking the shifts of opportunity sets 
through a more detailed lens is informative and can provide a bird’s eye view of how 
the context of terrorism and resulting media coverage changes over time. Using the 
data-set collected for this thesis it is possible not only to establish that between 1972 
and 1980 the terrorists’ opportunity set moved to the lower-left of the spectrum, but 
furthermore it is possible to discern oscillations within the 1970s as shown in Figure 
6.4.  
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Figure 6.4 Efficient Set Oscillations during the 1970s 
 
The efficient set of 1972 is located above all of the other opportunity sets. At that 
time it was possible to achieve the highest amount of expected media attention at 
all medium to upper risk levels.  Closer examination of Figure 6.4 reveals a series of 
oscillating shifts of opportunity sets from one year to the next. These shifts of annual 
opportunity sets mirror the cycles of actual (not expected) media coverage of 
terrorism shown in Figure 6.1 almost precisely. For example, in the years 1973 and 
1974 (at the lower-most boundary of the opportunity sets shown in Figure 6.4) the 
highest levels of risk needed to be born for even the smallest expected returns of 
media coverage. If we refer to the cycles illustrated in Figure 6.1 we see that the 
period 1973-1974 was indeed characterised by very low media attention to terrorism 
although the absolute number of terrorist attacks during 1973 was actually 
comparatively high. It is important to point out that the models applied in this thesis 
can be utilised in the analysis of other data-sets from alternative periods, locales and 
modes. A mean-variance analysis could, for example, be applied to online media 
data, and thus contribute further to the broader research program that examines 
terrorism and the media. While a shift of the efficient opportunity set to the lower-
left of the risk-reward spectrum over the course of the 1970s in West-Germany 
suggests that less media attention was to be expected at every level of risk, perhaps 
due in part to the effectiveness of response measures to terrorist events, the 
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structure and movement of efficient opportunity sets in other historical or 
contemporary contexts may show different trends and suggest alternative 
inferences.  
Up until this point, the efficient sets have been presented geometrically. Of course, 
these are just depictions of the sets of weightings across attack methods that yield 
the highest expected amount of media attention at each level of risk (standard 
deviation). By shifting our attention to the analysis that underlies the geometrical 
representations of the efficient sets, we can identify the exact weightings accorded 
to different attack methods in a particular combination anywhere along the efficient 
frontier. In this regard it is helpful to divide each of the efficient sets for each of the 
rolling periods into three regions of low, medium and high risk levels and to examine 
the changing characteristics of combinations within. Table 6.7 displays the 
weightings for each of the efficient set combinations at risk regions low, medium and 
high for each of the ten years within the period of the analysis. This allows us to 
identify the constituents of the efficient sets at each level of risk and in each of the 
periods. It also allows us to identify those combinations and, therefore, those attack 
methods, which may be chosen by terrorist groups with particular preferences. 
Within the mean-variance expected utility framework, risk preferences are the 
primary factor shaping choice. Corresponding to each range of risk (low, medium, 
high) will be risk preferences characterised predominantly by strong, medium and 
weak risk aversion. We now consider these preferences and the combinations 
presented in Table 6.7. The left-most column starts with the year 1972, the point at 
which decision-makers have access to data from the period 1970 to 1971, and ends 
with the year 1980, the point at which decision-makers have at their disposal data 
from the whole period 1970 to the end of 1979. In 1972, for example, a strongly risk-
averse terrorist decision-maker might be expected to choose an attack method 
combination from the low-risk range. Such a combination is weighted heavily 
towards Bombings (92.5%) and only very slightly towards Armed Assault. A much less 
risk-averse terrorist group on the other hand might have been expected to be most 
interested in a high  
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Table 6.7 Efficient Combinations at Three Levels of Risk 
starting Risk Level SD Armed Assault % Unarmed Assault % Bombing/ Expl. % Facility/ Infrastr. % Hijacking % Hostage-Taking % Assassination % 
1972 low 100 0.075403534 - 0.924596466 0 0 - - 
1973 low 125 0.411205375 - 0.536251888 0 0 - 0.052542738 
1974 low 100 0.036053152 - 0.7670899 0.196856949 0 - 0 
1975 low 100 0.107123802 - 0.810967606 0.078269022 0 - 0.00363957 
1976 low 100 0.188433705 - 0.774086987 0.004072712 0 0.022746159 0.010660437 
1977 low 85 6.43441E-05 - 0.843616746 0.136353596 0.000199765 0.019765549 0 
1978 low 85 0.086081774 - 0.868435125 0.023859618 0 0.021623483 0 
1979 low 15 0.028864618 0.817034572 0.15011643 0 0 0.003984381 0 
1980 low 15 0.028701079 0.806572363 0.160787548 0 0 0.00393901 0 
1972 medium 275 0.899154318 - 0 0 0.100845693 - - 
1973 medium 375 0.139950769 - 0 0 0.527179187 - 0.332870044 
1974 medium 350 0.306960352 - 0 0 0.392332636 - 0.300707012 
1975 medium 300 0.442502417 - 0 0 0.265769132 - 0.29172845 
1976 medium 375 0.058050176 - 0 0 0.502651257 0.088379791 0.350918776 
1977 medium 325 0.585109758 - 0 0 0.00021887 0.087357661 0.32731371 
1978 medium 325 0.347800043 - 0.009406326 0 0.312324218 0.060896233 0.26957318 
1979 medium 425 0.35802686 0 0 0 0.205295618 0.096658228 0.340019293 
1980 medium 425 0.420641326 0 0 0 0.139670277 0.100215726 0.339472671 
1972 high 675 0.006563582 - 0 0 0.993436416 - - 
1973 high 900 0 - 0 0 0.180614754 - 0.819385246 
1974 high 800 0 - 0 0 0.215766569 - 0.784233431 
1975 high 650 0 - 0 0 0.28952657 - 0.71047343 
1976 high 800 0 - 0 0 0.146229006 0.229807846 0.623963148 
1977 high 800 0.054742978 - 0 0 0.000218884 0.208627024 0.736411114 
1978 high 750 0 - 0 0 0.302180738 0.170788611 0.527030651 
1979 high 800 0 0 0 0 0.256762695 0.186630084 0.556607221 
1980 high 800 0 0 0 0 0.243284739 0.191002952 0.565712309 
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risk combination favouring Hijacking (99.3%) with a negligible resource allocation 
(0.7%) to Armed Assault.82  
This type of analysis provides a framework within which to interpret or infer general 
patterns of choice. It can be used to delineate the structure of opportunities and 
depict them geometrically (as efficient sets). It can be used, in conjunction with a 
model of terrorist preferences for risk and reward, to identify those ranges of risk 
from which particular terrorist groups may be expected to prefer to choose. Of 
course, knowledge of a terrorist group’s preferences may be difficult to infer a priori. 
Over time, however, the terrorist group chooses attack methods and, in doing so, 
must reveal something of its preferences. If such an inference is drawn from the 
actions of terrorist groups, the mean-variance framework may provide a general 
indication of the risk preferences characterising the group’s decision-makers. Such 
knowledge may provide a small yet valuable addition to counterterrorism. Much of 
this value might lie in preventing certain misestimates of the types of actions that are 
consistent with particular types of terrorist groups. 
One such misestimate might be to conclude that certain attack methods would never 
be consistent with the preferences of a particular type of group or that two quite 
different attack methods could never form part of a coherent combination of actions 
formed by the same group. The mean-variance analysis highlights the problem with 
this. It is true that some attack methods clearly feature more strongly in one or two 
particular risk ranges and not in others. Bombing, for example, is a component in low-
risk efficient sets throughout the 1970s, while assassination is more strongly 
represented in the medium and high risk ranges. However, a key observation is the 
following: one cannot assume that just because an attack method features 
predominantly in one particular risk-region that it will never be chosen by terrorists 
who are described by a different level of risk aversion. 
                                                     
82 It is usual, when working with the mean-variance geometry, to represent the decision-maker’s 
preferences by indifference curves. The indifference curves are convex, upward sloping, with 
steepness indicating the level of risk aversion. Superimposing an indifference map over the efficient 
set gives an indication of the risk ranges consistent with different decision-makers’ preferences. 
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A closer look at Table 6.7 reveals that low-risk Bombing is indeed included in the 
efficient set in 1978 in the medium-risk range. Similarly, Armed Assault, although 
most strongly represented in the medium-risk range, is also included in both the low 
and the high risk ranges albeit in smaller proportions. Failing to include these 
possibilities when assessing future terrorist action would ignore decisions and 
choices that terrorist decision-makers could make without contradicting their 
preferences for risk. 
In order to ground these points further and generate some new insights into the 
groups that were operating in West-Germany at the time, it is possible to inspect 
each group’s actions from the analytical perspective that we have been discussing. 
Table 6.8 lists the attack method combinations chosen by the eight most active 
terrorist groups in West-Germany during the 1970s, indicating the relative weighting 
attributed to each of six attack method categories and the media attention (c”) that 
could be expected to result from such a combination together with the associated 
standard deviation (risk).83 Figure 6.5 shows the expected media attention and risk 
of each group’s attack method combination relative to the efficient frontier for the 
period from 1970 to 1980. There are several interesting points to note. Several of the 
most active groups cluster noticeably in the low-risk range, indicative of higher levels 
of risk aversion. By contrast, the RAF and the 2nd June Movement each chose 
combinations with relatively high, but not extreme, risk. These two groups also 
pushed closest to the efficient frontier with the combinations they had chosen and it 
is not coincidental that these two groups showed the highest level of diversification 
during the period, choosing to allocate resources to more attack methods than most 
of the other active terrorist groups.84 
                                                     
83 This is expected media attention, not the media attention actually gathered, which may be higher 
or lower due to the variability inherent in the outcomes. 
84 Not all groups were active for the whole of the ten year period from 1970 to 1980. Sub-analyses 
may present interesting opportunities for future research. 
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Table 6.8 Attack Method Combinations, Most Active Groups, West-Germany, 1970-1980 
Name of Group 
Armed 
Assault 
Bombing/ 
Explosion 
Facility/Infrastr. 
Attack 
Hijacking 
Hostage-
Taking 
Assassination 
Nr of 
Attacks 
Standard 
Deviation 
(Risk) 
Expected 
Media 
Attention (c”) 
2nd June Movement 0.556 0.222 0 0 0.111 0.111 9 346.9777022 299.9919209 
Baader-Meinhof Group /Red Army Faction (RAF) 0.143 0.286 0.214 0 0.108 0.25 28 410.1668855 327.1604004 
Black September 0 0.8 0 0 0 0.2 5 203.911685 146.6023621 
Croatian Nationalists 0.125 0.625 0 0 0 0.25 8 228.4890669 171.6013172 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 80.32042645 68.54318122 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 5 173.5456314 95.19655429 
Red Cell 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 4 82.95583564 57.78072414 
Revolutionary Cells 0.286 0.571 0.143 0 0 0 21 90.60746932 78.0128762 
 
Figure 6.5 Expected Media Attention and Standard Deviation, Most Active Groups’ Attack Method Combinations, West-Germany, 1970-1980 
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Although the combinations chosen by the RAF and the 2nd June Movement lie in the 
medium-high range of risk, both groups included attack methods with less variable 
outcomes (i.e. bombings) in their combinations. The close proximity of the 
combinations of the RAF and the 2nd June Movement is significant given the close 
and competitive relationship between the two groups. It is plausible to suggest that 
both groups, sometimes taking the initiative and sometimes reacting to the actions 
of the other, pushed each other to take more risks and to allocate resources more 
efficiently. 
As was the case for the expected utility (logarithmic utility) preference orderings 
discussed in the previous section, where the preferences orderings were sometimes 
upset by the introduction of an attack method that had not yet been deployed during 
the period under consideration, the efficient opportunity sets can also be observed 
to undergo change and evolve when a new terrorist attack method is introduced. For 
example, the introduction of assassinations in 1972 had a reversal effect on the 
composition of the efficient set in the medium-risk range reducing the weighting of 
armed assault from very high (89.9%) in 1972 to very low (0.14%) in 1973 and 
increasing the weighting of hijacking from low (10.1%) in 1972 to a much higher level 
(52.7%) in 1973. Similarly, the introduction of unarmed assault in 1978 significantly 
shifted the weightings in the efficient combinations in the low-risk range from 
bombing to unarmed assault. At the same time, the introduction of unarmed assault 
completely removed facility/infrastructure attacks from the efficient set.  
The evolution of the opportunity sets over time, both in terms of the attack method 
categories included and their relative weightings, impact alternatives available to 
terrorist decision-makers regardless of their individual preferences; that is, there are 
macro-level factors that change the relationship between expected media attention 
and risk and, therefore, the opportunities to gather media attention by engaging in 
terrorist activity. While terrorist decision-makers maximising a mean-variance utility 
function and characterised by low risk aversion during the early 1970s may have 
concentrated almost all of their resources on hijacking (99.3%), by 1977 the balance 
of their attack method combination may well have shifted to assassination (73.6%) 
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and hostage-taking (20.9%), reducing the weighting allocated to hijacking to almost 
zero. Conversely, strongly risk-averse terrorist groups may have chosen to perpetrate 
mostly bombings (92.5%) in 1972, but by the very next year terrorist decision-makers 
maximising a mean-variance utility function may have reduced their allocation to 
bombings to 53.6%, while increasing the resources directed towards armed assault 
from 7.5% in 1972 to 41.1% in 1973 and increasing the allocation of resources to 
assassination to 5.3%. 
Mean-variance analysis provides a framework with which to depict and interpret the 
terrorism and media context. The efficient frontiers, especially when they are worked 
out for a rolling set of periods, provide a clear picture of the opportunities to gather 
media attention through terrorism. Underlying the geometric depictions are the 
combinations of actions that yield different average amounts of media attention at 
different levels of variability. This allows us to tell what attack methods constitute 
combinations at different levels of risk. Surprisingly, it is not always the most risky 
actions that constitute wholly the riskiest combinations and is it always the least risky 
actions that constitute wholly the safest combinations. When overlaid with a model 
of the terrorist group’s preferences, it is possible to determine which combinations 
may be chosen by groups with different risk preferences and, conversely, having 
observed a group choose in a certain way, it is possible to draw inferences about its 
level of risk aversion. Over a period of time, the group’s activity can be compared 
with the efficient frontier in order to see just how close or how far the group was 
from combining actions in an efficient manner. All of these new perspectives on this 
problem emerge from an application of mean-variance analysis.  
6.3.3 Prospect Theory Analysis and Terrorist Choice 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, two models of decision-making under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty have been applied to the analysis of terrorist choice 
in a context where media attention is the desired but uncertain or risky outcome of 
terrorist activity. Each model provides a new perspective on this context and 
generates insights that escape less formal analysis, especially in so far as that less 
formal analysis focuses on the highest absolute amount of media attention as the 
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factor that most directly shapes terrorist choice. It is known that decision-makers do 
not simply consider the expected outcomes but also consider the risk associated with 
those outcomes when making a choice from among alternative actions. By taking risk 
and the decision-maker’s risk preferences into account in developing a model of the 
decision-making process, the application of models like expected utility theory and 
mean-variance analysis allow us to explore in a more complete way the decisions 
that terrorists make in this context. Fundamentally, it is not always the case that 
terrorists will choose the action with the highest expected amount of media 
attention.  
One of the things that becomes clear from the application of expected utility theory 
and mean-variance analysis is that each model provides a distinct rendering of the 
decision-making process and a distinct analytical approach to determining a 
preference ordering over actions. For example, the way that mean-variance analysis 
can be used to develop a picture of the terrorist’s opportunities to obtain media 
attention at different levels of risk (the efficient set) is a useful analytical device and 
a useful interpretative device. During the 1960s and 1970s, economists and 
psychologists began to recognise the possibility of developing much more descriptive 
models of the decision-making process that embedded more and more behavioural 
characteristics observed to shape people’s decisions under risk and uncertainty. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed what would become the most prominent 
of these behavioural models. They called their model prospect theory. The technical 
development and structure of prospect theory was described in Chapter 4. Prospect 
theory contains a number of elements that make it a valuable counterpart and 
complement to the models that have been applied in the previous sections. 
As explained in Chapter 4, prospect theory has several key features. (1) Decision-
makers have a systematic tendency to weight probabilities non-linearly; they 
overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. (2) When 
assessing outcomes of actions, people are concerned with changes relative to a 
reference point rather than with absolute payoffs. (3) People act to maximise the 
expected value function 𝑉(𝑥) which is S-shaped; convex in the domain of losses and 
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concave in the domain of gains. The value function is steeper for losses than for gains 
as people are loss averse and feel losses more keenly than gains. (4) Subjective 
decision weights are assigned to probabilities and are employed in calculating 
expectations. In the cumulative version, cumulative probabilities are subjectively 
altered.  
Formally, the key technical feature of prospect theory is the introduction of decision 
weights into a model of the decision-making. In expected utility theory, the utility of 
outcomes is weighted by their probabilities of occurrence. The weighting is 
proportional and linear. In prospect theory, the value or utility of outcomes is 
weighted by a series of decision weights that are non-linear. This accounts for the 
observation that decision-makers often overweight unlikely outcomes and 
underweight more likely outcomes. Technically, therefore, an advantage of applying 
prospect theory to the determination of a preference ordering in any given context 
may derive from this complex portrayal of the weighting process. In general, it might 
be said that if terrorists are described by prospect theory, they may give unduly high 
weight to the prospect of an amount of media attention that is in fact very unlikely  
and vice versa. If this non-linearity is exaggerated enough, the terrorist group may 
choose in a manner that diverges from what would be predicted by expected utility 
theory.  
Less technical, but just as important to the structure of prospect theory, is the 
concept of the reference point. Whereas expected utility theory treats media 
attention absolutely, with every amount viewed as a gain, prospect theory depicts 
the terrorist group as choosing their actions by assessing potential outcomes against 
a reference point. As such, any particular amount of media attention may be 
considered to represent a loss if it fails to exceed the terrorist group’s reference 
point. In a context where media coverage is the desired but uncertain outcome, there 
cannot be negative amounts of media coverage (one cannot lose media coverage 
retrospectively and one cannot lose media coverage that was never accorded in the 
first place). For example, 100 c” of media attention received will be considered a loss 
if the decision-maker’s reference point is 101 c” or more and it will be considered a 
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gain for a reference point of 99 c” or less. Viewed from this perspective, outcomes of 
terrorist action are not considered in absolute terms alone, but in comparison to a 
point of reference. 
The reference point concept allows us to develop some additional and unique 
insights into the ways in which media attention may shape terrorist choice. There are 
three insights that emerge when the formation of the reference point in this context 
is considered. First, the terrorist group may reference its own previous outcomes in 
deciding which actions to perpetrate. If it has formed a low or high reference point 
as the result of past behaviour, its choices may be shaped in particular ways. Second, 
the terrorist group may aspire to a certain amount of media attention that it believes 
is necessary to establish the group’s identity. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
the terrorist group may reference the outcomes of other groups’ actions in deciding 
which actions to perpetrate. In a context where groups compete with each other to 
establish themselves as known terrorist groups, the media attention accorded to the 
actions of one group may form the basis for the reference point of a competing 
group. This reference point will shape the group’s choices in particular ways by 
altering the perspective from which the group perceives alternative actions and their 
prospective outcomes.    
Analytically, the reference point concept may also provide a way to cut through some 
of the complexity that might be perceived to characterise the media context. The 
media context in West-Germany was depicted in the first part of this chapter. 
Although the general trends are probably clearly defined enough to allow reasonably 
formed decisions to be made, by referencing a rival group or its own past behaviour, 
a considerable simplification may be achieved; that is, the terrorist group does not 
necessarily have to look at everything that is happening but only, say, at what one or 
two groups are doing and what media attention those groups are receiving. It should 
also be noted that the reference point is not a static concept. It may drift or change 
over time as the context changes and the group observes or experiences certain 
outcomes. It may also be subject to considerable disagreement within a terrorist 
group. If law enforcement agencies know or suspect that a particular group 
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references its choice of action against the media attention of another group or if it is 
known that a particular group always attempts to outdo the media attention 
achieved by its previous action, together with a basic statistical picture of the 
contemporary context, it may be possible to form some expectation regarding the 
type of action that the terrorist group may choose to do next. Tension regarding the 
group’s aspirations, reflected in the reference point, may splinter relations within the 
group in ways that represent important opportunities for law enforcement and 
intelligence. The value of decision theory lies not only in its formal determination of 
preference orderings but in the rich nature of the inferences that it may assist us to 
draw.  
Complementing the concepts of non-linear probability weights and the reference 
point are two additional concepts unique to prospect theory. These are loss aversion 
and the idea of a domain of gains and losses. Not only does prospect theory allow us 
to treat losses in this context (outcomes less than the reference point) but it also 
allows us to treat particular behavioural reactions to potential losses. If a terrorist 
group holds a reference point, say 100 c”, outcomes lower than the reference point 
are perceived as losses. Loss aversion refers to the fact that decision-makers weight 
losses more heavily than gains. A gain of 20 c” above the reference point (i.e. an 
outcome of 120 c”) confers less satisfaction than the pain felt when bearing a loss of 
20 c” below the reference point (i.e. an outcome of 80 c”). The behavioural response 
to loss aversion is risk-seeking over losses and risk aversion over gains. This is 
behaviour not reflected in the other two models that have been applied in this thesis, 
based as they are on considerations of risk aversion, not risk-seeking behaviour.  
Prospect theory operationalises risk aversion and risk-seeking in the two different 
domains. The domain of gains (losses) refers to the range of prospective outcomes, 
relative to the reference point, expected to result from alternative actions. The range 
of prospective outcomes and the reference point together determine the size of the 
domain of gains (losses). In the present context, where each prospective action is 
expected to generate some amount of media attention ranging from nothing to some 
higher amount, the domain of gains (losses) will be greater (less) depending on the 
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terrorist group’s reference point. A terrorist group with a low reference point 
confronts a larger domain of gains (smaller domain of losses) than a terrorist group 
with a high reference point. Loss aversion, the propensity to avoid losses, instigates 
risk-seeking behaviour when the terrorist group confronts a set of alternative actions 
that predominantly produce outcomes expected to be below the reference point. 
Risk aversion is instigated when the terrorist group confronts a set of alternative 
actions that predominantly produce outcomes expected to be above the reference 
point. In one case, therefore, we would expect the terrorist group to display a 
tendency towards those actions with higher but more variable outcomes and in the 
other case we would expect the terrorist group to display a tendency towards those 
actions with lower but more certain outcomes.  
The discussion is now complemented by a formal quantitative application of 
cumulative prospect theory to the terrorism context in West-Germany. This 
application formalises the insights and inferences that we have been discussing and 
demonstrates how prospect theory works. Primarily, like the other models of the 
decision-making process, prospect theory is designed to determine a preference 
ordering over alternative risky prospects. The risky prospects in this context are 
terrorist actions that potentially result in some amount of media attention being 
accorded to the group that perpetrated them. The application shows the impact of 
reference points, perceptions of chance and likelihood, and loss aversion on terrorist 
choice in this context. The application is followed by a deeper discussion of particular 
choices that were observed in the period under consideration. Together, this 
quantitative analysis and formal narrative approach provide a behavioural 
perspective on terrorist decision-making when media attention is desired but 
uncertain.  
Using the data gathered for this thesis, cumulative prospect theory was applied to 
determine a set of preference orderings over the alternative actions. There is, of 
course, a multiplicity of preference orderings for each different sub-period and 
reference point. The data for the overall period, 1970 to 1980, forms the basis for 
the results reported here. Similar patterns characterise all of the sub-periods. It will 
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be recalled from Chapter 4 that the formal structure of prospect theory is 
represented by a set of equations that detail the value function and the probability 
weighting functions: 
𝑉 =∑𝑣(∆𝑥𝑖)𝜋(𝑝𝑖) 
 
𝑣(∆𝑥) = {
𝑣(∆𝑥)𝛼 ∆𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−∆𝑥)𝛽 ∆𝑥 < 0
} 
 
𝜋𝑖 = {
𝜋𝑖
− = 𝑤−(𝑝1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑖) − 𝑤
−(𝑝1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑖−1) ∆𝑥 < 0
𝜋𝑖
+ = 𝑤+(𝑝𝑖 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑁) − 𝑤
+(𝑝𝑖+1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑁) ∆𝑥 ≥ 0
} 
 
≔ 
{
 
 
 
 𝑤+(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛾
(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)
1
𝛾
∆𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑤−(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛿
(𝑝𝛿 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛿)1/𝛿
∆𝑥 < 0
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are several parameters whose values must be estimated in order to use the 
model. The values of these parameters have been the subject of much research in 
behavioural economics and psychology. For the purposes of this application, the 
values reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) are used. For the loss aversion 
parameter 𝜆 a value of 2.25 is used, for the parameters 𝛾 and 𝛿, values of 0.61 and 
0.69, respectively, are used and, finally, for 𝛼 and 𝛽, each is accorded a value of 0.88. 
These parameter values are the result of intensive research in experimental settings. 
The full structure of prospect theory, as can be readily appreciated, is quite complex 
when considered alongside a model such as (basic) expected utility theory. The 
behavioural dimensions that are incorporated into the prospect theory model are 
deeper and some simplicity is sacrificed in order to accomplish a more descriptive 
theory of decision-making.  
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Viewed from the perspective of cumulative prospect theory, the terrorist group is 
depicted as choosing from among alternative actions on the basis of the media 
attention that the group expects to result from deploying particular actions. The 
group’s assessment, however, takes place with regards to a reference point rather 
than an assessment of the absolute amount of media attention expected. As 
explained, various behavioural characteristics impact the decision-making process, 
including the tendency to overweight or underweight particular outcomes and the 
desire to avoid losses if at all possible. As before, the value or utility that the group 
attributes to an amount of media attention is the basis for the decision. In deciding 
from among alternative actions, this value or utility is weighted by a decision weight 
and summed over outcomes to arrive at a prospect value for each alternative. The 
action with the highest prospect value is the most desirable.  
In addition to being the first analysis to apply prospect theory to the analysis of 
terrorist choice in a context where media attention is the desired payoff, this thesis 
represents one of few applications of prospect theory in an empirical setting (see 
Barberis, 2013). During the 1970s, terrorist groups deployed seven different attack 
methods. Using the average and standard deviation of the media attention accorded 
to each alternative and assuming normally distributed outcomes over time, an 
application of prospect theory involves determining the values and decision weights 
for each outcome for each alternative action and using these to compute the 
prospect value that forms the basis for a preference ordering over the alternatives. 
Unlike basic expected utility theory, the decision weights are non-linear for both 
gains and losses. An example, which depicts the weighting function for gains for the 
attack method category Bombing, is shown in Figure 6.6.85 
 
 
                                                     
85 The curvature of the function is determined by the magnitude of 𝛾 and 𝛿. 
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Figure 6.6 Non-Linear Probability Weights, Gains, Bombing, 1970-1980 
 
The inverse S-shaped decision-weighting function depicts a tendency to overweight 
less likely outcomes and underweight more likely outcomes. Expected utility theory, 
by contrast, depicts directly proportional or linear weighting. For a bombing attack, 
therefore, the terrorist group is depicted by prospect theory as attaching a higher 
(lower) weight to the less (more) likely amounts of media attention expected to 
derive from the action. The decision weights are applied to the values or utilities that 
the decision-maker attributes to each possible gain or loss (relative to the reference 
point). These values are shown in Figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.7 S-Shaped Value Function, Reference Point = 150, Bombing, 1970-1980 
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The value function is S-shaped to reflect risk-seeking in the domain of losses and risk 
aversion in the domain of gains. In Figure 6.7, we have chosen a reference point of 
150 (c”). The value function is kinked at the reference point. Essentially, the decision-
maker overweights and underweights different outcomes and comes to a 
determination of the prospect value of each action and chooses the action with the 
highest prospect value.  
The relative size of the domains of losses and gains plays an important role in shaping 
the outcomes of the decision-making process. The size of the domain of losses 
relative to the domain of gains is, of course, determined by the range of outcomes 
that can be expected to result from a particular action. It is also determined by the 
reference point; that is, the domain of gains or losses is perceived to be wider or 
narrower depending on the perspective of the decision-maker. Figure 6.8 presents 
the value function from Figure 6.7 but with a reference point of 300 (c”). With the 
other aspects of the decision-maker’s character held constant, the different 
reference point provides a starkly different perspective on the media attention 
expected to result from a bombing attack.  
 
Figure 6.8 S-Shaped Value Function, Reference Point = 300, Bombing, 1970-1980 
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gains and losses is different for each prospective action. As the reference point 
increases, the terrorist group’s desire to avoid losses, which is the loss aversion 
inherent in prospect theory, pushes it towards the actions expected to generate 
higher (but less certain) amounts of media attention. The terrorist group becomes 
more risk-seeking as its reference point increases because the group is willing to take 
more risk in order to avoid the unpleasantness of losses. This behaviour is inherent 
in prospect theory and has been observed in different settings. The preference 
orderings determined by applying cumulative prospect theory to the data gathered 
for this thesis should also reflect this tendency.  
Cumulative prospect theory generates a new picture of terrorist choice in a context 
where media attention is the desired but uncertain outcome of terrorist activity. The 
preference orderings deriving from cumulative prospect theory for each of the attack 
methods used during the period under consideration (for a range of reference points) 
are presented in Table 6.9. The overarching pattern is one of increasing tendency 
towards actions with higher but more variable outcomes as the reference point 
increases. At the lowest reference points, unarmed assault is favoured. As the 
reference point increases, actions such as bombing and armed assault come to be 
favoured. As the reference point increases further, hijacking, assassination and 
hostage-taking achieve the highest places in the preference orderings deriving from 
cumulative prospect theory.   
Table 6.9 Preference Rankings resulting from Prospect Value Analysis 
Reference 
Point (c”) 
Armed 
Assault 
Unarmed 
Assault 
Bombing/ 
Explosion 
Facility / 
Infrastruct. 
Hijacking 
Hostage 
Taking 
Assassin- 
ation 
5 4 1 2 3 5 7 6 
50 4 1 2 3 5 7 6 
100 4 3 1 2 5 7 6 
300 1 4 2 3 5 7 6 
500 1 5 4 3 2 7 6 
750 2 6 4 3 1 7 5 
1,000 3 6 5 4 1 7 2 
2,000 4 7 6 5 2 3 1 
3,000 4 7 6 5 3 1 2 
5,000 4 7 6 5 3 1 2 
8,500 4 7 6 5 3 1 2 
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Like the other models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty that we have 
applied, prospect theory does not lead us to conclude that the terrorist group will 
necessarily choose the action with the highest expected amount of media attention. 
Several behavioural characteristics, including the reference point, will shape the 
decision. This allows us to account for the range of actions that terrorist groups are 
observed to perpetrate at different times. Groups with lower reference points, for 
example, may be engaged in some types of actions while those with higher reference 
points may be engaged in others. Given the positive relationship between average 
media attention and its variability over time, groups with higher reference points 
must bear more risk. Because the domain of losses is wider for these groups (given 
the stable relationship between risk and reward that generally characterises the 
terrorism context), these groups may be expected to be quite risk-seeking in their 
decision-making. This behaviour, explained by prospect theory, derives from the 
group’s desire to avoid losses. If a group’s reference point moves sharply higher, 
perhaps due to the outcomes obtained by a rival group, it may exhibit risk-seeking 
behaviour and a willingness to engage in actions that it previously accorded much 
lower preference.  
Prospect values can be computed for any risky prospects, including combinations. 
Therefore, it can be applied to the combinations determined in the previous section. 
The same pattern will emerge once again. A higher prospect value will be accorded 
to the more risky combinations as the reference point rises. Groups with higher 
reference points will exhibit a tendency to engage in combinations of actions with 
higher but less certain outcomes and vice versa. Groups whose reference points are 
reshaped higher or lower over time, will be observed to engage in more risky or less 
risky combinations of actions than previously. Using both mean-variance analysis and 
prospect theory allows us to consider the changing structure of attack method 
combinations selected by terrorist groups over time. If a terrorist group suddenly 
shifts its reference point sharply higher, it must add higher risk actions to its existing 
combination or increase the weight accorded to those higher risk actions if they are 
already represented in the group’s existing combination. A higher reference point 
necessitates a rightward shift along the efficient frontier.  
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As was outlined in Chapter 2, terrorist groups active in Germany during the 1970s 
were well aware of the actions of other groups and the outcomes that those actions 
achieved. Members of the RAF not only kept detailed records of media reports but 
also had a complex and intertwined relationship with the 2nd June Movement (see 
for example: Wunschik, 2006, p. 542; Peters, 2007, p. 321; Winkler, 2008, pp. 246, 
247). This relationship included collaboration, the sharing of bounty and allies, 
expressions of solidarity, but also inter-group rivalries, competition over limited 
resources, jealousy at the other group’s successes and, in consequence, steps to vie 
for dominance and public recognition. Winkler (2008, p. 177) cites Bommi Baumann, 
member of the 2nd June Movement, who in 1975 put it this way: “Wer die 
knallhärtesten Taten bringt, der gibt die Richtung an” (Those who can pull off the 
toughest actions, point the way).  
The premise that terrorists reference their actions at least partially to actions of other 
terrorist groups is further supported by a quotation from RAF member Stefan 
Wisniewski (1997, p. 36), who in 1978 was charged and sentenced to life in prison for 
participation in the RAF kidnapping and murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer, President 
of the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations, in 1977. In an interview 
conducted in an Aachen prison in 1997, Wisniewski recalls the 2nd June Movement’s 
hostage-taking of West-Berlin Mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz in 1975 and suggests 
that his own group (the RAF) would have done well to emulate this action: “Am 
Augenmaß der Bewegung 2. Juni hätten wir uns ruhig ein Beispiel nehmen können“ 
(We could have learned a lesson from the sense of proportion displayed by the 
2nd  June Movement). However, with the benefit of hindsight, he adds: „Aber die 
Lorenz-Entführung hat wohl auch die Kräfteverhältnisse verändert” (But the Lorenz-
kidnapping had possibly changed the balance of power). Through the perpetration of 
the Lorenz-kidnapping the 2nd June Movement had been able to extract considerable 
concessions from the German government (see P. J. Phillips & Pohl, 2014, pp. 142-
143). The media coverage of this terrorist incident throughout all of its stages was 
considerable and on par with the media attention accorded to the assassination 
attack on the Munich Olympic Village in 1972 (see Table 6.2). No other terrorist 
attack throughout the 1970s had received an amount of media coverage of similar 
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proportions. It seemed clear that the next terrorist action had to be bigger than the 
Lorenz-kidnapping (Winkler, 2008, p. 252) in order to increase the RAF’s chances of 
attracting similar media attention and governmental concessions. With key-
members of the first RAF generation still imprisoned and weakened (or dead) after a 
series of collective hunger-strikes and spurred on by the recent success of the 
2nd  June Movement, members of the RAF’s second generation travelled across 
Europe scoping out potential targets for their next attack. In April 1975, just two 
months after the Lorenz-kidnapping a decision was made and a hostage-taking 
(barricade incident) perpetrated on the German Embassy in Stockholm. The RAF’s 
demands for the release of their hostages were very similar to the terms previously 
dictated by and granted to the 2nd June Movement in the Lorenz-kidnapping. Again, 
demands for extensive media coverage of the release of fellow terrorists held in 
German prisons were included. However, this time the German government was 
unwilling to concede and the action essentially failed for the RAF. In an interview with 
Der Spiegel magazine German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt summarised the 
government’s resolve: “Denen musste doch mal gezeigt werden, daß es einen Willen 
gibt, der stärker ist als ihrer“ (Somebody had to show them [the terrorists] that there 
is a will that is stronger than theirs). The German police force received additional 
resources and weapons while entitlements for terrorists held in custody and their 
lawyers were curtailed (Winkler, 2008, pp. 254-255). What followed were challenging 
times for the RAF, characterised by introspection and tensions within the group but 
their study of media reports and deployment of media strategies continued (Winkler, 
2008, p. 259): “Medienbeobachtung ist wichtig, und mehr denn je ist die RAF ein 
Medienphänomen” (Monitoring of media reports is important, and more than ever 
the RAF is a media phenomenon). However, despite its efforts, the RAF was 
weakened, key-members were still imprisoned, and group members underground 
were short of money, weapons and resources. In addition, two other terrorist groups, 
the Revolutionary Cells and the Croatian Nationals, became increasingly active 
relative to the RAF and were able to secure some media attention. On Mothers’ Day 
in May 1976, founding member of the RAF, Ulrike Meinhof, was found dead in her 
cell. News of her apparent suicide did not even appear in the print media until five 
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days later, as her death occurred during a period of industrial action which 
significantly disrupted the printing of newspapers for almost two weeks; a fact Ulrike 
Meinhof may not have been aware of during her last tumultuous days. It seems ironic 
that the ultimate and final demonstrative action of this accomplished journalist, 
columnist, media strategist, and ultimately terrorist barely received much media 
attention at all. The history of media attention accorded to terrorist actions during 
the 1970s would have made it clear to any astute observer that only a few types of 
attack methods remained which, if successful, would be capable of re-establishing 
the RAF’s position. 
On 7 April 1977, RAF “Kommando Ulrike Meinhof Rote Armee Fraktion” assassinated 
Federal Attorney General Siegfried Buback in a drive-by shooting in which two of his 
staff were also fatally wounded. Many were shocked by the incident as Peters (2007, 
p. 382) observes: “War Generalbundesanwalt Buback doch der oberste 
Terroristenjäger des Landes: Wenn es der RAF gelingt, ihn zu ermorden, wozu wird 
diese Gruppe noch in der Lage sein?, fragen sich viele Menschen“ (Federal Attorney 
General Buback was the top hunter of terrorists in the country: if the RAF can manage 
to murder him, what else will this group be capable of?, many people ask 
themselves). At the end of April 1977, surviving key-members of the RAF’s first 
generation, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe were sentenced to 
life in prison. Leading members of the 2nd June Movement had also been arrested 
and were held in custody. On the outside remaining RAF members were working 
feverishly to prepare their next action. A hostage-taking was to facilitate the “big 
raushole” (the big ‘getting out’), meaning to force the release of terrorists from 
prison in exchange for the life of two high-profile hostages: Dresdner Bank speaker 
Jürgen Ponto and President of the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations 
Hanns Martin Schleyer (Wisniewski, 1997, p. 36; Winkler, 2008, p. 304). On 30 July 
1977, the group drew on the personal connection of RAF member Susanne Albrecht 
to Jürgen Ponto and attempted to take the Dresdner Bank speaker hostage (Peters, 
2007, pp. 388-391). However, the action did not proceed as planned. Within a few 
minutes of Ponto and his wife unsuspectingly welcoming RAF members into their 
home Ponto was fatally shot by one of the terrorists all of whom managed to escape.  
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The failed hostage-taking of Jürgen Ponto exemplifies the inherent risks of this attack 
method not only in terms of operational results but also in terms of the outcome that 
can be expected with regard to media attention. The Ponto case attracted less than 
one third (2,566.30 c”) of the media attention accorded to the successful hostage-
taking of Peter Lorenz just two years earlier (8,356.33 c”). In fact, members of the 
2nd June Movement had faced a very similar scenario in November 1974 (Peters, 
2007, p. 321) when the group’s attempted hostage-taking of Günter von Drenkmann, 
President of the Superior Court of Justice (Kammergericht), failed and turned into an 
assassination-style attack in Drenkmann’s private residence which left him shot and 
killed. Unlike the group’s hostage-taking of Peter Lorenz a few months later, the 
attack on Günter von Drenkmann resulted in only limited media attention 
(362.20 c”). No attacks were perpetrated by the 2nd June Movement in 1977 while 
the RAF certainly appeared to be focused on high-risk attack methods, albeit with 
further unplanned results.   
On 25 August 1977 an oversight narrowly foiled the RAF’s rocket-launcher attack on 
the building of the Federal Attorney's office (Bundesanwaltschaft) in Karlsruhe. While 
the scale of the attack, if successful, could easily have destroyed the entire building 
(Peters, 2007, p. 395), the action was interpreted by the media and consequently the 
GTD as an assassination attempt on a specific person, Generalbundesanwalt (Public 
Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice) Kurt Rebmann. Significant 
damage was avoided as the RAF’s technician, Peter-Jürgen Boock, had not wound up 
the alarm clock that would have been necessary to set off the time fuse, a mistake 
which the group later claimed to have been intentional as the whole operation had 
been staged as no more than a warning. Despite the high risks incurred by the RAF, 
the payoffs received were negligibly small. In terms of media attention, only 456.82 
c” were accorded, equivalent to merely 5.5% of the amount of media coverage 
accorded to the Lorenz hostage-taking which remained the most successful terrorist 
action of the 1970s. Despite the set-backs incurred, the RAF pressed ahead and 
prepared the group’s final action during this eventful period later referred to as the 
German Autumn (Deutscher Herbst). 
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On 5 September 1977, several members of the RAF forced the passenger car that the 
President of the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations 
(Arbeitgeberpräsident) Hanns Martin Schleyer was travelling in as well as an 
escorting vehicle into a traffic accident. When the vehicles came to a halt, the RAF 
killed four men in an assassination-style rapid fire shooting: Schleyer’s driver, the 
driver of the second vehicle and two bodyguards. Miraculously, Schleyer himself 
sustained no injuries. Before any help could arrive, Schleyer was dragged from his 
car, transferred to a waiting van, injected with a short-term narcotic and rushed off 
to the terrorists’ first hide-out. The attack took less than a couple of minutes and was 
witnessed by a 10-year old boy, who believed he was watching the filming of a movie 
scene. Just thirty minutes later at around 6.00pm news of the event reached German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who immediately called for a televised address. At 
9.20pm, less than four hours after the Schleyer hostage-taking, the Chancellor gazed 
intensely into the camera addressing not only the German public but also Schleyer’s 
hostage-takers directly via this public television broadcast. It was the first of several 
communications between the German government and the RAF hostage-takers in a 
terrorist action that continued for 43 days. The incident attracted the longest lasting 
and highest volume of print media reports of the decade: 18,672.99 c” in Bild, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt alone, more than double the amount of media 
attention accorded to the Lorenz hostage-taking and more than seven times the 
volume of reporting following the failed Ponto hostage-taking attempt less than two 
months earlier. In terms of having their demands for the exchange of their hostage 
met, however, the action failed for the RAF, despite their securing the support of 
Palestinian terrorists who seized a German Lufthansa airliner (“Landshut”) and 
seconded the RAF’s demands in exchange for the release of their Landshut hostages. 
In a rescue operation entitled “Feuerzauber” (fire magic) on 18 October 1977, 
German counter terrorism group GSG 9 stormed the Landshut aircraft in Mogadishu, 
Somalia, freeing all hostages and killing three of the hijackers. Shortly thereafter, RAF 
founding member Andreas Baader as well as Gudrun Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe were 
found dead in their Stammheim prison cells. The next day, Schleyer’s body was 
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discovered in a car near Mulhouse, France. He had died through an execution-style 
shooting committed by remaining members of the RAF.86  
Prospect theory provides a rich framework with which to interpret and analyse these 
decisions and events. That terrorist groups may reference their actions against those 
of other groups and therefore assess the potential gains and losses of alternative 
actions relatively rather than absolutely generates new insights into terrorist 
decision-making and allows us to consider different ways in which terrorist choices 
may be shaped in a particular context. When a terrorist group perpetrates an 
extremely successful action, the positive trade-off between average (expected) 
outcomes and the possibility that the actual outcome diverges from the expected 
outcome leads us to expect that the group’s competitors will exhibit at least some 
tendency towards more risky actions when planning their next attack. In the 
terrorism context that we have used to frame the analysis, the experience with 
terrorism in West-Germany in the 1970s, groups that viewed themselves as rivals of 
the 2nd June Movement and who formed their reference points on the basis of the 
outcomes of actions perpetrated by that group may have been expected to shift their 
reference points sharply higher in the wake of the 2nd June Movement’s particularly 
successful actions. Cumulative prospect theory would lead us to expect more risk-
seeking behaviour from rival groups and a tendency towards the actions with higher 
but more variable outcomes. In the context that we have been considering, hostage-
taking was such an action. The RAF’s decisions may be interpreted from this 
perspective.   
6.4 Conclusion 
Chapter 6 presented a discussion of the media and terrorism context in West-
Germany during the period from 1970 to 1980. This discussion stressed the stories 
and reality that can be so easily obscured by the overarching statistics. The 
experience with terrorism in West-Germany in the 1970s was shaped by many 
                                                     
86 Considerable details surrounding the course of events of the Schleyer hostage-taking and the death 
of RAF members in their Stammheim prison cells are described by Peters (2007, pp. 401-470) and 
Winkler (2008, pp. 308-350). 
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factors, not least the actions of the many different active terrorist groups, each 
perpetrating actions using a variety of different methods. Although the motives for 
terrorism are complex, this thesis is primarily concerned with media attention as a 
desired outcome of terrorist activity. The data collected for this thesis provides an 
insight into the relative amounts of attention accorded to different actions over a 
ten-year period. If the amount of media attention expected to result from a particular 
action is considered by the terrorist group when it decides which action to 
perpetrate, an understanding of the structure of media attention within the 
terrorism context is essential to developing a full understanding of terrorist choice.  
In Chapter 3, we concluded that the extant approach within the terrorism and media 
studies literature has been to accord a strong emphasis to the absolute amount of 
media attention received by a particular group or a particular type of action. The 
implication, and sometimes the explicit conclusion, is that the terrorist group will 
choose the action that is expected to generate the most media attention. The 
literature also implies (or states, as the case may be) that terrorist groups can 
manufacture media attention and, indeed, that media attention leads to or causes 
terrorism. By contrast, this thesis stresses the uncertainty of media attention and its 
variability from attack to attack. From this perspective, actions are not guarantees of 
media attention or the method of manufacturing some given amount, but risky 
prospects expected to generate some uncertain amount of media attention. There is 
an inherent risk that the actual outcome of a terrorist action, in terms of the media 
attention it is accorded, is somewhat different from the amount that was expected. 
In this context the terrorist group will not necessarily choose the action with the 
highest expected amount of media attention. Rather, the decision will incorporate 
various behavioural factors, each reflected to some degree by the complementary 
models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty.  
In this chapter, three complementary models were applied to the terrorism and 
media context of West-Germany for the period from 1970 to 1980. The basic 
expected utility theory provides a more sophisticated perspective than the simple 
expected value approach implicit in the terrorism and media studies literature. 
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Specifying the terrorist group’s utility function as ln (𝑥), the order of preferences over 
the alternative attack methods can be determined in a manner that takes into 
consideration not only the expected outcomes and their variability (risk) but the 
decision-maker’s risk aversion. The fundamental result of all such applications is the 
determination of a preference ordering of the available alternatives. The analysis 
proceeded by working out the preference orderings that would have characterised 
such a decision-maker for each sub-period during the 1970s and explored the impact 
of new attack methods. This application allows us to highlight the interaction of 
outcomes, probabilities and some basic decision-making metrics in the 
determination of the terrorist group’s preferences in a context where media 
attention is desirable but uncertain.  
Terrorist groups, of course, are not always observed to restrict themselves to a single 
attack method or type of action. Over time or within a given period of time, terrorist 
groups will more commonly be observed to engage in more than one type of action. 
This is somewhat at odds with any explanation that would aim to explain terrorist 
choice as being guided primarily by the total absolute amount of media attention 
expected to result from a particular single action. In order to explore terrorist groups’ 
tendency to combine attack methods over time, mean-variance (portfolio) analysis 
was applied to determine the set of opportunities (to combine actions) that could be 
expected to generate efficient or optimal amounts of media attention at each given 
level of risk. This produced, for the first time in this context, a series of efficient 
frontiers depicting the terrorist groups’ opportunities to obtain media attention by 
combining attack methods in different ways.  
The mean-variance perspective highlights the positive relationship that exists 
between the expected amount of media attention and its variability or risk. The 
efficient frontiers are positively sloped. Importantly, the efficient frontiers are also 
concave to some degree. This reflects the gains from combination that terrorist 
groups may yield. Higher expected amounts of media attention can be obtained at 
each level of risk than we would expect if we only analysed attack methods 
individually. Terrorist groups who naïvely avoid putting all of their eggs in one basket 
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will obtain these increments in media attention, something that would be overlooked 
by other types of analysis. The determination of the efficient frontier generates the 
sets of attack method combinations that generate the highest expected amount of 
media attention at each level of risk. It is possible to identify the constituents of those 
combinations and identify the structure of attack method combinations consistent 
with different levels of risk. Because the terrorist group’s risk aversion is the primary 
determinant of choice in this context, it is then a straightforward matter to identify 
the types of choices that would be consistent with groups’ different levels of risk 
aversion.  
Both expected utility analysis and mean-variance analysis are orthodox approaches. 
The analysis was complemented by the application of a behavioural model, 
(cumulative) prospect theory. This model incorporates several behavioural features 
that are absent from the other models. Most prominently, prospect theory includes 
the effects of non-linear decision-weights, loss aversion and reference points in the 
decision-making process. This model allows us to consider situations where terrorist 
groups underweight or overweight different outcomes and, importantly, assess the 
gains and losses expected to be generated by a particular action against a reference 
point (rather than absolutely). Prospect theory provides a rich complementary 
perspective on terrorist group choice in this context. The overarching tendency 
implied by the model and reflected in the preference orderings that were determined 
in the analysis is that higher reference points will be associated with a tendency to 
seek risk and, therefore, a tendency towards engagement in those actions with 
higher but more uncertain outcomes in terms of the media attention they can be 
expected to generate.  
Together, these three decision-making models provide a unique analytical 
perspective on terrorist choice that can be applied in any context. During the 1970s, 
West-Germany experienced a terrorism context that is still accorded much scholarly 
interest today. The application of decision theory to this context generates a number 
of new insights into the ways in which the choices of terrorist groups may have been 
shaped by the evolving media and socio-political environment. Rather than simply 
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conclude that terrorist groups must have chosen those actions they expected to 
generate the highest amount of media attention, we have developed richer analytical 
vocabulary with which to facilitate discussion of the actions of these groups and of 
terrorist groups active at other times and in other places. Terrorists are risk-averse, 
experience diminishing marginal utility, naïvely or knowingly combine attack 
methods, consider the ups and downs in media attention accorded to different 
actions, assess gains and losses against a reference point and take risks to avoid 
losses. More deeply than this, terrorist groups that choose in a particular way may 
be identified as being more or less risk-averse, expectations may be formed regarding 
their future actions and, if terrorist groups adjust their reference points in light of the 
outcomes achieved by other groups, may be expected to engage in certain types of 
activity, some of which may be quite different from that which the group has been 
observed to perpetrate in the past.   
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Chapter 7  - Conclusion 
7.0 Introduction 
It is the purpose of this thesis to present an analysis of terrorist choice in a context 
where media attention is the desired but risky or uncertain outcome of terrorist 
activity. Although ‘terrorism and the media’ is a longstanding research program that 
has collected contributions from several different disciplines, on those few occasions 
when studies focus their attention on the ways in which the amount of media 
attention accorded to different actions may shape terrorist choice, there has been a 
tendency to emphasise the absolute amount of media attention accorded to an 
action as the primary consideration of the terrorist decision-maker. The implication 
that the terrorist group will choose the action that can be expected to attract the 
highest amount of media attention leaves the matter of risk and uncertainty to one 
side and results in the improper classification of terrorist actions as guaranteed 
manufacturers of media attention. Terrorist actions are risky and the outcomes are 
uncertain. Terrorist actions can be expected to be accorded some amount of media 
attention but the actual amount may be quite different from that which was 
expected. Terrorist actions are risky prospects. Decision theory, both orthodox and 
behavioural, provides a number of complementary models of decision-making that 
can be applied to develop a more satisfactory interpretative and analytical 
framework for terrorist choice in the media context.  
In this final chapter of the thesis, the approach that has been taken to the adaptation 
and application of orthodox expected utility theory, mean-variance analysis and 
cumulative prospect theory to the terrorism and media context is summarised. The 
conclusions that can be reached from the new perspectives constructed by this 
analysis overcome the weaknesses with existing approaches and open new paths 
towards a more complete understanding of terrorist choice and the ways in which 
terrorist decisions may be shaped by the media attention accorded to different types 
of terrorist actions. Several behaviours that terrorist groups are observed to engage 
in in this context are encompassed, for the first time, in an analytical framework. The 
choice of actions that are not expected to generate the highest amount of media 
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attention can be explained with reference to expected utility (rather than expected 
value) and risk aversion. The choice to combine actions can be explained with 
reference to the advantages pertaining to risk management that may accrue to 
groups that diversify, even naïvely. The choice to compete with but not necessarily 
to copy the actions of rival groups can be explained by utilising the reference point 
concept that lies at the heart of prospect theory. These observed terrorist behaviours 
have not received satisfactory analytical treatment up until now.  
7.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.2 the main contributions of the 
thesis are listed. The nature of the thesis means that its contributions stretch across 
several dimensions of the domain of the media and terrorism context. In Section 7.3 
the generalisability of the insights that have been generated by an application of 
decision theory to terrorist choice and its operationalisation within the particular 
context of West-German terrorism is explored. In Section 7.4 the ongoing relevance 
of left-wing extremism and the legacy of the archetype examples of terrorist groups 
that were active at the time is discussed with reference to the modern terrorism 
landscape. In Sections 7.5 and 7.6 the limitations of the study are outlined and ways 
in which these may be overcome by future research are identified. Section 7.7 
concludes the thesis.    
7.2 Summary of Contributions 
The application of decision theory to terrorist choice and the analysis of what this 
allows us to say about how those choices may be shaped by the media attention 
accorded to different terrorist actions represents the main focus of the thesis. 
However, the contributions to the literature are much broader and derive from the 
ways in which the main focus of the thesis has been approached, and situated within, 
a multidisciplinary field with many interconnected parts. The thesis deals with an 
area of study within terrorism studies that has been called ‘terrorism and the media’. 
This area of study aims to understand the interaction, in a very broad sense, between 
terrorism and the popular and mainstream press. Here we find a range of studies, 
from more targeted investigations exploring, for example, the amount of media 
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attention that certain actions have been accorded, to essay length discussions of the 
potential for symbiosis between terrorist groups and the media. A characteristic of 
the more focused analytical studies is their placement within a particular media and 
terrorism context. 
The choice of historical or contemporary period is not inconsequential, although 
general conclusions can almost always be reached. Sometimes, the absolute 
contemporary obtains its significance from its very contemporariness. This does not 
necessarily mean that the absolute contemporary should always be chosen to frame 
an analysis, nor does it mean that the ‘best’ insights will always be found by doing so. 
In dealing with any problem, apart from a purely contemporary one, certain 
advantages may be found to characterise other periods in terms of their suitability 
and relevance as a setting within which to apply new analytical methods. A study of 
the interaction of terrorist groups with the social media is a purely contemporary 
problem requiring, for the moment, a purely contemporary setting. A study of the 
interaction of terrorist groups with the popular and mainstream press is not a purely 
contemporary problem. Furthermore, certain settings will be richer than others in 
terms of terrorist activity and the awareness that terrorist groups may plausibly have 
exhibited with regards to the media attention accorded to their actions and those of 
their counterparts. Some settings are rich enough to provide archetype examples of 
certain behaviours that are observed to run in a continuous stream through the 
literature. The experience of West-Germany from 1970 onwards is one such setting. 
The type of terrorist activity, the nature of the active groups, the extent of their 
activities and their demonstrated awareness of the media attention have made a 
number of these groups, and the period in general, a point of reference within the 
literature.  
The first contribution of the thesis is the attempt presented in Chapter 2 to organise 
a statistical overview of terrorist activity in West-Germany (and Europe) during the 
period from 1970 to 1990 and fold this contextual narrative into the more detailed 
profiles of several prominent groups with particular emphasis on their interactions 
with each other and their more or less sophisticated strategies governing their 
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interactions with the media. Drawing on data from the GTD to provide the starting 
point for the statistical overview, a picture of a very active terrorism context begins 
to emerge that is, from a modern perspective, surprising in its scale and diversity. It 
is too easy to forget the tumultuousness of the past. In the midst of this 
tumultuousness and contributing to it, at least several groups rose to prominence 
and have retained their place as archetypal architects of left-wing political violence. 
Drawing on the extensive literature that has been devoted to these groups and their 
actions, a series of profiles were presented in Chapter 2 that pointed to the reasons 
for this prominence and, by highlighting the very scope of the literature devoted to 
them, provided an indication of the richness of the historical and the contextual 
material on which we may draw in trying to advance our understanding of the 
decisions that terrorist groups make and the ways in which the media attention 
accorded to their actions may shape those decisions.  
The second contribution of the thesis is its survey of the global terrorism studies 
literature. There is a ‘literature of literature surveys’ within terrorism studies and this 
highlights the volume and the multidisciplinary nature of the field. Providing a 
complete survey of the whole field (and even some sub-fields) is no longer possible 
but providing a literature survey of some sort is, of course, necessary in order to 
identify the place occupied within terrorism studies by this thesis. Rather than simply 
cover a sample of papers and books from each area, the approach taken in this thesis 
was designed to create a clearer picture of how the studies of terrorism program has 
developed and evolved over the past four decades from its origins through to its most 
recent criminological turn. In working towards this goal, it was decided to structure 
the literature survey around the ‘most read’ and the ‘most cited’ papers published in 
two of the major multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary academic journals (Terrorism 
and Political Violence 1989 (Vol 1/Issue 1) to 2015 (Vol 27/Issue 4) and Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 1977 (Vol 1/Issue 1) to 2015 (Vol 38/Issue 10). This allowed 
the development of a structured literature survey based on major themes, driven on 
the one side by publishers and editors and authors and on the other by readers. The 
preparation of the literature survey traversed more than 640 research articles and 
books. 
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The third contribution of the thesis derived from the intensive periods of archival 
research necessary to obtain the material that would form the basis for our 
measurements of ‘media attention’. Although the media and terrorism literature 
does contain some quantitative analysis, it is primarily driven by word searches; for 
example, the number of times an event or a group or even just the word ‘terrorism’ 
is mentioned in some period of time. For this thesis, the objective of the archival 
research was to identify the actual amount of media attention measured in page 
space or column inches accorded to each terrorist attack perpetrated in West-
Germany between 1970 and 1980. The limits imposed on a project undertaken by a 
single researcher prevented every news outlet from being covered. Guided by the 
approaches taken in similar types of studies by researchers in other comparable 
fields, three prominent newspaper publications were selected as targets for the 
archival research. The rationale for this selection was provided in Chapter 5 and 
references the geographic coverage and readership characterising the chosen 
publications as well as the nature of newspaper readership in the Federal Republic 
of Germany during the period under consideration.  
The ambitious objective of identifying and collecting all of the press accorded by 
these selected publications to each act of terrorism perpetrated in West-Germany 
during the tumultuous 1970s required two international trips (from Australia) and a 
total of several months in Berlin accessing the archives. Each terrorist incident was 
identified from the GTD and then the records of each publication were accessed in 
order to collect the media attention accorded to each incident. This required visual 
scanning and detailed reading of over 15,000 pages of newspaper text in the German 
language, stored on microfilm. Of course, there is no index for a newspaper issue and 
one must search manually for any mention of each terrorist event. This must be 
carried out not just for the day after the terrorist event, when reporting may be 
expected, but for many days following the terrorist event. Sometimes, this involves 
searching each newspaper issue published on each day for a period of many weeks 
following an incident. Once each newspaper article was found, it still needed to be 
selected and prepared for transfer from microfilm to flash-drive. Eventually, this 
process resulted in the data-storage of around 1,475 pages of newspaper text. 
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Most newspaper pages, of course, contain several stories, and material belonging to 
one and the same story is often located in more than one place on a single page and 
across pages. As such, it was necessary to measure manually the amount of page 
space or column inches occupied by each relevant section and article. From the 
almost 1,500 newspaper pages collected and stored, it was eventually determined 
that 51,586.61 column inches (c”) were devoted to acts of terrorism across the 10 
year period by the three newspapers. This total amount of media attention accorded 
to terrorist incidents was divided amongst hostage-taking (57.4%), assassination 
(27.1%), bombing/explosion (7.3%), armed-assault (3.5%), hijacking (2.6%), 
facility/infrastructure attack (2.2%), and unarmed assault (0.03%). Interestingly, the 
relative share accorded by Bild to each of the seven attack method categories follows 
the aggregate order exactly. Apart from a small variation, the same is true of the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt. In addition, no evidence was found for a 
significant difference between the space accorded to the reporting of terrorism 
incidents in tabloid, ‘serious’ and ‘medium quality’ newspapers. Each of the three 
newspapers contributed about equally to the aggregate coverage of terrorism: Bild 
(35%), Die Welt (33%) and the Süddeutsche Zeitung (32%). Because the analysis is 
based on relative amounts of attention accorded to different types of terrorist 
activity, rather than absolute amounts, the result provides a degree of reassurance 
that the proportions of media attention accorded to terrorist incidents are similar 
across different publications and that the three selected publications reflect the 
tendencies that would be observed by the broader media market.  
Even without the decision theory that is applied as an interpretative framework for 
the choices characterising this setting, there is much to be learned from the picture 
that emerges from the collected data. Exploring all of these elements must be left for 
future research but a number of them were picked up in Chapter 6. Media attention 
varies substantially across different attack method categories, yet terrorist groups do 
not limit their actions to those attack types which are more likely to attract a high 
volume of media attention. Media attention also varies significantly between 
terrorist incidents involving the same type of action. Media attention can be missed 
through the inopportune timing of a terrorist attack; for example, just prior to a day 
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on which no newspaper is issued or when unforeseen or competing events attract 
editorial focus, relegating terrorist attacks to the margins. While the total volume of 
newspaper space that each of the three newspapers devoted to the coverage of 
terrorist attacks is very similar, finer differences are evident; for example, many 
column inches in Bild can be taken up by super-sized headlines and numerous 
photographs, while in the Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt comparatively more 
space is devoted to reports and discussions of a more substantial length. Articles in 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung are generally printed in smaller text font sizes with 
modestly-sized headlines, thereby reaching a higher word-count as well as more 
depth and breadth of coverage per area of space relative to Bild. 
Perhaps, however, the most important facet to emerge from the collected data, even 
before the complementary models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty are 
applied, is the picture of the context that it reveals. The data is not just a series of 
column inches. Constituting the column inches are stories of real attacks, pictures of 
real victims, real terrorist groups and real responses by governments and law 
enforcement. These events unfolded, not in isolation, but encompassed within the 
day to day news and the events of ordinary and not-so-ordinary life. They were part 
of the context, but do not represent the whole context. The media attention 
accorded to even the most ‘successful’ terrorist actions occupied only part of the 
newspaper space available on any given day. The juxtaposition of terrorist actions 
against the most mundane of advertisements is stark and so is its juxtaposition 
against issues and problems that had perhaps an even more direct impact on the 
lives of ordinary people. Sometimes terrorism was but a small ripple; sometimes it 
was a wave that substantially upset the daily rhythm. 
The overarching objective of the thesis is to contribute to the development of our 
understanding of terrorist choice in circumstances where the media might shape 
those choices. It is not the objective of the thesis, of course, to prove that media 
attention shapes terrorist choice in particular ways. Rather, the premise that media 
attention shapes terrorist choice is the starting point for the thesis. Attention 
accorded to terrorism by the media is strongly suspected, if not generally accepted, 
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to be a desire, a motivation, an operational objective of terrorist groups because it 
plays a key role in identifying the terrorist group as being responsible for certain 
actions and this has flow-on effects in terms of propaganda, communication and, 
perhaps, recruitment and public support.  
The fourth contribution of the thesis derives from the application of decision theory 
to the analysis and interpretation of terrorists’ choice of action when the media 
attention expected to be accorded to those actions is a desired but risky and 
uncertain outcome. In the first instance, in Chapter 4 and parts of Chapter 6, this 
application proceeds purely analytically, without reference to any specific context. 
The insights that are generally capable of being derived from these decision-making 
frameworks emerge during this phase of the application and are then emphasised by 
examples crafted from the data gathered for the thesis. Existing studies imply that 
terrorist group strategies pertaining to media attention accorded to their actions are 
guided by the absolute amount of media attention that is expected. A further 
implication evident in some studies is that terrorist groups can ‘manufacture’ media 
attention or somehow guarantee that attention will be accorded to their actions. This 
is not the case and, as a foundation for understanding terrorist choice and how it 
might be shaped by a desire for media attention, is both incomplete and open to 
logical problems.  
It is well known that expected value cannot form the foundation for a logically 
consistent theory of decision-making under risk and uncertainty. At the very least it 
is susceptible to the St Petersburg Paradox. Rather, as von Neumann and 
Morgenstern showed, it is the expected value of a utility function that is required for 
a basic theory of risky decision-making that avoids the St Petersburg Paradox and 
other related shortcomings. As soon as we cast terrorist actions such as bombing, 
armed assault and assassination as risky prospects, it becomes clear that the 
expected value model is insufficient as an interpretative framework. The basic 
expected utility model provides a simple but more advanced theoretical framework 
with which to interpret terrorist choice when media attention is the desired 
outcome. Because of the risk and uncertainty and the decision-maker’s risk 
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preferences, it is not necessarily the case that the terrorist group will choose the 
action with the highest expected amount of media attention. The expected amount 
of media attention, the degree of uncertainty surrounding it and the decision-
maker’s risk preferences all shape the decision as to which action the terrorist group 
will choose to perpetrate.  
Overemphasising the absolute amount of media attention expected to be accorded 
to an action as the only consideration of the terrorist group also restricts the analysis 
by ignoring combinations of actions over time. Terrorist groups are observed to 
combine actions rather than always choosing one single type of attack method. This 
behaviour can be encompassed into a framework of decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty by the Markowitz mean-variance technique. This approach depicts the 
terrorist group as choosing on the basis of reward and risk, thereby improving upon 
extant analysis, with risk aversion a primary behavioural characteristic. If a decision-
maker must bear more risk, more reward must be forthcoming as compensation. This 
approach most clearly highlights the positive relationship between risk and reward.  
Although not completely orthodox, both mean-variance analysis and expected utility 
are somewhat interconnected. The advances that were made in our understanding 
of decision-making under risk and uncertainty during the period from 1960 onwards 
culminated in the development of behavioural economics and its most well-known 
theoretical model, prospect theory. To incorporate these advances into the analysis 
of terrorist decision-making, cumulative prospect theory was applied, in this thesis, 
to the study of media and terrorism. The structure of prospect theory includes a 
number of behavioural characteristics that are omitted from the other models. Some 
of these allow us to highlight, interpret and analyse behaviour that has been 
observed to characterise terrorist groups. The more technical features of prospect 
theory, such as non-linear probability weighting, may form the foundation for a more 
accurate preference ordering. However, it is concepts such as loss aversion and 
reference point dependence that generate the most penetrating new insights. 
Reference point dependence may encompass such behaviour as emulating, but not 
copying, the actions of other groups and together with loss aversion allows us to 
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explain why terrorist groups may be compelled towards taking more risky actions 
when their reference point is higher or when losses are ubiquitous (or almost so).  
When these complementary models of decision-making are applied to the archival 
data and the picture of the media and terrorism context in West-Germany, their 
value as an interpretative and analytical framework becomes very clear. Of course, 
the insights generated purely analytically are borne out. It is not always the case that 
terrorist groups choose the action with the highest expected amount of media 
attention. It is not always the case that terrorist groups choose one single action. 
Both expected utility theory and the mean-variance analysis encompass these 
observations and allow us to interpret the choices that terrorist groups made with 
more sophisticated and nuanced conclusions. This, of course, does not hinge on the 
direct alignment of the preference orderings that emerge from these models and the 
actual choices of terrorist groups. Even though the preference orderings are more 
accurate than the existing (expected value) model, it is not solely the preference 
orderings and the optimal action or combination of actions that is at issue. The 
models predict or lead us to expect or allow us to better interpret and understand 
not simply the choice of a single action but why that action may not be the one with 
the highest expected amount of media attention and, it must be emphasised, why 
that action might not be chosen stand-alone but as part of a combination of actions.  
Likewise, cumulative prospect theory allows us to compute a preference ordering of 
actions for each reference point. Again, this represents a step forward in the 
prediction of what a terrorist group might choose but this is not the sole purpose or 
the sole factor determining the value of this approach. Reference points formalise 
the observation that rivalry, competition and benchmarking are inherent features of 
terrorist group behaviour. Terrorist groups with different reference points will 
behave in different ways; understanding the impact of a reference point on risky 
decision-making allows us to better understand this behaviour. Because of loss 
aversion, as explained previously, terrorist groups with higher reference points must 
be compelled to engage in more risky actions because only those actions will offer 
the prospect of avoiding an outcome below the reference point. When rival groups 
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are particularly successful, therefore, we should generally expect more risk-taking 
from their counterparts. At the extremes, terrorist groups will be compelled to 
choose the most risky action in order to avoid a loss. This emerges quite clearly in the 
West-German context.  
7.3 The Generalisability of the Analysis 
The context, the time and place must not be allowed to distract from the generality 
of the conclusions that can be reached from the analysis. In any time and place and 
for any type of outcome, it is a mistake to conclude that terrorists will choose those 
actions that have the highest expected value. The alternatives explored in this thesis 
help to avoid the shortcomings that emerge from the emphasis that has been placed 
on the magnitude of media attention accorded to different actions. In the process of 
developing and working through these alternatives, a number of general conclusions 
are reached. The action with the highest expected amount of media attention will 
not necessarily be chosen. There is a positive relationship between the amount of 
media attention expected and the variability of attention across attacks. Terrorist 
groups will be observed to diversify or combine actions across time or within periods. 
This behaviour potentially enhances the amount of media attention received at each 
level of risk because the outcomes of different actions are imperfectly correlated. 
Reference points may emerge for several reasons and when they do they shape 
choice. Specifically, when reference points are higher, riskier actions may be 
necessary in order to avoid losses. These statements hold their validity in any media 
context where the media attention accorded to a terrorist action is uncertain. This is 
the case regardless of the nature of the media attention that the terrorist desires.   
7.4 The Contemporary Interest in Left-Wing Extremism 
In certain periods of time, certain types of terrorism dominate others and whichever 
type of terrorism is dominating, contemporary considerations obscure the other 
types and the other periods. However, types of terrorism come and go and most 
never completely fade away. Many of the most prominent groups that were active 
in West-Germany from 1970 onwards were leftist or nationalist and this type of 
terrorism may be overlooked in periods where, for example, religious extremism 
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appears to present the major challenge to governments and law enforcement. 
Terrorism studies must continue to encompass in its frameworks all varieties of 
terrorism. One type or the other can always experience a resurgence. In terrorism 
studies, leftist terrorism has continued to attract dedicated research (Brockhoff, 
Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2016, pre-print) and within more general analysis many of the 
groups that have been mentioned in this thesis are referenced as the archetypal 
examples.87  The thesis represents a contribution that is relevant to the broader 
research programs of terrorism studies. Also, finally, it should be noted that the 
insights that have been generated and the interpretative and analytical frameworks 
that have been developed are generalisable not only across periods of time but 
across different types of groups whenever those groups desire media attention and 
their terrorist actions are risky prospects that result in some uncertain amount of 
coverage in the media. 
7.5 The Limitations of the Study 
As with any investigation there are some limitations to the study presented in this 
thesis. Some of these are more important than others and some are more 
appropriately called perceived limitations which, upon further reflection, are not 
major obstacles to the acceptance of the main threads of the argument. First, it may 
be suggested that more newspapers be used in order to develop some fuller picture 
of the media attention accorded to terrorist actions. Also, the newspapers may be 
supplemented by news magazines such as Der Spiegel and Stern. In Chapter 5 a 
thorough rationale for the choices that were made was provided. The news 
magazines are weekly or monthly publications and this adds more complexity to the 
data collection and analysis in the sense that it is not commensurable with the daily 
newspaper cycle. The three newspapers that formed the basis for the examples and 
applications presented in Chapter 6 were chosen by following a similar methodology 
or approach to that used in media studies; that is, selecting representatives from 
                                                     
87 Several contemporary studies focus on leftist-terrorism and use groups covered in this thesis as 
archetypal examples (Brockhoff et al., 2016; Hanshew, 2016; Kaplan, 2016; Karcher, 2016; Morris, 
2016; Skoll, 2016; Pfahl-Traughbar, 2014; Abrahms, 2008; Kentsch, 2008; Geipel, 2007; Cronin, 2006; 
Siqueira & Sandler, 2006; Nacos, 2005). 
  244 
 
readership tiers. The picture of the terrorism context that can be constructed by 
using the archival material that was gathered in combination with the statistics 
provided by the GTD is a rich one. This is evident from the beginning of Chapter 6. On 
a more technical note, the study is focused on relative proportions of media attention 
accorded to different actions, not absolute amounts. Coverage of terrorist action in 
each of the three newspapers that were selected is characterised by similar 
proportions. It is likely that inclusion of additional newspapers would simply scale up 
the absolute amount of media attention (c”) without influencing the relative 
proportions accorded to different actions and, therefore, the outcomes of the 
analysis. This is especially likely to be the case if the additional newspapers are 
national in scope such that minor events with special interest for a small local 
readership do not enter into consideration.  
From a contemporary perspective, a newspaper study may seem quaint. As explained 
above, however, the results of this analysis are generalisable beyond the medium. It 
might be asked, though, whether the study could be enhanced by including television 
coverage accorded to terrorist actions. This would make an interesting task for future 
research. Restraints on time and access, among other things, restricted the study to 
the single medium. A strong rationale was provided in Chapter 5 to justify the focus 
on print media. As explained in Chapter 5, the print media remained a dominant 
source for people’s daily news in West-Germany during the 1970s. According to a 
report by Der Bundesminister des Inneren in 1982 (cited in Schoenbach, 1987, p. 376), 
newspaper circulation in West-Germany grew by 41 percent from 17 million in 1965 
to 24 million in 1979. On an average workday, newspapers (76%) were reaching 
about as many members of the West-German adult population as did television 
(77%), with radio audiences being somewhat smaller (69%) as reported by Media 
Perspektiven 1985 (cited in Schoenbach, 1987, p. 385). While the rise of television 
has been accompanied by a fall in newspaper readership in many countries around 
the world, the effect has been far less prominent in Germany. A high newspaper 
readership of 85 percent on an average workday in Germany in the mid-1970s 
declined by just 5 percent over 20 years to 1997 (Atanassoff, 1997; cited in 
Schoenbach et al., 1999, p. 226). 
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The study focused its attention on the experience of West-Germany with terrorism 
during the 1970s. A rationale for this has been provided and the resource constraints 
that prevented further data collection have been noted. The inclusion of a longer 
dataset would supplement the study. Including the 1980s and 1990s up to the period 
when the RAF finally dissolved, in 1998, may encompass and reflect broader patterns 
in the media attention accorded to terrorist activity. At the very least, the structure 
of the opportunities would be identified. The West-German context served as the 
basis for examples and applications in this thesis. It has already been explained that 
many of the most important aspects of our interpretation and explanation for 
terrorist choice, when media attention is desired but uncertain, are generalisable. 
Although the structure of opportunities and choices evolved during the 1970s, and 
undoubtedly evolved beyond 1980, the decision-making models that facilitate the 
interpretation of the media and terrorism context could be applied in exactly the 
same manner to other time periods as has been shown throughout this thesis.  
7.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
The task of preparing the thesis began with a fairly well-defined objective which 
became refined during the course of the project’s development.88 This came to be 
encapsulated in the overarching objective of the thesis provided in Chapter 1. This 
overarching objective guided the study along the path towards its timely completion. 
During the course of the investigation, especially following the two separate periods 
of archival research, data collection, data organisation and measurement, a number 
of interesting avenues for research opened up. Some of these have been 
incorporated within the thesis. Others had to be left for future research. A selection 
of the most important of these directions for future research is provided in this 
section.  
The material gathered from the archives is much richer than that used in other 
studies relating to media and terrorism. As such, a more detailed picture emerges 
from it. While the thesis presented this overall picture and explored some of the most 
                                                     
88 The project was commenced in 2010 and completed towards the end of 2016.  
  246 
 
prominent active terrorist groups of the period, it is possible to explore the choices 
of individual terrorist groups in more detail. Because these groups retain a place of 
prominence in terrorism studies, such an investigation would represent a worthwhile 
contribution to the literature. Such an investigation would proceed by identifying all 
of the actions of each individual group. This was done for this thesis but with a 
different objective in mind; that is, to ascertain the amount of media attention 
accorded to different types of actions. The media attention accorded to each action 
of each particular group was not explored in detail. Using the material gathered from 
the archives it would be possible and useful to determine media attention accorded 
to the actions and combinations of actions chosen by each individual terrorist group. 
This would provide a more fine-grained picture of the settings in which terrorist 
groups decisions are made and the outcomes achieved.  
A more technical consideration that would be interesting to consider, though 
perhaps not completely generalisable, is the fitting of the prospect theory 
parameters to the terrorist groups’ decisions within the West-German context. This 
would contribute something towards a more detailed description of the decision-
making processes of specific groups. It will be recalled that the application of 
prospect theory requires values for several parameters, including loss aversion. The 
values for these have been estimated in laboratory settings by many researchers, 
including Tversky and Kahneman. The parameter values for this study were taken 
from this literature. It would be possible to overlay the choices of individual groups 
with the prospect theory framework and attempt to determine values for loss 
aversion and the curvature parameters for the value function and probability 
weighting functions that are consistent with the observed choices. Because 
applications of prospect theory in empirical settings are still rare within the 
economics literature, such an exercise may have implications for both terrorism 
studies and microeconomics.  
One aspect of the media attention data that was recognised even before the archival 
research was undertaken was the possibility of decay. During the collection phase, 
this was noted as a more and more interesting phenomenon. The archival research 
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involved starting with the newspaper edition published the day following an event 
and proceeding until the attention was interrupted. This was explained in Chapter 5. 
This part of the process, therefore, generated an interesting picture of how media 
attention accorded to events declines over time. The decay for a selection of specific 
events was reported as part of Table 6.2. A more detailed investigation of decay 
represents a promising task for future research. Not only would this research focus 
on identifying the general patterns, if there are any, in the decay of the media 
attention following an event but it may also focus on the application of the decision-
making models to such choice objectives as, for example, the maximisation of 
attention span or, conversely, the minimisation of the rate of decay. Rather than 
aiming to maximise the volume of expected media coverage with a few high impact 
attacks, some groups may aim at perpetrating a long string of lower impact attacks 
with smaller but more sustained expected media attention. 
7.7 Closing Remarks  
Through a combination of archival research, theoretical argument, application and 
analysis the overarching objective of this thesis has been addressed. There are 
weaknesses inherent in both the decision-making models that are implicit in the 
existing literature that deals with terrorism and the media and the data that is used 
as the foundation for existing arguments and analysis. This thesis has taken some 
steps towards overcoming these limitations. A complementary framework of 
decision-making under conditions of risk and uncertainty was developed using three 
prominent models: expected utility, mean-variance analysis and cumulative prospect 
theory. The application of this framework to a context in which terrorist groups 
desire media attention and seek to obtain it by perpetrating acts of terrorism was 
worked through both purely analytically and empirically in the context of West-
German terrorism during the period from 1970. The outcomes of this thesis are 
multifaceted but, in general terms, the thesis represents a new lens through which 
to interpret terrorist decision-making in this context and identify broad patterns of 
behaviour. In a dynamic, evolving and seemingly complex setting, the analysis 
presented in this thesis represents a valuable and practicable contribution to the 
literature that can be further augmented by future research.  
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